Tsygankov P. Political sociology of international relations

Chapter I. Theoretical origins and conceptual foundations of the political sociology of international relations

Political sociology of international relations is an integral part of the science of international relations, including diplomatic history, international law, the world economy, military strategy and many other disciplines. Of particular importance is the theory of international relations, which is understood as a set of multiple conceptual generalizations presented by theoretical schools polemicizing with each other and constituting the subject field of a relatively autonomous discipline. This discipline, called “International Relations” in the West, is being rethought in the light of the general sociological understanding of the world as a single society in the sphere of interaction between individuals and diverse social communities, acting in the context of global changes observed today, affecting the fate of mankind and the existing world order. In the above sense, the theory of international relations, as emphasized by S. Hoffmann, is both very old and very young. Already in ancient times, political philosophy and history raised questions about the causes of conflicts and wars, about the means and methods of achieving peace between peoples, about the rules of their interaction, etc., and therefore it is old. But at the same time, it is young, because it involves a systematic study of observed phenomena, designed to identify the main determinants, explain behavior, reveal typical, recurring in the interaction of international authors. This study refers mainly to the post-war period. Only after 1945 did the theory of international relations really begin to free itself from the “suffocation” of history and from the “crushing” of legal science. In fact, in the same period, the first attempts to “sociologize” it appeared, which subsequently (in the late 50s and early 60s) led to the formation (however, continuing to this day) of the sociology of international relations as a relatively autonomous discipline.

Based on the foregoing, understanding the theoretical sources and conceptual foundations of the sociology of international relations involves referring to the views of the predecessors of modern international political science, considering the most influential theoretical schools and trends today, as well as analyzing the current state of the sociology of international relations.

1. International relations in the history of socio-political thought

One of the first written sources containing a deep analysis of the relationship between sovereign political units was written more than two thousand years ago by Thucydides (471-401 BC) “The History of the Peloponnesian War in Eight Books”. Many of the provisions and conclusions of the ancient Greek historian have not lost their significance to this day, thereby confirming his words that the work he compiled is “not so much a subject of competition for temporary listeners as a legacy for the ages.” Asking the question about the reasons for the long-term exhausting war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, the historian draws attention to the fact that these were the most powerful and prosperous peoples, each of which dominated its allies. “...From the time of the Median wars to the last, they did not cease either to put up, or to fight among themselves, or with falling away allies, and they improved in military affairs, refined themselves in the face of dangers and became more skillful” (ibid., p. 18). Since both powerful states turned into a kind of empire, the strengthening of one of them, as it were, doomed them to continue this path, pushing them to strive to subjugate their entire environment in order to maintain their prestige and influence. In turn, the other "empire", as well as smaller city-states, experiencing growing fear and anxiety before such an increase, take measures to strengthen their defenses, thereby being drawn into a conflict cycle that eventually inevitably turns into a war. That is why Thucydides from the very beginning separates the causes of the Peloponnesian war from the various reasons for it: “The most real reason, although in words the most hidden, is, in my opinion, that the Athenians, by their strengthening, inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians and thus led them to war” (see note 2-v.1, p.24).

Thucydides speaks not only of the dominance of force in relations between sovereign political units. In his work, one can find a mention of the interests of the state, as well as the priority of these interests over the interests of an individual (see note 2 v.1, p.91; v. II, p.60). Thus, in a certain sense, he became the founder of one of the most influential trends in later ideas and in modern science of international relations. Later this direction, called classical or traditional, was presented in the views of N. Machiavelli (1469-1527), T. Hobbes (1588-1679), E. de Vattel (1714-1767) and other thinkers, acquiring the most complete form in the work of the German general K. von Clausewitz (1780 -1831).

