Secret negotiations of NapoleonIIIwith AlexanderIIabout the world. In mid-October 1855, Alexander II first received news that Napoleon II would like to begin “direct” relations with him. In other words, the Emperor of the French, on the one hand, made it clear that he was not at all constrained by the alliance with England, and on the other, that he, too (like Alexander) was not very happy with the Vienna conferences.
Very soon after Sweden refused to join the coalition, Napoleon III came to the conclusion that he had no need to fight further, and there was little chance of success. The British would like to continue the war. "The world is threatening us" - Palmerston wrote frankly to his brother. British diplomacy was not averse to, firstly, seizing the entire Crimea to Perekop and “returning” it to Turkey, then landing in the Caucasus, taking away Georgia, taking away the entire south-eastern Caucasus, creating “Circassia” for Shamil, and turning Shamil himself into a Turkish-protected and England as a vassal, designed to block the road to Russian advance into Persia. But Napoleon III did not at all want such a strengthening of England; on the contrary, in Russia he already seemed to begin to see a useful counterbalance to the British in some cases. Shedding French blood in the Caucasus in order to protect India from the Russian invasion seemed completely unnecessary to Napoleon III. And he gave permission to Count Morny to establish “private” relations with Russia. One fine day, the head of the large banking house Sipa came to Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, and told him that he had received from his Parisian friend and also a banker, Erlanger, a letter in which Erlanger reported on an interesting conversation he had with Earl of Morny. The Count finds that it is time for the French and Russians to stop the useless slaughter. Gorchakov immediately notified the Tsar about this and, without even waiting for an answer, told the banker Sipa that he could write the following on his behalf to his friend Erlanger in Paris. He, Gorchakov, believes that not only peace, but also direct rapprochement between France and Russia after the conclusion of peace can be extremely useful for these powers. But peace conditions should not affect Russia's sense of national dignity. Morni realized that this was a direct allusion to the demand threatening Russia for a mandatory limitation of the military fleet in the Black Sea. He answered Gorchakov with a gentle refusal: one cannot demand from Napoleon III and from England, after all the sacrifices they suffered at Sevastopol, that they renounce this demand. This first mutual sounding was followed by official, albeit secret, negotiations in Paris itself. But here the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode committed a tactlessness from the very beginning, which greatly damaged the matter. He informed the Viennese court about the beginning of relations between Russia and Paris. Why he did this is difficult to understand. Apparently, Nesselrode stubbornly flattered himself with the illusion that the solidarity of the powers of the Holy Alliance continued to exist, and believed that it was not good to conspire behind the back of “friendly” Austria. Of course, Franz Joseph and Count Buol were greatly alarmed when they learned about Napoleon III’s sudden change of heart and that he could come to an agreement with Alexander without the participation of Austria. Such a turn of events threatened Austria with dangerous isolation. Buol immediately informed Napoleon III of Austria's complete readiness to finally join the Western powers and present Russia with something like an ultimatum. Napoleon III was surprised and annoyed by the strange frankness of Russian diplomacy and interrupted the negotiations that had begun.
All this significantly worsened Russia's diplomatic position. From now on, it became even more difficult for Napoleon III than before to hinder the aggressive aspirations of England. Buol was in a hurry, and already in mid-December the Austrian proposals were presented to Nesselrode.
Austrian ultimatum to Russia. These proposals presented Russia with the following demands:
1) replacement of the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia with the protectorate of all great powers; 2) establishment of freedom of navigation at the mouths of the Danube; 3) preventing the passage of anyone’s squadrons through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus into the Black Sea, prohibiting Russia and Turkey from keeping a navy in the Black Sea and having arsenals and military fortifications on the shores of this sea; 4) Russia’s refusal to patronize the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects; 5) the concession by Russia in favor of Moldova of the section of Bessarabia adjacent to the Danube. These conditions were much more difficult and humiliating for Russia than the previous “four points”, to which neither Nicholas I nor Alexander II agreed in their time. The Austrian “proposals” were presented as an ultimatum, although without specifying an exact date. But it was categorically made clear that failure to accept the conditions would entail Austria declaring war on Russia.
A few days after presenting the Austrian note, Alexander II received a letter from Frederick William IV. The Prussian king wrote at the obvious instigation of Buol and Franz Joseph. The letter, written in amiable tones, contained a direct threat: the king invited the tsar to weigh “the consequences that may occur for the true interests of Russia and Prussia itself” if Alexander rejected the Austrian proposals. So, it was foreseen that not only Austria, but also Prussia would join France and England.
What was to be done?
On the evening of December 20, 1855, a meeting convened by him took place in the tsar’s office. Nine people were present: Alexander II, Grand Duke Konstantin, Nesselrode, Vasily Dolgorukov, P. D. Kiselev, M. S. Vorontsov, Alexei Orlov, Bludov and Meyendorff.
The debate was not very long. Everyone, except Bludov, spoke out for the decisive need to conclude peace as quickly as possible. The king did not clearly express his opinion. We settled on agreeing to the conditions presented, except for the concession of Bessarabia. They also did not agree to accept the vague, but fraught with consequences, article of the Austrian note, which spoke of the right of the allies to present Russia, in addition to the “four points,” with “special conditions” if the “interest of Europe” requires it. On January 10, Buol received a Russian response in Vienna, and since it was he who included the clause on Bessarabia, this time he resorted to a formal ultimatum: he stated that if after six days (after January 10) Russia does not accept all the requests her conditions, the Austrian Emperor will break off diplomatic relations with her. Alexander II convened a secondary meeting on January 15. At this meeting, Nesselrode read a note in which this time he placed all his hopes on the location of Napoleon III; He gave up on Austria, finally realizing, much belatedly, that she was no less an enemy of Russia than England. The assembly unanimously decided to accept the ultimatum as preconditions for peace.
France's position at the Paris Congress. Alexander II sent Count Orlov to Paris for the peace congress, giving him Baron Brunnov, the former Russian ambassador in London, as his assistant. From the first to the last moment of his stay in Paris, Orlov based all his diplomatic activities on the rapprochement with the French emperor and on the support that Napoleon III began to provide to the Russian plenipotentiary from the very beginning of the negotiations.
The Paris Congress began on February 25 and ended with the signing of a peace treaty on March 30, 1856. Count Walewski, French Foreign Minister, son of Napoleon I from Countess Walewska, presided. Already from the first meetings of the congress, it became clear to all its participants that Walewski would support the British only formally. And soon in diplomatic circles they learned about the intimate conversations that Emperor Napoleon III had with Count Orlov immediately after Orlov’s arrival in Paris.
This count was one of the most gifted diplomatic people who were at the court of Nicholas, and then Alexandra P. Orlov loved diplomacy. At one time, without hesitation, for reasons of career, after the death of Benckendorff, he accepted the position of chief of gendarmes. But he was not personally involved in espionage matters. Out of disgust and laziness, he left everything to Dubelt. He had a brother, Vladimir, who was close to the Decembrists, and Orlov did not disown him, but supported him in difficult times. He also ordered to remove supervision from Herzen and issue him a foreign passport, at the request of O. A. Zherebtsova, whose granddaughter Orlov was married to.
Arriving in Paris, Orlov was able, from the very first conversation, to agree with Napoleon III that a close rapprochement between Russia and France, between which there were essentially no fundamental contradictions, was now possible. Orlov's interlocutor was inclined to fully meet him halfway. Napoleon III achieved everything he wanted: Turkey was saved from Russian conquest; the arms of France are covered with new glory; “revenge” was taken for 1812; the French emperor strengthened his throne within the country and took first place in Europe. Napoleon III did not require anything more from Russia.
England's position at the Congress. But this was not the case with England. Even before the opening of the congress, Palmerston, to his great chagrin, was convinced, firstly, that Napoleon III did not intend to continue the war and, secondly, that at the congress he would behave evasively and ambiguously in relation to its ally - England. Palmerston realized this when, in January and February 1856, there was a debate about whether to admit Prussia to the congress or not. Alexander II desired her presence because he counted on her friendly support. But that is precisely why Palmerston refused to admit the Prussian representatives. He motivated this by the fact that Prussia did not take any part in the war and did not even want to act the way Austria did. On this very sensitive issue, Napoleon III supported Palmerston extremely sluggishly. Prussia, however, was not allowed in, but Palmerston realized before the start of the meetings that a difficult game lay ahead in Paris. His worst fears were realized.
Napoleon III did not compromise his “friendship” with the “allies” with a single word in front of Orlov and did not say anything that Orlov could later, with reference to him, use in front of the British. But Orlov did not need this at all: what was important to him was not what Napoleon said, but how he listened to the Russian commissioner, why he did not interrupt him, at what moments he was silent, and when he smiled. In essence, in two or three afternoon conversations in the imperial office, face to face with Napoleon III, over a cup of coffee, Orlov completed all the work, and the solemn sessions of the plenum of the congress did not change anything significant and could not change anything. Orlov’s strength lay precisely in what Palmerston with irritation saw as his weakness: Orlov knew that England would not continue the war alone. Consequently, on all those points on which there is a unity of views between England and Napoleon III, Russia has to concede; but on all issues on which there is a difference between them, the Russian representatives must persist and refuse their signature, and the British will do absolutely nothing with them. Orlov chose his assistant very successfully: he was Baron Brunnov, who had long served as the Russian ambassador in London. The roles were distributed as follows: where decisive work of diplomatic thought was required, Orlov spoke; where it was necessary to patiently listen and challenge the enemy, step by step defending the interests of Russia, the main role fell to the lot of Brunnov, a very intelligent, albeit overly self-confident, but experienced, hardworking dignitary, gray in diplomatic affairs. Everything fundamentally important that Orlov achieved in secret conversations with Emperor Napoleon III was transferred by Orlov to Baron Brunnov, and he, already on solid ground, knew how to talk to the British at the ceremonial meetings of the Congress.