So, T. Hobbes proceeds from the fact that man by nature is an egoistic being. It has an enduring desire for power. Since people by nature are not equal in their abilities, their rivalry, mutual distrust, the desire to possess material goods, prestige or fame lead to a constant “war of all against all and each against each”, which is a natural state of human relationships. In order to avoid mutual extermination in this war, people come to the need to conclude a social contract, the result of which is the Leviathan state. This happens through the voluntary transfer of rights and freedoms by people to the state in exchange for guarantees of public order, peace and security. However, if relations between individuals are thus introduced into a channel, albeit an artificial and relative, but still a civil state, then relations between states continue to be in a state of nature. Being independent, states are not bound by any restrictions. To each of them belongs what it is able to seize” and as long as it is capable of holding what it has seized. Thus, the only "regulator" of interstate relations is force, and the participants in these relations themselves are in the position of gladiators, holding weapons at the ready and wary of each other's behavior.

A variation of this paradigm is the theory of political equilibrium, which was followed, for example, by the Dutch thinker B. Spinoza (1632-1677), the English philosopher D. Hume (1711-1776), as well as the above-mentioned Swiss lawyer E. de Vattel. Thus, de Vattel's view of the essence of interstate relations is not as gloomy as that of Hobbes. The world has changed, he believes, and at least “Europe is a political system, a whole, in which everything is connected with the relations and various interests of the nations living in this part of the world. It is not, as it once was, a disorderly heap of separate particles, each of which considered itself little interested in the fate of others and rarely cared about what did not concern itself directly. The constant attention of sovereigns to everything that happens in Europe, the constant presence of embassies, constant negotiations contribute to the formation of independent European states, along with national interests, of the interests of maintaining order and freedom in it. “It is this, emphasizes de Vattel, that gave rise to the famous idea of ​​political balance, the balance of power. By this is meant such an order of things in which no power is in a position to absolutely prevail over others and establish laws for them.

At the same time, E. de Vattel, in full accordance with the classical tradition, believed that the interests of individuals are secondary compared to the interests of the nation (state). In turn, “if we are talking about saving the state, then one cannot be too prudent” when there is reason to believe that the strengthening of a neighboring state threatens the security of yours. “If one so easily believes in the threat of danger, then the neighbor is to blame for this, showing various signs of his ambitious intentions” (see note 4, p. 448). This means that a preventive war against a dangerously towering neighbor is legal and just. But what if the forces of this neighbor far outnumber the forces of other states? In this case, replies de Vattel, “it is easier, more convenient and more correct to resort to ... the formation of coalitions that could resist the most powerful state and prevent it from dictating its will. This is what the sovereigns of Europe are doing today. They join the weaker of the two main powers, which are natural rivals, designed to restrain each other, as appendages to the less loaded scale to keep it in balance with the other bowl ”(see note 4, p. 451).

In parallel with the traditional one, another direction is developing, the emergence of which in Europe is associated with the philosophy of the Stoics, the development of Christianity, and the views of the Spanish Dominican theologian. F. Vittoria (1480-1546), the Dutch lawyer G. Grotius (1583-1645), the representative of German classical philosophy I. Kant (1724-1804) and other thinkers. It is based on the idea of ​​the moral and political unity of the human race, as well as the inalienable, natural rights of man. In different eras, in the views of different thinkers, this idea took different forms.

So, in the interpretation of F. Vittoria (see 2, p. 30), the priority in the relationship of a person with the state belongs to a person, while the state is nothing more than a simple necessity that facilitates the problem of human survival. On the other hand, the unity of the human race ultimately makes any division into separate states secondary and artificial. Therefore, a normal, natural human right is his right to free movement. In other words, Vittoria places natural human rights above the prerogatives of the state, anticipating and even ahead of the modern liberal-democratic interpretation of this issue.

The direction under consideration has always been accompanied by the conviction that it is possible to achieve eternal peace between people, either through the legal and moral regulation of international relations, or in other ways related to the self-realization of historical necessity. According to Kant, for example, just as relations between individuals based on contradictions and self-interest will eventually inevitably lead to the establishment of a legal society, relations between states must end in the future in a state of eternal, harmoniously regulated peace (see note 5, ch. VII). Since the representatives of this trend appeal not so much to what is, as to what is due, and, in addition, rely on the corresponding philosophical ideas, the name idealistic has been assigned to it.