For example, Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley, English representatives, demand the demolition of Russian fortifications along the Black Sea coast. Orlov flatly refuses. The British are threatening. Orlov refuses again. The Austrian delegate Buol wholeheartedly joins the British. Orlov refuses for the third time. Chairman Count Walewski says he supports the British and Austrians. But not only Valevsky knew what Napoleon III’s position was on this issue - Orlov also knew this. Therefore, Orlov again refuses, and Valevsky helplessly throws up his hands. In the end, Orlov wins. Next, the question arises about neutralizing the Black Sea. Here Orlov, knowing Napoleon’s opinion, concedes; but when the British raise the question of neutralizing the Sea of Azov as well, Orlov refuses. The same comedy with Valevsky is repeated, and again Orlov wins. The question of Moldavia and Wallachia is raised. The Russians have already left there, but Orlov does not want these provinces to remain occupied by Austria. Both Russian interests and the reluctance for Austria to receive such a reward for its behavior during the Crimean War - all this forced Alexander II and Orlov to resist the demand of the Austrian commissioner Buol. Orlov, knowing that Napoleon III did not want to give Moldavia and Wallachia to Austria, opposed Buol’s demand at the congress. If Russia had to cede Bessarabia, then Austria had to say goodbye forever to the dream of a bloodless acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. To his greatest fury, exactly three days before the end of the congress, Buol became convinced that Orlov and Brunnov had achieved their goal. Buol deliberately delayed the question of the Danube principalities; he hoped somehow, in passing, already during his departure, to wrest from the Congress the desired permission - to leave unchanged the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian troops. And suddenly, on March 27, the chairman of the congress, Walevsky, in a cold, strictly official tone, suggested that Buol inform the congress: when exactly will the Austrians liberate Moldova and Wallachia from their troops? There was nothing to do. Austria left the congress without receiving payment from the allies for its ultimatum to Russia on December 2, 1855. Orlov understood better than Buol what the true meaning of the participation of the Minister of the Sardinian Kingdom Cavour at the congress was.
Conditions of peace. The return of Kars, taken by the Russians at the end of 1855, the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of Bessarabia - these were the main losses of Russia. Orlov agreed to the abolition of the exclusive Russian protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia and Serbia without objection. Contemporaries attributed the relatively tolerable peace conditions not only to the turn in the policy of Napoleon III, who did not want to further weaken Russia and thus help England, but also to the strong impression that the heroic defense of Sevastopol, which lasted almost a year, made on the whole world. This was also reflected in the fact that the most powerful monarch in Europe at that time, Napoleon III, immediately after signing the Peace of Paris on March 30, 1856, began to seek an alliance with Russia.
1. The most famous congresses
Paris Congress
Congress of Vienna
Congress structure
Congress procedure
The most famous congresses
Paris Congress
Paris Congress - multilateral international negotiations with the aim of completing the Crimean War, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Paris; opened on February 13 (25), 1856 in the capital. It was attended by authorized representatives of France, England, Austria, Sardinia, the Ottoman Empire, as well as Prussia. The meetings were chaired by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, cousin of Napoleon III, Count A. Walewski. Russia was represented by the first commissioner, Count A.F. Orlov, and the second, F.I. Brunnov, who served for a long time as the Russian ambassador in London. England was represented by Lord Clarendon (George Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon) and Cowley (Henry Wellesley, 1st Earl Cowley). Austria - Buolem, Sardinian Kingdom - Cavour.
The decision of the Russian Emperor Alexander II to enter into peace negotiations was made at a meeting in the Winter Palace on January 3 (15), 1856, at which the ultimatum presented to the Russian Federation by the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph was discussed for the second time (only Count D. spoke out against the adoption of the Austrian ultimatum. N. Bludov); By that time, Napoleon III, behind the back of his allied England, was already conducting secret negotiations with St. Petersburg on the possibility of concluding peace, to which he himself was inclined, not seeing any interest in continuing the war.
England and Austria took the most irreconcilable position towards Russia in Paris; their line was subsequently softened under the influence of Napoleon III. England, which initially did not want such a quick peace at all, now openly sought to weaken the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin, to undermine its positions in the Caucasus, and insisted on the demilitarization of the Åland Islands. With the support of the Austrians, the British even demanded the complete demolition of Russian fortifications along the Black Sea coast, however, thanks to the support of Napoleon III, Orlov won in this matter. Austria demanded the separation of all of Bessarabia from the Russian Federation and counted on adding the Danube principalities to its possessions. The former allies, however, did not support the Danube Empire in any way, and the Austrians left the congress without receiving any payment for their ultimatum of December 2, 1855.
Congress of Vienna
In January 1813, the Russian army entered Prussian territory. The demoralized remnants of the French troops retreated to the west. In January - February, East Prussia and Poland were cleared of the French. Under the influence of the successes of the Russian troops, the commander of the Prussian corps of the former Great Army, General York, turned his arms against the French, and after this the Prussian king entered into an alliance with the Russian Federation against Napoleon. In March - April 1813, the allied Russian-Prussian army liberated almost all of Prussia from the French and entered Saxony, occupying the Saxon capital Dresden. At the same time, a group of Russian troops under the command of Barclay de Tolly took the Thorn fortress, the most important French stronghold in Poland.
On April 16, 1813, a sad event occurred in the small Prussian town of Bunzlau. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, has died. Instead, the Allied forces were led by a not so talented commander, General Wittgenstein.
During these months, Napoleon came to his senses and with frantic energy set about creating a new army. In a short time, he managed to put almost the entire male population of France, including teenagers, under arms. Napoleonic army again became a formidable force. In addition, the actions of the allied armies were complicated by the constant interference of Tsar Alexander I and the Prussian king Frederick William III, who were in the troops. With them in the army are the court entourage, staff generals who have never led soldiers into battle, and all sorts of hangers-on.
On April 20, near Lutzen, the newly created 100,000-strong French army inflicted a serious defeat on the Allied forces. And after a bloody two-day battle near Bautzen, the allied army was forced to retreat. After this, a truce was concluded between the allies and Napoleon, which lasted two months. During this time, the 6th coalition against Napoleon was created. In addition to Russia and Prussia, it included Austria, England and. The commander-in-chief of the united army was the Austrian General Schwarzenberg, who had recently fought with Napoleon against the Russian Federation. All important posts in the Allied forces were occupied by Austrians and Prussians. At the end of the truce, in the first serious battle near Dresden on August 14-15, the allied armies were defeated and retreated from Saxony. The 6th coalition found itself in a difficult position. Napoleon began to push the allies from the west; at the same time, he sent a 37,000-strong column to the rear of the allied forces so that it would cut off their path to retreat. If such a plan was successful, the allied army had every chance of being defeated. However, the path of this column of French troops near the town of Kulm was blocked by a 19,000-strong Russian detachment led by generals Osterman-Tolstoy and Ermolov. Despite their numerical superiority, the French were unable to break through the barrier set up by the Russian generals - heroes of the War of 1812. During the counterattack, General Osterman's arm was torn off. The Russian soldiers did not flinch and held out until reinforcements led by Barclay de Tolly arrived. The French column was surrounded and defeated. After some time, the Union army went on the offensive on a wide front.
On October 4-7, one of the largest battles in world history took place near Leipzig, known throughout the world as the “battle of the nations”, since the armies of almost all European countries took part in it. About 500 thousand people took part in the Battle of Leipzig on both sides. At the very beginning of the battle, the brave commander of the 27th Infantry Division, the hero of Smolensk, General Neverovsky, was mortally wounded. For a long time it was unclear on whose side success was. But in the end the allies gained the upper hand. The French lost over 60 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, the Allies - 50 thousand soldiers. The Battle of Leipzig was decisive in the war. After him, everything was freed from French. Despite desperate resistance, Napoleon could not hold back the Allied advance - they were approaching France.
In January 1814, the armies of the 6th coalition, including the Russian, entered French territory. Here the war became even more fierce and bloody, as the French were now fighting for their land. But by this time the allies already had an overwhelming numerical superiority, and the reinforcements hastily collected by Napoleon could not withstand them for long.
The first major battle took place on January 17 near Brienne, 200 km southeast of Paris. Despite the fact that Napoleon was almost captured in the battle (he had to fight off the Cossacks with his sword), no one could confidently call himself a winner. But just three days later, the Austrians, Prussians, and the Russian corps under the command of Barclay inflicted a heavy defeat on selected French troops at La Rotière and forced them to retreat.
Napoleon still hoped to defeat the allied forces one by one in several battles. He fought with the desperate courage of a wounded lion. At times, the French he led into battle won isolated victories, but the allies moved uncontrollably towards Paris.
On March 18, the Allied troops entered Paris, a few days later Napoleon laid down his arms and abdicated the throne. The war, and with it the foreign campaign of the Russian army, ended with the complete defeat of Napoleonic France. After participating in the ceremonial parade in Paris, the Russian army returned to the Russian Federation.
On October 1, 1814, an international congress opened in Vienna, which was supposed to determine the structure of post-war Europe. Representatives of all European states, even the tiny German and Italian principalities, formally took part in it. But in reality, all decisions were made by the great powers: Russia, Austria, Prussia and England. The remaining participants in the Congress of Vienna mostly indulged in social entertainment, so contemporaries often called the congress “dancing.”
France, represented by the experienced and resourceful diplomat Talleyrand, who betrayed Napoleon and became the foreign minister of the new royal government, was able to influence the decisions of the great powers from the very beginning of the Congress of Vienna. She achieved this by exploiting the differences of former coalition members.
The recent allies pursued completely different goals at the Congress of Vienna. Emperor Alexander I of Russia sought to increase his possessions. To do this, he wanted to create a Polish kingdom within the Russian Empire, uniting all Polish lands, including those that belonged to Prussia. As compensation, Alexander offered to transfer the kingdom of Saxony to Prussia.
However, this plan did not suit Austria, England and France. Austria, which sought dominance in Germany, did not want Saxony to join Prussia, realizing that in this case Prussia would become a very dangerous rival. England, carrying out its traditional maneuvering, was afraid of the excessive strengthening of the Russian Federation. France, in the person of Talleyrand, opposed the aspirations of Alexander I, since they contradicted the principle of legitimism, and only this principle prevented the dismemberment of France: it remained within its pre-revolutionary borders.
Among other issues discussed in Vienna, the most important was the German problem. The people of Germany, inspired by the liberation struggle against Napoleon, hoped for countries. However, instead of a unified Germany, a vague German Union was created from four dozen independent small German principalities. The Austrian emperor was to preside over this alliance. By decision of the Congress of Vienna, Russia remained politically fragmented. European monarchs were panicky and did everything to prevent them. They sought to erase all the consequences of the French Revolution from the map of Europe.
In the spring of 1815 The congress had already begun to sum up the results, when suddenly its participants were shocked by unexpected news: Napoleon Bonaparte secretly fled from the island of Elba and landed in France on March 1. All the detachments sent by the French king, which were supposed to capture Napoleon, went over to his side. During the short reign of the Bourbons, the French people managed to hate them again. Virtually without firing a single shot, Napoleon entered Paris on March 20. King Louis XVIII and his entourage fled in horror. The Empire was restored. Came, known in history as “The Hundred Days,” since Napoleon this time managed to hold on to the French throne for only one hundred days: from March 20 to June 22, 1815.
The Congress of Vienna created a new system of international relations in Europe, based on the dominance of the four “great powers” (Russia, England, Austria, Prussia), which were joined by France in 1818 after the withdrawal of the Allied troops. At first, after the Congress of Vienna, the decisive role in this system was played by Russia, which had no equal in the international arena after Napoleonic military actions. England and Austria also had a significant influence on European politics. Prussia was just beginning to strengthen, and France was significantly weakened by the terms of the peace treaty, according to which the independence of France was recognized, but only “as far as it is compatible with the security of the allies and the general tranquility of Europe.” In reality, this meant the possibility of interference in the internal affairs of France by other great powers. Thus, allied troops were stationed in France until 1818.
However, the “Vienna System” turned out to be fragile. The common enemy disappeared, but acute disagreements between different countries remained. None of the powers was completely satisfied with the results of the Congress of Vienna: old contradictions were replaced by new ones.
England, which received a significant part of the French colonies, intensified its expansion around the world, which inevitably led it to conflicts with other powers. The interests of Austria, which had achieved dominance in Germany, came into conflict with the interests of Prussia. And all states were afraid that the Russian emperor would become the sole ruler of Europe.
To prevent a possible conflict, the great powers needed a common goal that would unite them. And such a goal was the fight against revolutions and the liberation movement in Europe.
The initiator of such a union was Alexander I. On September 14, 1815, he sent a declaration to the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, in which he called on them “in all cases and in every place” to defend absolute monarchical power and fight against revolutions and popular movements. This was beneficial to all the monarchs, who gladly supported the initiative of the Russian emperor and created the so-called Holy Alliance. Officially, it included the rulers of Russia, Austria and Prussia, who pledged to “give each other assistance, reinforcement and assistance” in the event of a threat to any of them. In fact, England also participated in the activities of the Holy Alliance. The creation of the Holy Alliance did not completely remove the contradictions between its members. They appeared as the political situation in Europe became more complicated.
The policy of the Russian Federation in Europe at this time was ambivalent, which is associated with the personality and political views of Emperor Alexander I. On the one hand, Russia was an active participant in the Holy Alliance and supported its measures to suppress liberation movements. On the other hand, there were elements of liberalism in the international policy of Alexander I. Thus, Alexander I introduced the Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian Federation after the Congress of Vienna. The policy of Alexander I was also uncertain in relation to the national liberation movement that flared up in Russia, which sought to overthrow Turkish oppression and become an independent state. From the point of view of the principles of the Holy Alliance, Russia should have supported the Turkish government. But the difficulty was that the Greeks were Orthodox and the Turks were Muslims, and the Greek struggle for independence enjoyed great popularity and support in Russian society. In addition, it was politically beneficial for Russia to support the Greeks, since the liberation of Orthodox Greece could strengthen Russian influence on the Balkan Peninsula.
Berlin Congress
On June 3, Prince Bismarck officially addressed invitations to the interested powers. The Congress met on June 13 in Berlin, and, as had been previously agreed, the German Chancellor was immediately elected its chairman. Together with him, Baron von Werther and Prince Gogunlohe represented the German Empire there. Other representatives were: from Austria-Hungary - Count Andrássy, Count Karolyi and Baron von Heimerle; from France - Waddington, Comte de Saint Vallier and Despres; from - Earl of Beaconsfield, Marquess of Salisbury and Lord Odo Russell; from Italy - Count Corti and Count de Launay; from the Russian Federation - Prince Gorchakov, Count Shuvalov and Baron Ubri; finally from Turkey - Kara-Teodoripasha, Sadulla Bey and Mehmed Ali Pasha.
As soon as this meeting of diplomats, most of whom were very distinguished figures, opened, England began its hostile attacks against the Russian Federation with particular harshness. Of all the issues that were to be discussed, the Bulgarian question seemed the most serious; at Bismarck’s suggestion, it was decided to put an end to it first.
On June 17, the British commissioners demanded the inclusion of Greek commissioners in the congress, who wanted to be allowed to discuss this issue. This small state, which Russia did not at all want to enlarge, also wanted its share of the Ottoman Empire.
Greece claimed Epirus, Thessaly and even Macedonia, which the Treaty of San Stefano included in Bulgaria. Thanks to the intervention of the French commissioners, who showed great interest in the Greeks, but not to push Russia to the extreme, it was decided that the Greek delegates should submit their comments and wishes to the Congress when the question arose of deciding the fate of the Greek provinces of Turkey bordering the Greek state, in other words, only Emir and Thessaly.
Main issues of the congress
The debate on the Bulgarian issue took four sessions (June 22–26). This was a genuine battle between representatives of Russia, on the one hand, and representatives of England and Austria-Hungary, on the other. As a result, the latter won on almost all counts.
It was finally agreed that the new principality would be limited to the Balkans, with the exception of the west, where it would be left, together with Sofia, a small territory south of the mountains. In this way it was reduced from 163 thousand to 64 thousand square kilometers and from 4 million to 1500 thousand inhabitants.
Thus, the coast of the Aegean Sea will be removed from the indirect domination of Russia, and Turkey will avoid the disastrous fragmentation to which the Treaty of San Stefano doomed it. Instead of two years, the Russian occupation was to last only nine months. Congress decided that the organization of Bulgaria would take place not under the exclusive supervision of a Russian commissar, but under the supervision of.
The Congress was also concerned with the organization of a new province located south of the Balkans, between Macedonia and the Adrianople Sanjak. This province, with its capital at Philippopolis, will enjoy broad administrative autonomy. It will be called Eastern Rumelia. Although the Sultan's regular troops did not have the right to remain permanently inside this country, they could occupy and defend its borders.
When it came time to discuss the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 28), Andrássy read out a long memorandum, from which it followed that, in his opinion, Turkey would never be able to pacify these provinces and it was necessary to urgently address their fate, since with their unrest they were disturbing the peace and interests of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was decided that for an indefinite period Austria-Hungary could occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and administer these provinces, which thus remained only nominally part of the Ottoman Empire; Austria-Hungary was even allowed, when it considered it appropriate, to maintain its garrisons in the New Bazar Sanjak, which was an advanced post in the direction of Thessaloniki.
The following sessions of the congress were devoted primarily to Serbia and Montenegro. The independence of these states was recognized. However, the territorial concessions promised to the second of them were reduced by two-thirds. As for Serbia, a significant part of the territorial increments provided for it by the Treaty of San Stefano was transferred to the east; in other words, instead of providing them to Serbia at the expense of Bosnia, they were taken from Bulgaria.
Romanian affairs led to quite heated debates. The Romanian principality was declared independent without pretense, like Serbia and Montenegro. At the request of the French commissioners, who upheld, to their credit, certain principles of justice that had been too long ignored, Romania, like both of the above states, had to recognize the complete civil equality of all its subjects, without distinction of religion.
Romania agreed to this without difficulty. But it was not easy for her to submit to the demands of her former ally. The Romanian commissioners (Bratiana and Cogolnicianu) asked the Congress to listen to them. Despite the sharp resistance of Russia, they achieved their goal (July 1). In addition to recognition of Romanian independence, they demanded that their country not have to make any territorial concessions, that Russian troops not be given the right of passage through Romanian territory, that Romania be given the mouth of the Danube and Snake Island, and that Russia pay it military indemnity.
Congress did not consider it possible to grant their request. Despite the admonitions of Wiconsfield and Andrássy, the decision to reverse the cession of Bessarabia was upheld. But as a consolation, Romania received, at Waddington’s request, an extra two thousand square kilometers in Dobruja, to the great displeasure of the Russian Federation, since this territorial increase was provided at the expense of Bulgaria.
The Congress then had to deal with the Danube question and the question of the military indemnity imposed by the Tsar on the Sultan. As regards the first question, with the exception of some benefits granted to Austria-Hungary, the status quo established by previous treaties was maintained. With regard to the amounts that were to be paid to Russia, it was decided that they could not be replaced by territorial acquisitions, and that the tsar would not enjoy preferential rights over other Turkeys to receive his own.
Russia, which had so many times and very recently wanted to assume the right of patronage over the Christian religion in Turkey, had to refuse this. The Porte voluntarily expressed its firm intention to respect religious freedom, giving it the broadest meaning. The Congress took note of this declaration (July 4th) and proclaimed in the name of Europe the principle that there should exist in Turkey unconditional civil and political equality between adherents of different faiths; ecclesiastics, pilgrims and monks of different nationalities should enjoy the same rights in the Ottoman Empire, and their institutions, like themselves, would be placed under the protection of the great European powers. The privileges of the monasteries of Mount Athos were preserved; the privileges of France in the “holy places” (Palestine), where the status quo was to be observed, were fully stipulated.
On July 6, only one more or less important question remained to be resolved, namely, the Asian territories conquered by Russia during the last war; it was resolved without much difficulty. Remaining true to its obligations towards England, Russia declared that it was renouncing the Alashkert Valley and Bayazet at the cost of the concession of Kotur. Moreover, wanting to give further satisfaction to the British government, the Tsar's ministers declared that their sovereign did not intend to strengthen Batum and was going to make it a free port (porto-franco). In addition, it was decided that the draft reforms promised to Armenia would be transferred to the discretion of not only the Russian Federation, but the powers. Finally, the freedom of the Straits of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, as established by the treaties of 1856 and 1871, was confirmed.
England could now, without committing imprudence, reveal its secret with the Porte of June 4th. Indeed: she did this on July 8, saying that she would immediately borrow. For most powers, and especially for Russia, this was a truly unexpected outcome. Gorchakov, who had been fooled for so long, had to suffer severely from the latest hoax. A few days before, he was still talking pompously about the laurels that he had brought to Berlin to turn them into olive branches there. The world he sought was completely different from what he dreamed of. Therefore, he could not hide his annoyance.
The Congress ended its work on July 13 with the signing of a treatise of 64 articles, the essence of which the drafting commission gleaned from its protocols.
Berlin Treaty
What is striking about the Berlin Treaty, first of all, is that it seems to have been created not to ensure universal peace, but with the goal of causing a quarrel among all the great and even many small European powers. On first reading it becomes clear that it is in no way pacifying. There is no doubt that none of the parties concerned returned from the Congress without some dissatisfaction, without a feeling of uneasiness, without a new germ of hatred and conflict.
Türkiye was the least satisfied. Romania considered itself robbed of its own allies. Serbia and Montenegro, which had hoped to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina among themselves, were deeply disappointed. The Greeks achieved nothing except encouragement and good words; Moreover, they were allowed to hope at most to obtain a quarter of the territories they coveted.
Bulgaria, which for a long time had not ceased to strive for the creation of a single state, was, against its will, divided into two segments, which inevitably had to gravitate towards each other, as Wallachia and Moldavia once did. The Christian provinces left to Turkey had to be content with vague, insufficient, in their opinion, obligations, which, however, were far from being realized.