The emergence of Marxism in the middle of the 19th century heralded the emergence of another paradigm in the views on international relations, which is not reducible to either the traditional or the idealistic direction. According to K. Marx, world history begins with capitalism, because the basis of the capitalist mode of production is large-scale industry, which creates a single world market, the development of communications and transport. By exploiting the world market, the bourgeoisie transforms the production and consumption of all countries into a cosmopolitan one and becomes the ruling class not only in individual capitalist states, but on a global scale. In turn, "to the same extent that the bourgeoisie, that is, capital, develops, the proletariat also develops" 6 . Thus, international relations in economic terms become relations of exploitation. On the political plane, however, they are relations of domination and subordination and, as a consequence, relations of class struggle and revolutions. Thus, national sovereignty, state interests are secondary, because objective laws contribute to the formation of a world society in which the capitalist economy dominates and the driving force is the class struggle and the world-historical mission of the proletariat. “The national isolation and opposition of peoples, wrote K. Marx and F. Engels, are disappearing more and more with the development of the bourgeoisie, with freedom of trade, the world market, with the uniformity of industrial production and the corresponding living conditions” (see note 6, p.444).

In turn, V.I. Lenin emphasized that capitalism, having entered the state-monopoly stage of development, was transformed into imperialism. In Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 7 he writes that with the end of the era of the political division of the world among imperialist states, the problem of its economic division among the monopolies comes to the fore. Monopolies are faced with an ever-growing problem of markets and the need to export capital to less developed countries with higher profit margins. In so far as they face fierce competition with each other, this necessity becomes the source of world political crises, wars and revolution.

The considered main theoretical paradigms in the science of international relations, classical, idealistic and Marxist, as a whole, remain relevant today. At the same time, it should be noted that the constitution of this science into a relatively independent field of knowledge also entailed a significant increase in the diversity of theoretical approaches and methods of study, research schools and conceptual directions. Let's consider them in a little more detail.

2. Modern theories of international relations

The above diversity has greatly complicated and problem of classification of modern theories of international relations which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by various authors.

Thus, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, singling out Anglo-Saxon concepts, Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study by authors representing the "third world" 8 .

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and the philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (which include the behaviorist school) 9 . Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author G. Briar classifies political realism, historical sociology, and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations as general theories. As for private theories, they are called the theory of international authors (B. Korani); the theory of interactions within international systems (OR Young; S. Amin; K. Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflicts and peace studies (A. Beaufr, D. Singer, I. Galtung); integration theory (A. Etzioni; K. Deutsch); theory of international organization (J. Siotis; D. Holly) 10 .

Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers and, from this point of view, they focus on the controversy between representatives of the traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations 11,12.

The fourth single out the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, emphasizing the main and turning points in the development of science 13 .

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist B. Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations based on the methods they use (“classical” and “modernist”) and the conceptual vision of the world (“liberal-pluralistic” and “materialistic-structuralist”). As a result, he identifies such areas as political realism (G. Morgenthau, R. Aron, H. Buhl), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin) and neo-Marxism (or the “dependence” school: I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, A. Frank, F. Cardozo)14. In a similar way, D. Kolyar focuses on the classical theory of the “state of nature” and its modern version (that is, political realism); the theory of "international community" (or political idealism); Marxist ideological trend and its numerous interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French school of international relations 15 . M. Merl believes that the main trends in the modern science of international relations are represented by the traditionalists, the heirs of the classical school (G. Morgenthau, S. Hoffmann, G. Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (R. Cox, D. Singer, M. Kaplan; D. Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin) currents 16 .

Examples of various classifications of modern international relations theory could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant circumstances. First, any of these classifications is conditional and unable to exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their "kinship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, questioning the opposite opinion still encountered today, there is every reason to talk about the emerging synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual “compromise” between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we confine ourselves to a brief consideration of such areas (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism And neo-marxism.

The legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Vattel and Clausewitz on the one hand, Vittoria, Grotius, Kant on the other, was directly reflected in the great scientific discussion that arose in the USA between the two world wars, the discussion between idealists and realists.

Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical sources, which are utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the belief in the need and possibility to put an end to world wars and armed conflicts between states through the legal regulation and democratization of international relations, the spread of morality and justice to them. According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of resolving conflicts that arise between its members peacefully, using legal regulation methods, increasing the number and role of international organizations that contribute to the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange. One of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism was embodied in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Wilson 17, the Bryan-Kellogg Pact (1928), which provides for the rejection of the use of force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stymson Doctrine (1932). .), according to which the United States refuses diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State J.F. Dulles and Secretary of State Z. Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), Presidents D. Carter (1976-1980) and George W. Bush (1988-1992). In the scientific literature, it was represented, in particular, by the book of American authors R. Clark and L.B. Sona Achieving peace through world law. The book proposes a project for the phased disarmament and creation of a collective security system for the whole world over the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace among peoples should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution. Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors 19 . The idea of ​​a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII "Pacem in terris" of 04/16/63, Paul VI "Populorum progressio" of 03/26/67, and John Paul II of 2. 12.80, who even today advocates the creation of a "political power endowed with universal competence."

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds of our day. Moreover, it can be said that in recent years its influence on some aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, hopelessly lagged behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it turned out to be deeply undermined due to the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was a revival on American soil of the European classical tradition, with its inherent prominence in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as "power" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict".

political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing out, in particular, to the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time to a large extent contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives R. Niebuhr, F. Schumann, J. Kennan, J. Schwarzenberger, K. Thompson, G. Kissinger, E. Carr, A. Wolfers and others determined the paths of the science of international relations for a long time. G. Morgenthau and R. Aron became the undisputed leaders in this direction.

The work of G. Morgenthau “Politics among the nation. The Struggle for Influence and Peace, the first edition of which was published in 1948, has become a kind of "bible" for many generations of political science students in the United States and other Western countries. From the point of view of Morgenthau, international relations are an arena of sharp confrontation between states. The basis of all international activity of the latter is the desire to increase their own power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. At the same time, the term "power" is understood in the broadest sense: as the military and economic power of the state, a guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, the possibility of spreading its ideological attitudes and spiritual values. The two main ways in which the state secures its power, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy, are military strategy and diplomacy. The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is a peaceful struggle for power. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest". The result of the desire of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests is the establishment on the world stage of a certain balance (balance) of power (strength), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of peace is the state of balance of power between states.

According to Mergenthau, there are two factors that can keep the aspirations of states for power within some framework - international law and morality. However, relying too much on them in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealist school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being solved with the help of collective security mechanisms or through the UN. Projects of harmonization of national interests through the creation of a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hope to avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from the six principles of political realism, which he justifies at the very beginning of his book 20 . IN summary they look like this.

1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, it is possible to create a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws, although only relatively and partially. Such a theory makes it possible to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be known. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. This notion thus avoids two errors. First, judging a politician's interest based on motives rather than behavior, and second, inferring a politician's interest from his ideological or moral preferences rather than "official duties".

Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. A rational policy is a correct policy, because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept of "interest expressed in terms of power" is not invariable. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the state's international policy takes place. This also applies to the concepts of "power" (power) and "political balance", as well as to such an initial concept, denoting the main character of international politics, as the "nation-state".

Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change the modern world. He is convinced that such a change can only be brought about by the skillful use of objective laws that have worked in the past and will work in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time, he is also aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. Oki must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!". It cannot afford suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral standards. It is one thing to know that nations are subject to the moral law in their politics, and quite another to claim to know what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. The theory of political realism comes from a pluralistic conception of human nature. A real person is both an “economic person”, and a “moral person”, and a “religious person”, etc. Only a political man" is like an animal, because he has no "moral brakes". Only the "moral man" is a fool, because he lacks caution. Only a saint can be a "religious person" because he has no earthly desires.