The authors of the treatise seemed to want to quarrel among themselves the various Balkan nationalities. The districts coveted by the Bulgarians were given to Romania and Serbia. The Serbs, Bulgarians, Montenegrins and Greeks had to contend with each other for a vast territory, the population of which was so mixed that it could not be recognized as the property of any one of these peoples without arousing the protest of the other three.
The Berlin Treaty failed to strengthen the always fragile agreement between the six great European powers. The Russian power, which prepared and caused the last war with such fervor, supported its major ones, found that it received too little for its sacrifices. England lost the trust of Turkey and was forced to think about protecting itself from Russian revenge. Austria-Hungary began the military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - a difficult operation as a result of strong resistance; she received a gift that was more embarrassing than advantageous.
Congress structure
The Chairman of the House of Representatives is the Speaker. He is elected at the beginning of the first session of Congress from the majority party, although formally the entire chamber as a whole participates in his election. Before being elected to the post of Speaker, a member of the House of Representatives must pass through many levels of the House hierarchical ladder.
The speaker's functions are quite extensive. He directs the proceedings of the chamber and ensures compliance with established procedural rules. He has the right of appointment to investigation and conciliation committees. He resolves procedural disputes and ensures order in the chamber's meeting place. One of its most important functions is the “right of recognition”. It may depend on the discretion of the speaker whether the deputy will or will not receive the floor, or whether he will or will not be given the right to make any proposal.
Under the leadership of the Speaker, the officials of the House work - the clerk of the House of Representatives, secretaries (clerks), bailiff, gatekeeper, postmaster and parliamentary practice. The latter plays a special role in the activities of the chamber. He provides legal and technical advice to the Speaker and members of the House, and advises in cases of controversy regarding the interpretation and application of certain procedural rules. The said officials, who are not deputies, are appointed by the chamber at the beginning of the first session. Each of them has a subordinate apparatus.
2. Budget and finance;
3. Formation of the executive and judicial apparatus;
4. Control over the activities of the government apparatus;
5. Exercising quasi-judicial functions;
6. Regulation of intergovernmental relations.
To this list should be added those functions that are not reflected in the Constitution, but which largely determine the role of Congress. Such unconstitutional functions may include representation of parties, social classes and groups, public and professional organizations; participation in the formation of public opinion; determining the political line, etc.
Legislation. In form, acts of Congress are divided into bills (laws), resolutions and orders.
Bills, which, after being approved by the president or overcoming his veto, become laws (acts, statutes), are divided into public bills and private bills. The first are acts of general action. The second - by acts of individual application or local action.
Congress adopts three types of resolutions: joint, concurrent and simple. Joint resolutions practically do not differ from bills either in the order of their passage or in the nature of their regulation. Often changes to existing laws are made by joint resolutions, and, conversely, changes to joint resolutions by laws. Like bills, joint resolutions are submitted to the president for signature. Draft constitutional amendments are adopted in the form of joint resolutions. If approved by a two-thirds majority of both houses, they are sent to the legislature for ratification, without the sanction of the president.
When characterizing the legislative activity of Congress, it is necessary to emphasize: it is under the significant influence of the president. He determines in many ways not only the program of legislative activity, but also controls the entire legislative process.
According to some estimates, at the initiative of the president or other bodies and persons subordinate to him, up to 30 bills are submitted to Congress. Formally, the executive branch is deprived of the right of legislative initiative. Only a senator or member of the House of Representatives can introduce a bill into the House. However, this does not reduce the effectiveness of the president’s initiatives. Congress approves up to 50% of projects proposed by the executive branch.
The president's most powerful means of influence, as before, remains the right of veto (the entire project is rejected), which Congress can only overcome if the bill is re-approved by a two-thirds majority. Often, only the threat of a veto forces legislators to pay more attention to requests and comments from the president. This position has sufficient grounds. Congress manages to override no more than three percent of the total number of presidential vetoes.
Budget and finance. According to the Constitution, the president is deprived of any powers in this area. Only Congress has the right to establish and collect taxes and taxes. Loans on behalf of the United States can also only be made by Congress. Finally, the “minting of coin” or the issuance of money from it can only be carried out by law of Congress.
However, already from 1921, the preparation, and subsequently the largest financial bills, was entrusted to the executive branch. In fact, in this area, the initiative passed to the president, although Congress retained sufficient weight. Legislators independently decide whether to increase, reduce or deny appropriations requested by the executive branch. Often they themselves determine for what purposes and in what volume allocations are needed.
The budget, adopted in the form of a concurring resolution, is not binding, but it serves as the basis for the adoption of financial bills.
The latter are taken in two forms. Initially, an enabling bill is adopted, which provides for the implementation of certain projects and their implementation. However, no payments are made on the basis of such a law. This requires the adoption of an appropriation bill, in which the Treasury is ordered to allocate the appropriate amounts of money. Both of these bills are submitted for signature by the president, who can veto them. begins on October 1 of the previous calendar year.
Control over the activities of the government apparatus. Traditionally, the most effective means of influence has been and remains the “power of the purse.” Often, only the threat of a reduction in appropriations forces the president or individual parts of the executive branch to listen more carefully to the demands of Congress and take into account its possible reaction to certain of their actions.
An equally tried and tested tool remains the power of the standing and investigative committees of Congress to conduct investigations into the activities of government agencies.
Until recently, Congress had such an effective tool as a legislative veto in its arsenal. Through it, Congress could annul or suspend acts of the executive branch, adopting both concurrent resolutions and simple resolutions of one of the chambers. However, in 1983, the US Supreme Court declared its application unconstitutional, nullifying the provisions of slightly less than 200 legislative acts of Congress and depriving the latter of its effective form.
1.17 US Congressional Chamber
Quasi-judicial functions. The quasi-judicial functions of Congress include: assessing the fitness of members of Congress to the qualifications established by the Constitution and the court of impeachment. The first power is of little importance either for the activities of the Congress itself or for determining its actual role. Impeachment is another matter.
Impeachment is a special procedure borrowed by the authors of the Constitution from the parliamentary practice of England. Its essence boils down to the following. The subjects of responsibility are the President, Vice President, judges and executive officials. The basis for impeachment is “treason, bribery, or other serious crime” (Article II, Section 4). The initiative to initiate impeachment belongs to the House of Representatives, and the implementation of the trial belongs to the US Senate. However, impeachment can be considered a trial only by name and certain similarities with legal proceedings. In essence, this is a “political process”, the purpose of which is to remove from office those guilty of committing a crime or misdemeanor, which, however, does not subsequently exempt them from ordinary judicial liability.
Intergovernmental relations. The question of the forms of relations between Congress and state governments is discussed above. Here it is necessary to supplement it with information about how the connection between them is carried out. These issues are not regulated by the Constitution and legislation. However, practice, including judicial practice, has established fairly strict rules.
Thus, Congress does not have the right to direct or give orders to state governments. Even messages to the states to ratify constitutional amendments do not create a legally binding requirement to consider them. In turn, state bodies do not have the right to dictate their will to those deputies who represent their states in Congress. Each of them has lobbyists - their own “intercessors” at the Capitol. Many advisory bodies coordinating the efforts of states - the Council of State Governments - also have their own representations. National Conference of Legislatures. National Governors, National Civic League, etc.
By passing legislation and approving appropriations, Congress determines the development of vertical federal relations. At the same time, he controls them horizontally. Relations between individual states must be formalized on a contractual basis, and agreements between states must be approved by Congress. Without the latter's sanction, only those agreements are allowed to be concluded that “do not increase the political power of the states or threaten the supremacy of the government of the United States.”
Questions of war and peace. According to the Constitution, the decision of the question of war and peace is entrusted to Congress. He is empowered to “declare war, issue letters of marque and permission for reprisals, and make rules regarding captures on land and sea” (Article 1, Section 8). The authors of the Constitution unconditionally assigned the right to decide the issue of entering into hostilities within the competence of Congress. Without his sanction, the president could only send troops into combat to repel a surprise attack on the country and in a state of emergency. But Congress resorted to a formal declaration of war only in five cases. In the rest - and, according to American experts, there were more than 200 of them - the decision to use military force was made by the president alone.
The Constitution gave Congress broad control powers, using which it could limit the power of the president. In Art. 1, sec. 8 states: “Congress has the right. recruit and maintain armies; however, no appropriation of money for these purposes shall be made for a period of more than two years; create and maintain a fleet; make rules for the management and organization of land and naval forces.” But before the Vietnam War, none of these mechanisms were used. And only after it did Congress take a number of measures designed to limit the power of the president.
Conclusion of international treaties. Treaties are concluded under the direct supervision of the President and are submitted for approval to the US Senate. The process of ratification of treaties itself consists of two independent stages: at the first, the Senate approves treaties (gives advice and consent) by a two-thirds majority vote of the senators present; on the second, the president determines at his own discretion whether he should take advantage of the consent received and ratify the treaty. The Senate's positions are weighty. No wonder V. Wilson once said: “The President, who submits a treaty to the Senate for approval, acts in the role of a servant who turns to his master with a request to give him advice.” The name of V. Wilson is also associated with the largest defeat that a president has ever suffered. Senators rejected the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which provided for US participation in the League of Nations. Often, when determining the nature of treaty obligations, the executive branch is forced to take into account possible opposition in the Senate.
The US Senate can not only reject the treaty, but also introduce amendments or reservations to it, or simply not consider it. The amendments introduce significant changes to contractual obligations, which entails the need for additional agreement between the parties to the contract. Reservations, without changing the text of the treaty, unilaterally change only US obligations. While the amendments are no less important, they essentially put other states in an unequal position. In addition to reservations and amendments, the US Senate in its resolution approving treaties also includes so-called “understandings” - statements in which the Senate defines and interprets certain provisions of a treaty act.
At the second stage of ratification, the fate of the treaties is in the hands of the president. He may refuse to promulgate the treaty. In this case, it will not take effect.
The international obligations of the United States appear not only in the form of treaties, but also in the form of executive agreements, that is, those agreements that are concluded by the executive branch, but are not submitted for approval by the House of Congress.
There are several types of executive agreements. The first group consists of executive agreements concluded on the basis of laws and treaties or the “constitutional” powers of the president himself. Contractual acts of this type do not require approval. The second group includes executive agreements which, by the nature of the obligations they contain or according to the requirements of Congress itself, must receive its sanction.
Sources
Foreign constitutional law. - comp. Maklakov V. V. M. 1996.
Carpenter D. “Understanding America” - St. Petersburg 1995.
Constitutions of foreign states. / Tutorial. M. BECK, 1996.
Constitutional (state) law of foreign countries. Textbook ed. B. A. Strashuna, M. BEK, 1995.
Constitutional law of foreign countries. /Textbook ed. V. E. Chirkina. M. Lawyer, 1997.
US Constitution/Commentary by L. V. Smorgunov. St. Petersburg, 1992.
Soloviev S.M. About the history of the new Russian Federation. M.: Education, 1993.
Malkov V.V. A manual on the history of the USSR for those entering universities. M.: Higher School, 1985.
Anisimov E.V. The time of Peter's reforms. - L.: Lenizdat, 1989.
Anisimov E.V., Kamensky A.B. Russia in the 18th - first half of the 19th centuries: History. Historian. Document. - M.: MIROS, 1994.
bestreferat.ru Abstracts
ru.wikipedia.org Wikipedia – the free encyclopedia
http://www.bankreferatov.ru abstracts
Paris Congress - took place from 25.II to 30.III. The Treaty of Paris, signed as a result of the P.C., ended the Crimean War.
In 1853, after the start of the war between Russia and Turkey, the European powers took a hostile position towards Russia. The head of the English cabinet, Aberdeen and Napoleon III, stated that England and France would not remain neutral and would take Turkey under their protection. After the Battle of Sinop (XI 30, 1853), these statements were reinforced by the appearance of the Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea with the officially declared goal of preventing an attack by Russian naval forces on the Turkish shores. In reality, the united squadrons of England and France entered the Black Sea with aggressive goals. Austria and Prussia refused to support Russia, and after England and France declared war on Russia (27.3.1854), they signed an alliance treaty in Berlin (20.4.1854), essentially directed against Russia; Soon Austria signed an alliance treaty with France and England (XII 2, 1854). The ring closed around Russia: it waged a war with Turkey, England and France (and from January 1855 with Sardinia) in the absence of any support from Prussia and the clearly hostile attitude of Austria.
Back in the summer of 1854, the allies developed the so-called. “four conditions” for a future peace treaty with Russia: Russia’s cleansing of Moldavia and Wallachia and the replacement of the Russian protectorate over the principalities with a common protectorate of the great powers; freedom of navigation on the Danube; the transfer into the hands of all the great powers of protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey; revision of the London Convention of 1841 (q.v.) on the Straits. These conditions formed the basis of negotiations at the Vienna Conference of 1855 (see). Since Russia rejected the demands of the allies put forward during the negotiations (including the prohibition of Russia from keeping a navy in the Black Sea and the disarmament of Sevastopol), the Vienna Conference did not lead to an agreement.
After the fall of Sevastopol (8. IX 1855), the defeat of Russia was finally determined, and the new Emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on 2. III 1855) had to agree to the opening of peace negotiations based on “four conditions”, including the clause on neutralization of the Black Sea . The severity of the conditions presented to Russia was aggravated by the addition of a new condition put forward by England and Austria: the right to present new claims to Russia during future negotiations. The uncertainty of this point confronted Russia with the possibility of facing the far-reaching demands of its opponents. However, the continuation of the war threatened such dire consequences that this danger had to be neglected.
At the suggestion of the allies, Paris was appointed as the venue for peace negotiations. In February 1856, Russian representatives Count A.F. Orlov (see) and Baron F.I. Brunnov arrived there. Even before the opening of the P.C., in conversations with Russian representatives, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Congress, Walewski, as well as Napoleon III himself, made it clear that the French Emperor was conciliatory towards Russia and would moderate English and Austrian demands. This position of France corresponded to the desire of Alexander II and Orlov to get closer to Napoleon III, discarding any attempts to rely on the old ally, who had now become an enemy, Austria. The resulting and subsequently intensified rapprochement between Russia and France was the defining moment in the work of the PK and the development of peace conditions.
The first real expression of this rapprochement was Napoleon III’s refusal to support English demands for granting independence to Russia’s Caucasian possessions (this, as Orlov’s negotiations with Walevsky showed, was the content of a new condition added to the previous ones). In the same way, Napoleon III was not inclined to fully support Austria, which demanded that Russia cede Bessarabia to Turkey.
The meetings of the Paris Congress proceeded relatively calmly. Some of the issues did not cause disagreement: the Russian commissioners quickly agreed to Russia’s refusal to strengthen the Åland Islands, just as the English commissioners (Lord Clarendon and Cowley) did not insist on Russia’s refusal to renounce the Caucasus.
Without difficulty, the participants of the P.K. agreed to declare complete freedom of commercial navigation on the Danube. In order to ensure this principle, it was decided to create a special commission consisting of representatives of Russia, Austria, France, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey (European Danube Commission).
The issue of transferring patronage over the Christian subjects of Turkey into the hands of all European powers was resolved by the Sultan’s rescript of 18.2.1856, drawn up under the dictation of England and France, which declared the freedom of all Christian religions, and P.K. decided to mention this rescript in a special article agreement. The question of the Danube principalities went less smoothly. Russia renounced the protectorate over them and agreed to the formation of a special commission of representatives of the contracting parties to develop principles for the future structure of the principalities. The Russian commissioners insisted on the merger of Moldavia and Wallachia into one state, which caused sharp objections from the Austrian commissioners (Buol and Hübner), who hoped that, given the separate existence of the principalities, it would be possible to annex some of them to Austria. However, Austria was forced to abandon its plans for the principalities, since Orlov and Brunnov were supported by Napoleon III. To resolve the issue of the situation of the Danube principalities, the Paris Conference was convened in 1858 (see).
On the issue of Serbia, a resolution was adopted that the contracting parties jointly guarantee its full internal autonomy while maintaining the supreme power of the Sultan over it.
Disputes erupted over the issue of correcting the border of Bessarabia. The Turkish commissioner Ali Pasha (q.v.), instigated by the British and strongly supported by the Austrians, demanded significant territorial concessions from Russia. At Walevsky’s suggestion, these demands were reduced, but Russia still had to give up part of southern Bessarabia.
Russia was asked to return Kars, occupied during the war, to the Turks. Agreeing to this concession, the Russian commissioners demanded compensation for it, but, not receiving the support of Napoleon III in this matter, were forced to abandon their demands and agreed that the agreement would indicate the return of Kars to the Turks in exchange for Sevastopol and other cities in the Crimea .
The most difficult condition for Russia was the neutralization of the Black Sea, but it was decided to accept this demand at meetings with Alexander II in St. Petersburg. Therefore, this issue did not cause controversy. The P.K. decided that the Black Sea was declared neutral, and the passage of military ships of European powers through the Bosporus and Dardanelles was prohibited. Russia cannot keep more than 6 steam ships of 800 tons each and 4 ships of 200 tons each in the Black Sea (the same restrictions were established for the Turkish fleet) and should not, like Turkey, have naval arsenals in the Black Sea. When discussing the last point, Clarendon tried to oblige Russia to destroy the naval shipyards in Nikolaev, but met strong resistance from Orlov and was forced to concede.
In connection with the discussion of the issue of the straits and the neutralization of the Black Sea, it was decided to admit a representative of Prussia to the Paris Congress on the basis that Prussia had signed the London Convention of 1841 on the straits and now could not help but participate in the development of a new decision on this issue.
The Paris Congress also adopted several other resolutions: prohibiting privateering and ensuring neutral merchant ships from attack by warring countries; a recommendation to powers between which serious disagreements arise to seek the mediation of a friendly power in order to avoid an armed conflict; recognition of Turkey as a state participating “in the benefits of common law and the alliance of European powers,” etc.
took place from 25.II to 30.III. The Treaty of Paris, signed as a result of the P.C., ended the Crimean War. In 1853, after the start of the war between Russia and Turkey, the European powers took a hostile position towards Russia. The head of the English cabinet, Aberdeen and Napoleon III, stated that England and France would not remain neutral and would take Turkey under their protection. After the Battle of Sinop (XI 30, 1853), these statements were reinforced by the appearance of the Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea with the officially declared goal of preventing an attack by Russian naval forces on the Turkish shores. In reality, the united squadrons of England and France entered the Black Sea with aggressive goals. Austria and Prussia refused to support Russia, and after England and France declared war on Russia (27.3.1854), they signed an alliance treaty in Berlin (20.4.1854), essentially directed against Russia; Soon Austria signed an alliance treaty with France and England (XII 2, 1854). The ring closed around Russia: it waged a war with Turkey, England and France (and from January 1855 with Sardinia) in the absence of any support from Prussia and the clearly hostile attitude of Austria. Back in the summer of 1854, the allies developed the so-called. “four conditions” for a future peace treaty with Russia: Russia’s cleansing of Moldavia and Wallachia and the replacement of the Russian protectorate over the principalities with a common protectorate of the great powers; freedom of navigation on the Danube; the transfer into the hands of all the great powers of protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey; revision London Convention of 1841 (q.v.) about the straits. These conditions formed the basis of negotiations at Vienna Conference 1855(cm.). Since Russia rejected the demands of the allies put forward during the negotiations (including the prohibition of Russia from keeping a navy in the Black Sea and the disarmament of Sevastopol), the Vienna Conference did not lead to an agreement. After the fall of Sevastopol (8. IX 1855), the defeat of Russia was finally determined, and the new Emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on 2. III 1855) had to agree to the opening of peace negotiations based on “four conditions”, including the clause on neutralization of the Black Sea . The severity of the conditions presented to Russia was aggravated by the addition of a new condition put forward by England and Austria: the right to present new claims to Russia during future negotiations. The uncertainty of this point exposed Russia to the possibility of facing the far-reaching demands of its opponents. However, the continuation of the war threatened such grave consequences that this danger had to be neglected. At the suggestion of the allies, Paris was appointed as the venue for peace negotiations. In February 1856, Russian representatives Count A.F. arrived there. Orlov (see) and Baron F.I. Brunnov. Even before the opening of the P.C., in conversations with Russian representatives, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Congress Walewski, as well as Napoleon III himself, made it clear that the French Emperor was conciliatory towards Russia and would moderate English and Austrian demands. This position of France corresponded to the desire of Alexander II and Orlov to get closer to Napoleon III, discarding any attempts to rely on the old ally, who had now become an enemy, Austria. The resulting and subsequently intensified rapprochement between Russia and France was the defining moment in the work of the PK and the development of peace conditions. The first real expression of this rapprochement was Napoleon III’s refusal to support English demands for granting independence to Russia’s Caucasian possessions (this, as Orlov’s negotiations with Walevsky showed, was the content of a new condition added to the previous ones). In the same way, Napoleon III was not inclined to fully support Austria, which demanded that Russia cede Bessarabia to Turkey. The meetings of the Petrograd Committee proceeded relatively calmly. Some of the issues did not cause disagreement: the Russian commissioners quickly agreed to Russia’s refusal to strengthen the Åland Islands, just as the English commissioners (Lord Clarendon and Cowley) did not insist on Russia’s refusal to renounce the Caucasus. Without difficulty, the participants of the P.K. agreed to declare