Recognizing this, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from others and takes place in its own terms.

As we will see later, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents and, especially, opponents of this trend. At the same time, its conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, an impartial and rigorous analysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them, all this contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment, and in the circles of statesmen of various countries.

However, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. Its transformation into a central link, cementing the beginning of some unified theory, was hampered from the very beginning by its serious shortcomings.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a "natural state" of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism essentially reduces these relations to interstate ones, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the internal and external policies of the state in the interpretation of political realists look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves are like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies with an identical reaction to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong and others are weak. Not without reason, one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table 21 . The absolutization of the role of force and the underestimation of the importance of other factors, for example, such as spiritual values, socio-cultural realities, etc. significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations, reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true because the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its desire to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has become, in fact, a hostage of its own approach. He lost sight of the very important trends and changes that have already taken place, which increasingly distinguish the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, another circumstance was overlooked: these changes require the use, along with traditional ones, of new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All this caused criticism of political realism from adherents of other approaches, and, above all, from representatives of the so-called modernist trend and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to a growing awareness of the need to supplement the political analysis of international realities with sociological ones.

Representatives of modernism", or " scientific directions in the analysis of international relations, most often without affecting the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized his adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The controversy between "modernists" and "traditionalists" reaches a special intensity, starting from the 60s, receiving the name "great new dispute" in the scientific literature (see, for example, notes 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (K. Wright, M. Kaplan, K. Deutsch, D. Singer, K. Holsti, E. Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. . Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the researcher's intuition, judgments by analogy, etc. This approach, which arose in the United States, touched upon studies not only of international relations, but also of other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil as early as the 19th century.

Indeed, even Saint-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods that have already been tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, an appropriate technical base that provides researchers with new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by a rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of international relations, a denial of both any “metaphysical prejudices” and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as emphasized by M. Merl (see note 16, pp. 91-92), this approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposite models, between which even specialists in the field of social sciences vacillate. On the one hand, this is the teaching of Charles Darwin about the ruthless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation, on the other hand, the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the USA took the second path, that of likening society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other kind of public relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, then move on to the study of interactions between their bearers and, finally, to problems related to the adaptation of a social organism to its environment. In the heritage of organicism, according to M. Merl, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on the study of the behavior of actors, the other articulation various types such behaviour. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and a systematic approach in the science of international relations (see note 16, p. 93).

Being a reaction to the shortcomings of the traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become in any way a homogeneous trend either in theoretical or methodological terms. What he has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire for the application of rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and an increase in the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which leads to the actual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivism. Nevertheless, many studies of adherents of the modernist trend turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also with very significant conclusions drawn on their basis. It is also important to note that they opened the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then the representatives transnationalism(R.O. Keohan, J. Nye), integration theories(D. Mitrani) and interdependence(E.Haas, D.Mours) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. At the center of the new "big dispute" that flared up in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and strength for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward the general idea that political realism and the statist paradigm inherent in it do not correspond to the nature and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state as an international author loses its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The diversity of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and "channels" (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them displace the state from the center of international communication, contribute to the transformation of such communication from "international" (that is, interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) to "transnational" (that is, carried out" in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond interstate interaction has led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” write American scholars J. Nye and R.O. Keohan (quoted in: 3, p. p. 91-92).

This approach was significantly influenced by the ideas put forward in 1969 by J. Rosenau about the relationship between the internal life of society and international relations, about the role of social, economic and cultural factors in explaining the international behavior of governments, about “external” sources that may have purely “ internal, at first glance, events, etc. 23.

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, the transformation of the situation in world markets, the growth in the number and importance of transnational corporations stimulated the emergence of new trends on the world stage. The prevailing among them are: the outpacing growth of world trade compared to world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes is the growing interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations 24 . Supporters of transnationalism are often inclined to consider the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, to the analysis of which the same methods are applicable that allow us to understand and explain the processes occurring in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, so many of the provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (see, for example: 25). At the same time, an undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism, with its inherent inclinations to overestimate the real significance of observed trends in changing the nature of international relations, left an imprint on it.