complete freedom of commercial navigation on the Danube. In order to ensure this principle, it was decided to create a special commission consisting of representatives of Russia, Austria, France, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey (European Danube Commission). The issue of transferring patronage over the Christian subjects of Turkey into the hands of all European powers was resolved by the Sultan's rescript of 18.2.1856, drawn up under the dictation of England and France, which declared the freedom of all Christian religions, and P. K. decided to mention this rescript in a special article agreement. The question of the Danube principalities went less smoothly. Russia renounced the protectorate over them and agreed to the formation of a special commission of representatives of the contracting parties to develop principles for the future structure of the principalities. The Russian commissioners insisted on the merger of Moldavia and Wallachia into one state, which caused sharp objections from the Austrian commissioners (Buol and Hübner), who hoped that, given the separate existence of the principalities, it would be possible to annex some of them to Austria. However, Austria was forced to abandon its plans for the principalities, i.e. K. Orlov and Brunnov were supported by Napoleon III. To resolve the issue of the situation of the Danube principalities, a meeting was convened in 1858 Paris Conference(cm.). On the question of Serbia, a resolution was adopted that the contracting parties jointly guarantee its full internal autonomy while maintaining the supreme power of the Sultan over it. Disputes erupted over the issue of correcting the border of Bessarabia. Turkish Commissioner Ali Pasha(see), incited by the British and strongly supported by the Austrians, demanded significant territorial concessions from Russia. At Walewski's suggestion, these demands were reduced, but Russia still had to give up part of southern Bessarabia. Russia was asked to return Kars, occupied during the war, to the Turks. Agreeing to this concession, the Russian commissioners demanded compensation for it, but, not receiving the support of Napoleon III in this matter, were forced to abandon their demands and agreed that the agreement would indicate the return of Kars to the Turks in exchange for Sevastopol and other cities in the Crimea . The most difficult condition for Russia was the neutralization of the Black Sea, but it was decided to accept this demand at meetings with Alexander II in St. Petersburg. Therefore, this issue did not cause controversy. The P.K. decided that the Black Sea was declared neutral, and the passage of military ships of European powers through the Bosporus and Dardanelles was prohibited. Russia cannot keep more than 6 steam ships of 800 each in the Black Sea T and 4 ships of 200 each T(the same restrictions were established for the Turkish fleet) and should not, like Turkey, have naval arsenals in the Black Sea. When discussing the last point, Clarendon tried to oblige Russia to destroy the naval shipyards in Nikolaev, but met Orlov’s firm resistance and was forced to concede. In connection with the discussion of the issue of the straits and the neutralization of the Black Sea, it was decided to admit a representative of Prussia to the PK on the grounds that Prussia had signed the London Convention of 1841 on the straits and now could not help but participate in the development of a new decision on this issue. The PK also adopted several other resolutions: prohibiting privateering and protecting neutral merchant ships from attack by warring countries; a recommendation to powers between which serious disagreements arise to seek the mediation of a friendly power in order to avoid an armed conflict; recognition of Turkey as a state participating “in the benefits of common law and the union of European powers,” etc. The Paris Peace Treaty marked the beginning of a new course of Russian foreign policy. The note, compiled on behalf of Alexander II by Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode and sent on IV 17, 1856 to Orlov in Paris, stated that the Holy Alliance, as shown by the war and especially the behavior of Austria, had ceased to exist; Russia's relations with Turkey remained tense even after the conclusion of peace. The hostility towards Russia on the part of England, not satisfied with the Paris Peace, did not decrease. Nesselrode believed that in order to eliminate the danger of creating a new coalition directed against Russia, one should try by all means to maintain the favor of the French Emperor toward Russia, “without, however, obliging to follow him in his enterprises.” Russian foreign policy adhered to this new course for several years after the P.K. Restrictions on Russian sovereignty in the Black Sea were abolished by Gorchakov’s letter of 30. X 1870 (see. Gorchakov circulars). Serious changes to the system of international relations in the Balkans, created by the PK, were made by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78 and its conclusion Treaty of San Stefano 1878(mass media Berlin Congress 1878(cm.).
Secret negotiations between Napoleon III and Alexander II about peace. In mid-October 1855, Alexander II first received news that Napoleon II would like to begin “direct” relations with him. In other words, the Emperor of the French, on the one hand, made it clear that he was not at all constrained by the alliance with England, and on the other, that he, too (like Alexander) was not very happy with the Vienna conferences.
Very soon after Sweden refused to join the coalition, Napoleon III came to the conclusion that he had no need to fight further, and there was little chance of success. The British would like to continue the war. “The world is threatening us,” Palmerston frankly wrote to his brother. British diplomacy was not averse to, firstly, seizing the entire Crimea to Perekop and “returning” it to Turkey, then landing in the Caucasus, taking away Georgia, taking away the entire south-eastern Caucasus, creating “Circassia” for Shamil, and turning Shamil himself into a Turkish-protected and England as a vassal, designed to block the road to Russian advance into Persia. But Napoleon III did not at all want such a strengthening of England; on the contrary, in Russia he already seemed to begin to see a useful counterbalance to the British in some cases. Shedding French blood in the Caucasus in order to protect India from the Russian invasion seemed completely unnecessary to Napoleon III. And he gave permission to Count Morny to establish “private” relations with Russia. One fine day, the head of the large banking house Sipa came to Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, and told him that he had received from his Parisian friend and also a banker, Erlanger, a letter in which Erlanger reported on an interesting conversation he had with Earl of Morny. The Count finds that it is time for the French and Russians to stop the useless slaughter. Gorchakov immediately notified the Tsar about this and, without even waiting for an answer, told the banker Sipa that he could write the following on his behalf to his friend Erlanger in Paris. He, Gorchakov, believes that not only peace, but also direct rapprochement between France and Russia after the conclusion of peace can be extremely useful for these powers. But peace conditions should not affect Russia's sense of national dignity. Morni realized that this was a direct allusion to the demand threatening Russia for a mandatory limitation of the military fleet in the Black Sea. He answered Gorchakov with a gentle refusal: one cannot demand from Napoleon III and from England, after all the sacrifices they suffered at Sevastopol, that they renounce this demand. This first mutual sounding was followed by official, albeit secret, negotiations in Paris itself. But here the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode committed a tactlessness from the very beginning, which greatly damaged the matter. He informed the Viennese court about the beginning of relations between Russia and Paris. Why he did this is difficult to understand. Apparently, Nesselrode stubbornly flattered himself with the illusion that the solidarity of the powers of the Holy Alliance continued to exist, and believed that it was not good to conspire behind the back of “friendly” Austria. Of course, Franz Joseph and Count Buol were greatly alarmed when they learned about Napoleon III’s sudden change of heart and that he could come to an agreement with Alexander without the participation of Austria. Such a turn of events threatened Austria with dangerous isolation. Buol immediately informed Napoleon III of Austria's complete readiness to finally join the Western powers and present Russia with something like an ultimatum. Napoleon III was surprised and annoyed by the strange frankness of Russian diplomacy and interrupted the negotiations that had begun.
All this significantly worsened Russia's diplomatic position. From now on, it became even more difficult for Napoleon III than before to hinder the aggressive aspirations of England. Buol was in a hurry, and already in mid-December the Austrian proposals were presented to Nesselrode.
Austrian ultimatum to Russia. These proposals presented Russia with the following demands:
1) replacement of the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia with the protectorate of all great powers; 2) establishment of freedom of navigation at the mouths of the Danube; 3) preventing the passage of anyone’s squadrons through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus into the Black Sea, prohibiting Russia and Turkey from keeping a navy in the Black Sea and having arsenals and military fortifications on the shores of this sea; 4) Russia’s refusal to patronize the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects; 5) the concession by Russia in favor of Moldova of the section of Bessarabia adjacent to the Danube. These conditions were much more difficult and humiliating for Russia than the previous “four points”, to which neither Nicholas I nor Alexander II agreed in their time. The Austrian “proposals” were presented as an ultimatum, although without specifying an exact date. But it was categorically made clear that failure to accept the conditions would entail Austria declaring war on Russia.
A few days after presenting the Austrian note, Alexander II received a letter from Frederick William IV. The Prussian king wrote at the obvious instigation of Buol and Franz Joseph. The letter, written in amiable tones, contained a direct threat: the king invited the tsar to weigh “the consequences that may occur for the true interests of Russia and Prussia itself” if Alexander rejected the Austrian proposals. So, it was foreseen that not only Austria, but also Prussia would join France and England.
What was to be done?
On the evening of December 20, 1855, a meeting convened by him took place in the tsar’s office. Nine people were present: Alexander II, Grand Duke Konstantin, Nesselrode, Vasily Dolgorukov, P. D. Kiselev, M. S. Vorontsov, Alexei Orlov, Bludov and Meyendorff.
The debate was not very long. Everyone, except Bludov, spoke out for the decisive need to conclude peace as quickly as possible. The king did not clearly express his opinion. We settled on agreeing to the conditions presented, except for the concession of Bessarabia. They also did not agree to accept the vague, but fraught with consequences, article of the Austrian note, which spoke of the right of the allies to present Russia, in addition to the “four points,” with “special conditions” if the “interest of Europe” requires it. On January 10, Buol received a Russian response in Vienna, and since it was he who included the clause on Bessarabia, this time he resorted to a formal ultimatum: he stated that if after six days (after January 10) Russia does not accept all the requests her conditions, the Austrian Emperor will break off diplomatic relations with her. Alexander II convened a secondary meeting on January 15. At this meeting, Nesselrode read a note in which this time he placed all his hopes on the location of Napoleon III; He gave up on Austria, finally realizing, much belatedly, that she was no less an enemy of Russia than England. The assembly unanimously decided to accept the ultimatum as preconditions for peace.
France's position at the Paris Congress. Alexander II sent Count Orlov to Paris for the peace congress, giving him Baron Brunnov, the former Russian ambassador in London, as his assistant. From the first to the last moment of his stay in Paris, Orlov based all his diplomatic activities on the rapprochement with the French emperor and on the support that Napoleon III began to provide to the Russian plenipotentiary from the very beginning of the negotiations.
The Paris Congress began on February 25 and ended with the signing of a peace treaty on March 30, 1856. Count Walewski, French Foreign Minister, son of Napoleon I from Countess Walewska, presided. Already from the first meetings of the congress, it became clear to all its participants that Walewski would support the British only formally. And soon in diplomatic circles they learned about the intimate conversations that Emperor Napoleon III had with Count Orlov immediately after Orlov’s arrival in Paris.