There is a noticeable similarity of the provisions put forward by transnationalism with a number of provisions that are defended by the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations.

Representatives neo-Marxism(P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Amin, A. Immanuel, I. Wallerstein and others) of a current as heterogeneous as transnationalism, the idea of ​​the integrity of the world community and a certain utopia in the estimation of its future are also united. At the same time, the starting point and the basis of their conceptual construction is the idea of ​​the asymmetry of the interdependence of the modern world and, moreover, of the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, of the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the former colonial countries gained their political independence. This is manifested in the inequality of economic exchanges and uneven development 26 .

So, for example, the “center”, within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends in its development on the raw materials and resources of the “periphery”. In turn, the countries of the periphery are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. Thus, they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the end, "economic growth based on integration into the world market is the development of underdevelopment" 27 .

In the 1970s, such an approach to the consideration of international relations became for the countries of the "third world" the basis of the idea of ​​the need to establish a new world economic order. Under the pressure of these countries, which constitute the majority of the member countries of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year, the Charter on economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has its own strengths and its shortcomings, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, to the enrichment of the science of international relations as a whole. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one of the currents over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (R.O. Keohan, K. Holsti, K. Waltz, R. Gilpin, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time enrich it, taking into account new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical movements. . It is significant that one of the most long-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohane, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism "power", "national interest", rational behavior, etc., remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations 28 . On the other hand, K. Walz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach due to the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of the conclusions, the need for which the supporters of the traditional view, as a rule, rejected. Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, making the existence of a global system, and not the states that are its elements, its starting point, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists 29 .

And yet, as B. Korani emphasizes, this revival of realism is much less due to its own advantages than to the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to preserve the maximum continuity with the classical school means that the lot of neorealism remains the majority of its inherent shortcomings (see note 14, p. 300-302). An even more severe sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smutz and B Badi, who argued that theories of international relations, remaining in the foam of a Western-centric approach, proved unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “to predict neither the accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War, nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to sinful social reality” 30 .

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main motives for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline of the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scientists.

3. French sociological school

Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still today bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions. At the same time, since the beginning of the 1980s, the influence of European theoretical thought and, in particular, the French school has become more and more noticeable in this area. One of the well-known scientists, Professor M. Merl of the Sorbonne, noted in 1983 that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline that studies international relations, three major trends have emerged. One of them is guided by the "empirical-descriptive approach" and is represented by the works of such authors as K.A. Colliar, S. Zorgbib, S. Dreyfus, F. Moreau-Defargue and others. The second is inspired by the Marxist provisions on which P.F. Gonidec, Ch. Chaumont and their followers in the School of Nancy and Reims. hallmark The third direction is the sociological approach, which was most vividly embodied in the works of R. Aron31.

In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of the modern French school in the study of international relations is of particular interest. The fact is that each of the theoretical currents considered above idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism exist in France as well. At the same time, they are refracted in the works of the historical and sociological direction that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left their mark on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with the problems of international relations. As domestic experts note, the formation of the main methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of the philosophical, sociological and historical thought of France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and above all Comte's positivism. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative historical method and skepticism regarding the mathematical methods of research 32 .

At the same time, in the works of specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main currents of sociological thought already established in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical legacy of E. Durkheim, the second comes from the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with the utmost clarity by such prominent representatives of the two lines in the French sociology of international relations as, for example, R. Aron and G. Boutoul.

“Durkheim’s sociology,” writes R. Aron in his memoirs, did not affect in me either the metaphysics that I aspired to become, or the reader of Proust, who wants to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society”33. “Neo-Durkheimism,” he argued, is something like Marxism in reverse: if the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and belittles the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, the denial of the existence of a dominant ideology in society is just as utopian as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot share the same values, just as totalitarian and liberal societies cannot have the same theory (see note 33, pp. 69-70). Weber, on the contrary, attracted Aron by the fact that, while objectifying social reality, he did not "reify" it, did not ignore the rationality that people attach to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: M. Weber's assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics, and concern for epistemology, characteristic of the social sciences (see note 33, p. 71). The oscillation between many plausible interpretations and the only true explanation of this or that social phenomenon, which is central to Weber's thought, became the basis for Aron's view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativism in understanding social, including international relations.