This count was one of the most gifted diplomatic people who were at the court of Nicholas, and then Alexandra P. Orlov loved diplomacy. At one time, without hesitation, for reasons of career, after the death of Benckendorff, he accepted the position of chief of gendarmes. But he was not personally involved in espionage matters. Out of disgust and laziness, he left everything to Dubelt. He had a brother, Vladimir, who was close to the Decembrists, and Orlov did not disown him, but supported him in difficult times. He also ordered to remove supervision from Herzen and issue him a foreign passport, at the request of O. A. Zherebtsova, whose granddaughter Orlov was married to.
Arriving in Paris, Orlov was able, from the very first conversation, to agree with Napoleon III that a close rapprochement between Russia and France, between which there were essentially no fundamental contradictions, was now possible. Orlov's interlocutor was inclined to fully meet him halfway. Napoleon III achieved everything he wanted: Turkey was saved from Russian conquest; the arms of France are covered with new glory; “revenge” was taken for 1812; the French emperor strengthened his throne within the country and took first place in Europe. Napoleon III did not require anything more from Russia.
England's position at the Congress. But this was not the case with England. Even before the opening of the congress, Palmerston, to his great chagrin, became convinced, firstly, that Napoleon III did not intend to continue the war and, secondly, that at the congress he would behave evasively and ambiguously in relation to his ally, England. Palmerston realized this when, in January and February 1856, there was a debate about whether to admit Prussia to the congress or not. Alexander II desired her presence because he counted on her friendly support. But that is precisely why Palmerston refused to admit the Prussian representatives. He motivated this by the fact that Prussia did not take any part in the war and did not even want to act the way Austria did. On this very sensitive issue, Napoleon III supported Palmerston extremely sluggishly. Prussia, however, was not allowed in, but Palmerston realized before the start of the meetings that a difficult game lay ahead in Paris. His worst fears were realized.
Napoleon III did not compromise his “friendship” with the “allies” with a single word in front of Orlov and did not say anything that Orlov could later, with reference to him, use in front of the British. But Orlov did not need this at all: what was important to him was not what Napoleon said, but how he listened to the Russian commissioner, why he did not interrupt him, at what moments he was silent, and when he smiled. In essence, in two or three afternoon conversations in the imperial office, face to face with Napoleon III, over a cup of coffee, Orlov completed all the work, and the solemn sessions of the plenum of the congress did not change anything significant and could not change anything. Orlov’s strength lay precisely in what Palmerston with irritation saw as his weakness: Orlov knew that England would not continue the war alone. Consequently, on all those points on which there is a unity of views between England and Napoleon III, Russia has to concede; but on all issues on which there is a difference between them, the Russian representatives must persist and refuse their signature, and the British will do absolutely nothing with them. Orlov chose his assistant very successfully: he was Baron Brunnov, who had long served as the Russian ambassador in London. The roles were distributed as follows: where decisive work of diplomatic thought was required, Orlov spoke; where it was necessary to patiently listen and challenge the enemy, step by step defending the interests of Russia, the main role fell to the lot of Brunnov, a very intelligent, albeit overly self-confident, but experienced, hardworking dignitary, gray in diplomatic affairs. Everything fundamentally important that Orlov achieved in secret conversations with Emperor Napoleon III was transferred by Orlov to Baron Brunnov, and he, already on solid ground, knew how to talk to the British at the ceremonial meetings of the Congress.
For example, Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley, English representatives, demand the demolition of Russian fortifications along the Black Sea coast. Orlov flatly refuses. The British are threatening. Orlov refuses again. The Austrian delegate Buol wholeheartedly joins the British. Orlov refuses for the third time. Chairman Count Walewski says he supports the British and Austrians. But not only Valevsky knew what Napoleon III’s position was on this issue - Orlov also knew this. Therefore, Orlov again refuses, and Valevsky helplessly throws up his hands. In the end, Orlov wins. Next, the question arises about neutralizing the Black Sea. Here Orlov, knowing Napoleon’s opinion, concedes; but when the British raise the question of neutralizing the Sea of Azov as well, Orlov refuses. The same comedy with Valevsky is repeated, and again Orlov wins. The question of Moldavia and Wallachia is raised. The Russians have already left there, but Orlov does not want these provinces to remain occupied by Austria. Both Russian interests and the reluctance for Austria to receive such a reward for its behavior during the Crimean War - all this forced Alexander II and Orlov to resist the demand of the Austrian commissioner Buol. Orlov, knowing that Napoleon III did not want to give Moldavia and Wallachia to Austria, opposed Buol’s demand at the congress. If Russia had to cede Bessarabia, then Austria had to say goodbye forever to the dream of a bloodless acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. To his greatest fury, exactly three days before the end of the congress, Buol became convinced that Orlov and Brunnov had achieved their goal. Buol deliberately delayed the question of the Danube principalities; he hoped somehow, in passing, already during his departure, to wrest from the Congress the desired permission - to leave unchanged the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian troops. And suddenly, on March 27, the chairman of the congress, Walevsky, in a cold, strictly official tone, suggested that Buol inform the congress: when exactly will the Austrians liberate Moldova and Wallachia from their troops? There was nothing to do. Austria left the congress without receiving payment from the allies for its ultimatum to Russia on December 2, 1855. Orlov understood better than Buol what the true meaning of the participation of the Minister of the Sardinian Kingdom Cavour at the congress was.
Peace terms. The return of Kars, taken by the Russians at the end of 1855, the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of Bessarabia - these were the main losses of Russia. Orlov agreed to the abolition of the exclusive Russian protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia and Serbia without objection. Contemporaries attributed the relatively tolerable peace conditions not only to the turn in the policy of Napoleon III, who did not want to further weaken Russia and thus help England, but also to the strong impression that the heroic defense of Sevastopol, which lasted almost a year, made on the whole world. This was also reflected in the fact that the most powerful monarch in Europe at that time, Napoleon III, immediately after signing the Peace of Paris on March 30, 1856, began to seek an alliance with Russia.
Chapter Ten The Civil War in North America (1861 - 1865)
Two social systems in North America. The seeds of the North American Civil War were sown during the Revolutionary War of the 18th century. As a result, slavery was preserved and developed alongside capitalist production as an “growth on capitalism.”
The strengthening of slavery led to the fact that from the 30s of the 19th century the American democratic republic found itself in the hands of southern slave-owning planters. The interests of slave owners became the guiding light of the foreign policy of the United States.
At the insistence of the cotton planters of the South, the United States in 1810–1812. captured West Florida. In 1818 they brought troops into East Florida; in 1845 - Texas, which had broken away from Mexico, was annexed; in 1846–1848 - fought with Mexico and took away its richest fertile territories; in 1854 they laid claim to Cuba.
For the time being, slavery and capitalist production existed side by side. But the moment of inevitable collision of “two social systems” has come. In 1860, the United States split: they became known as the “Divided States.”
In this social conflict, the diplomacy of the southerners and northerners of the United States was to play an extremely important role.
The balance of power between North and South was clearly not in favor of the latter. The North had 23 states with a population of 22 million people. The South had 11 states with a population of 9 million. The South was going to fight to preserve slavery, and among those 9 million were about 4 million black slaves. But, most importantly, the North had a developed industry, which the South did not have at all, and an immeasurably more developed network of railways and shipping canals. In the event of a long war, the southerners had no chance of victory.
But the southerners, starting the war, still hoped to win. Their calculation was as follows: due to the fact that the entire personnel of the small federal army was in the hands of the slave-owning planters, they assumed, by moving regular units into battle and joining them with the militia of the southern states with a hastily formed cavalry, with a quick blow to capture the capital of the Union and, relying on first successes, to achieve armed intervention by England and France.
The possibility of such an intervention seemed undeniable to the southerners.
The English bourgeoisie sought to destroy its dangerous rival in the industry of the northeastern and western states of America. In the event of a victory for the South over the North, the United States would again become a colony of England; France also sought to conquer America.
Thus, the entire calculation of the southerners was based not on the possibility of victory on their own, but on the help of English and French interventionists.
On March 4, 1858, one of the political leaders of the South, Senator John Gammond from South Carolina, said: “Without a single shot of a cannon and without drawing a sword, we can bring the whole world to its knees if they dare to make war on us... What will happen if will there be no supply of cotton for three years? I will not go into detail about what each of you can imagine, but one thing is certain: England will do everything possible and mobilize the entire civilized world to save the South. No, you don't dare fight cotton. There is no power on earth that would dare to fight him. Cotton rules the world"
Based on these considerations, the southerners were interested not so much in the strategic plan as in questions about recognition of the South by England and France and in persuading the governments of these countries to provide military assistance to the South.
The beginning of the war. The Civil War was not a war with a foreign state, but between two parts of the same state. Therefore, the procedure for declaring war in this case differed from the generally accepted one. The day after the Southerners captured Fort Semter, Lincoln called up 75,000 volunteers for the militia of all the states of the Union to suppress the conspiracy in the Southern states (April 15, 1861). Lincoln gave those who plotted against the Union 20 days to disperse and return to peaceful pursuits.
On April 17, 1861, the President of the Confederacy, a major slave owner, Jefferson Davis, issued a proclamation on the issuance of documents for privateering to fight against the merchant and military fleets of the United States. Two days later, Lincoln responded by declaring a blockade of the South, classifying Southern privateering as piracy. Thus, when in fact the war had already begun, it was declared by the South to the North and the North to the South.
Two weeks have passed since the opening of hostilities. On February 28, 1861, news was received of the beginning of the intervention of European powers in America.
Spain came first. The Spaniards, having Cuba as their base, tried to take away the eastern part of the island, which was formerly a Spanish colony, from the Negro Republic of San Domingo.
On April 2, 1861, despite the fact that the United States had no official relations with the Negro Republic of Saint-Domingue, United States Secretary of State (Foreign Secretary) Seward wrote a letter to the Spanish ambassador in Washington protesting the Spanish invasion. On July 1, 1861, the Spanish ambassador notified Seward of the annexation of the Negro Republic. At the moment the situation was so difficult that the United States preferred a wait-and-see approach in this matter.
The next stage of European intervention in American affairs was England's recognition of the southern states as a belligerent. On May 3, 1861, the emissaries of the rebels of the South, Yancy and Rost, were first received by Rossel, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs in Palmerston's cabinet. At the insistence of the United States Ambassador in London, Dallas, they were accepted unofficially. Dallas received Rossel's assurance that decisions on matters related to the Civil War would be made by the government only after the arrival of the new Union-appointed ambassador, Charles Francis Adams. However, even before Adams arrived in London, on May 6, Rossel sent instructions to the British Ambassador in Washington, Lyons, notifying him of the government’s decision to recognize the South as a belligerent. Adams arrived on May 13, but on the same day, before he was accepted, the British government had already approved a declaration of neutrality. This declaration recognized the South not as rebellious states, but as a belligerent state. The Declaration of May 13 was a step toward recognition of the Confederacy, and therefore entry into the war against the Union, which rightfully viewed the Confederates as conspirators and rebels. It is significant that immediately after the publication of the declaration, the British government sent its navy to American waters.
Intervention of England, France and Spain in Mexico. A new stage in the aggression of European powers in America was the agreement signed in London on October 31, 1861 between Great Britain, France and Spain on intervention in Mexico.
In December, Spanish troops had already landed at Vera Cruz. In January 1862, they were joined by troops from England and France. The United States protested the intervention. However, only the end of the civil war allowed them to achieve the withdrawal of French troops; English and Spanish troops were recalled somewhat earlier.
Incident at Trent (1861). Soon after the start of the intervention of the three powers in Mexico, undertaken, as Marx points out, on the initiative of Palmerston, the threat of British intervention loomed over the United States itself, which was suffering heavy defeats at the front. The Union blockade of the Confederacy, which almost excluded the possibility of exporting American cotton, caused severe irritation in Europe. On March 26, 1861, the British ambassador to America, Lord Lyons, during a meeting with Seward, said: “If the United States decides to suspend by force trade with the cotton-producing states, which is so important for Great Britain, I am not responsible for what may happen.”
On November 8, 1861, the slaveholders' emissaries Mason and Slidell were removed from the English merchant ship Trent by the captain of the United States warship San Jacinto. The prisoners were taken to Boston. The chauvinist press of England and France took advantage of this opportunity to make an incredible noise, demanding war with the Union. The only formal reproach against Captain Wilkes was that he captured and carried the Confederate envoys to Boston without detaining the ship they were on. But John Bull, “mad, with disheveled sideburns,” was burning with anger and, it seemed, could not be kept from the war. Lord Rossel demanded the extradition of Mason and Slidell within seven days. English troops had already been sent to Canada; In the shipyards of England, work was carried out day and night.
Action by English workers against southern support.“Palmerston wants war,” Marx wrote on December 25, 1861, “the English people do not want it. Coming events will show who will prevail in this fight - Palmerston or the people.” Events showed that, in addition to the official diplomacy of the bourgeoisie, in 1861 .there was already an unofficial, unrecognized force - the international solidarity of the proletariat. A wave of workers' rallies swept through all the major industrial centers of England: Marx was one of the main initiators of this movement. Despite the cotton famine, which left a lot of people without work and without bread, the workers protested against shameful intervention in the civil war on the side of the slave owners and threatened England itself with civil war.
At the same time, the North American government took a compliant position. It freed the Southern emissaries and thus created another obstacle to intervention from Europe.
The true thoughts and feelings of English workers and workers of other European countries were expressed by the First International in its address to Lincoln on the occasion of his victory in the presidential election of 1864.
“The workers of Europe express the confidence,” the address read, “that just as the American War of Independence ushered in a new era of expansion for the bourgeoisie, so the American war against slavery will bring the same to the working class.”
So, the slave owners’ calculation that the English bourgeoisie would organize an intervention turned out to be erroneous.
Another mistake of the southerners was their hope for the magical effect of banning the export of cotton. Needing money, they began to export cotton themselves, trying to break the blockade. Moreover, the European famine of 1861 made the wheat question even more important than the cotton question, and the Union, despite the Civil War, exported huge quantities of wheat to Europe.
However, neither the southerners nor the leaders of the English and French governments gave up hope of joint participation in the war. Palmerston and Napoleon III decided to wait for the course of external events and intervene as soon as the southerners dealt a decisive blow to the northerners.
The following year, 1862, the Lincoln government still did not dare to free the slaves. The North again suffered one defeat after another. The proponents of intervention raised their heads again.
France's position. In April 1862, during one of the conversations with Napoleon III, the southern emissary Slidell insisted on French recognition of the Confederation. Napoleon III, in principle, spoke in favor of recognition, but replied that “not a single power except England has a sufficient fleet to provide France with effective assistance in the war on the ocean...” By this, the emperor made it clear that if England agreed to recognize Confederacy, he would do it too. Slidell proposed organizing an action against the United States together with Spain, Austria, Prussia, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Denmark. He assured Napoleon III that the United States, if France recognized the Confederacy, would not declare war on it, “since their hands are already quite busy with household affairs.”
Despite Slidell's tempting promises, the Emperor rejected immediate recognition of the Confederacy and only promised to secretly help build military ships. This ended the conversation. But in mid-July 1862, during a period of new severe defeats for the northerners at the front, Napoleon III sent the French ambassador Thouvenel a telegram with the following content: “Ask the English government if it considers that the moment has come for recognition of the South.” However, in the House of Commons, at the insistence of Palmerston, the proposal for intervention was rejected. The English government waited for the final outcome of hostilities, while at the same time providing assistance to the Confederates.
On July 29, 1862, the cruiser, built for the Confederacy at the Layard shipyard in Liverpool, despite the protests of the United States Ambassador Adams, was released from England with the knowledge of the English government. This cruiser Alabama privateered on the seas and oceans until June 1864; it sank 65 United States ships and destroyed $5 million worth of property. On June 19, 1864, the Alabama met with the United States cruiser Kearsage, which sank her after a stubborn battle. In addition to the Alabama, the Confederate privateers Florida, Georgia, Shenandoah, and others were built in a similar way in England.
On September 14, 1862, Palmerston made his final decision and wrote to Rossel, offering to recognize the Confederation. Rossel replied that a cabinet meeting to resolve this issue would be scheduled for September 23 or 30.
Abolition of slavery (1863). During these days the situation has changed dramatically. During the time between Palmerston's letter and the proposed meeting of the British cabinet in the United States, a preliminary proclamation for the emancipation of slaves was issued.
The Union took the path of war “in a revolutionary way.” The decisive step, which caused an upsurge within the country and enormous sympathy for the Union from all of democratic Europe, was taken.
When news of the Union's decision to abolish slavery in the United States was received in England, the issue of recognition of the South was again removed from the agenda of the cabinet meeting. However, the French government made a new attempt to act in favor of the South.
On October 31, diplomatic representatives of England and Russia were notified by the French government of the project proposed by France for joint action by the three powers. It was planned to offer a truce for 6 months, lifting the blockade and opening American ports to European trade. But Russia rejected the French offer. The British government, referring to Russia, also responded with disagreement. This time too, a huge role was played by the active resistance to this project of the British workers, who again organized a number of mass protest rallies.
After the abolition of slavery, the internal and external affairs of the Confederacy deteriorated so much that Vice President of the Confederacy Alexander Stephens, one of the most ardent ideologists of slavery, proposed to follow his example and abolish slavery in the South in order to defeat the North. But the Congress in Richmond did not and could not decide to do this.
The victories of the northerners at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July 1863 and the general turning point in military operations in North America made intervention by England and France completely impossible.
Russia's position. In 1863 there was a somewhat unexpected rapprochement between the United States and Russia. This rapprochement was facilitated by Russia's tense relations with England and France, which especially worsened in 1863. It is now known that Palmerston and Napoleon III did not seriously think about war with Russia over the Polish issue. But then in Russia they proceeded from the idea that such a war was inevitable.
In connection with the current situation, it was decided to send two Russian squadrons to America. The plan to send squadrons overseas was approved by Alexander II, and in July 1863, the manager of the naval ministry handed Rear Admiral Lesovsky a secret instruction.
The sending of squadrons to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was carried out on the basis of a boldly conceived plan for offensive operations in the inevitably expected war with England and France. As the experience of the Confederate cruiser Alabama showed, privateer cruisers could cause enormous harm to the enemy’s trade and navy.
In September 1863, two Russian squadrons - one under the command of Admiral Lesovsky, the other - Admiral Popov - arrived: the first in New York, the second in San Francisco. The main task of sending squadrons was to create a threat on the routes of English world trade in order to influence England’s position on the Polish issue.
In a memorandum from the head of the Naval Ministry, Crabbe, addressed to Alexander II, a plan was already outlined to select certain American ports for the meeting of squadrons. At the same time, Crabbe mentioned that the Union privateer fleet was a huge force.
In contrast to the plans of the naval department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was clearly afraid of the political effect of sending squadrons to America. The Vice-Chancellor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Gorchakov and the Minister to the United States, Baron Steckl, only expressed retrospective pleasure at the brilliant effect achieved by the fleet's entry into the world trade routes and its stay in America. The Tsar's ambassador in London, the “Nestor of Russian diplomacy,” the elderly Baron Brunnov, was even in despair at this step.
The sympathies of the tsarist government were on the side of the southerners, but contradictions with England and France forced it to take the path of rapprochement with the North. Of course, rumors of a formal union between Russia and the United States had no basis. But sending squadrons to the ports of a warring state inevitably led to a situation close to a de facto union. During their stay in America, on two occasions, Russian ships even put pressure on the military ships of the southerners with a direct threat of military action.
The benevolent position taken by Russia during the Civil War in the United States played a significant role in the general international situation and provided undoubted assistance to the United States.
Principles of American Diplomacy. In the scientific historical literature there are two different and even opposing assessments of the basic principles of diplomacy of the United States.
Some historians believe that the entire history of the United States is closely connected with European politics. Others believe that the policy of isolation was the basic principle of the United States. In fact, there is no doubt that the history of the United States and its foreign policy are closely connected with European - and indeed with world history - starting with the emergence of the United States of America.
There is some misunderstanding with the content of the very concept of “isolationism”. Isolationism is sometimes described as the non-participation of the United States in wars in Europe and in the political and military alliances of European states. But the refusal of an active role in Europe did not at all mean the actual and complete self-removal of the United States from European and world politics; The United States has always taken part in it, but mostly as a passive force, influencing the course of events in Europe with its maneuvers. Thus, isolationism is not isolation from Europe, but participation in European affairs through passive maneuvers.
In addition to the English colonies, England, France, Spain, and Holland took part in the War of Independence. Those powers that adhered to armed neutrality were also indirectly related to it. Thus, it was an event in world history. The refusal of the United States to ally with France in 1793, during the period of the revolution in France and its struggle with England, was of great significance for European history. Louisiana Purchase in 1803, participation of the United States in 1805 in the war in the Mediterranean against the corsairs of the Bey of Algiers, capture of Florida, Monroe Doctrine, war with Mexico, role of the United States during the Civil War, Far Eastern expansion of the United States in the 40s - 60s - all these were events that played their role in world history.
If we ask the question whether American diplomacy has introduced anything fundamentally new into the history of this institution, then it must be answered as follows: with the exception of the 70s of the 18th century and the period 1863–1865, American diplomacy, in its methods and goals, has little to do with essentially different from the diplomacy of the Old World.
Chapter Eleven Napoleon III and Europe. From the Peace of Paris to the beginning of Bismarck's ministry in Prussia (1856 - 1862)