It is quite logical, therefore, that R. Aron considers international relations in the spirit of political realism as a natural, or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a fundamental change in the main feature of international relations, which consists in the legitimacy and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron emphasizes, peace is impossible, but war is improbable. From this follows the specificity of the sociology of international relations: its main problems are determined not by the minimum of social consensus, which is characteristic of intra-social relations, but by the fact that they "deploy in the shadow of war", because conflict, and not absence itself, is normal for international relations. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not the state of peace, but the state of war.

R. Aron names four groups of basic problems of the sociology of international relations applicable to the conditions of traditional (pre-industrial) civilization. Firstly, it is "to clarify the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society." Second, "the study of which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Thirdly, the study "in every era, in every specific diplomatic system, of that set of unwritten rules, more or less respected values ​​that characterize wars and the behavior of the communities themselves in relation to each other." Finally, fourthly, an analysis of the "unconscious functions that armed conflicts perform in history" 34 .

Certainly, most of current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of an impeccable sociological study in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, the above problems remain important today. New ones can be added to them, arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the 20th century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations will remain the same, as long as it will be determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the study of the decision-making process will remain the central problem. From here Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who lead states from the “rulers”, “who can only be advised and hope that they will not be crazy.” And this means that "sociology, applied to international relations, reveals, so to speak, its own boundaries" (see note 34, p. 158).

At the same time, Aron does not give up the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his fundamental work "Peace and War between Nations" he identifies four aspects of such a study, which he describes in the relevant sections of this book: "Theory", "Sociology", "History" and "Praxeology" 35 "

The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Resorting to his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels theories. The first is designed to answer questions about “what tricks the players have the right to use and which are not; how they are distributed on the different lines of the playing court; what they do to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the efforts of the enemy.

Within the framework of the rules that answer such questions, numerous situations can arise: both random and pre-planned. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations that may develop on the site. At this second level of theory, it defines recommendations that describe the rules for the effective behavior of various participants (for example, goalkeeper, defender, etc.) in various game circumstances. As typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, strategy and diplomacy are singled out and analyzed, a set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations are considered.

On this basis is built sociology international relations, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international authors. Sociology is called upon to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this way and not in some other way. Its main task is to study determinant And patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables that determine the policy of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes such issues as the nature of the influence of a political regime and/or ideology on international relations. Their elucidation allows the sociologist to derive not only certain rules of conduct for international authors, but also to identify social types of international conflicts, and also to formulate the laws of development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, we can say that at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or trainer. Now he is tackling issues of a different kind. How do matches unfold not on the blackboard, but on the playground? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? How much of the team's success belongs to the technical virtuosity, and how much to the moral qualities of the team?

It is impossible to answer these questions, Aron continues, without referring to historical research: it is necessary to follow the course of specific matches, the change in their "pattern", the variety of techniques and temperaments. The sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then in vain he will follow the actions of the players, because he will not be able to understand its tactical meaning. In the history section, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of deterrence strategy in the nuclear age, traces the evolution of diplomacy between and within the two poles of the bipolar world.

Finally, in the fourth part, devoted to praxeology, another symbolic character, the arbiter, appears. How should the provisions written in the rules of the game be interpreted? Was there really a violation of the rules under certain conditions? At the same time, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of the same team “judge” both their partners and rivals, etc. All of these judgments oscillate between performance (he played well), punishment (he played according to the rules), and morality (this team behaved in the spirit of the game). Even in sports, not everything that is not forbidden is morally justified. This applies even more so to international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited only to observation and description, it requires judgment and evaluation. What strategy can be considered moral, and what is reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of striving for peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?

As already noted, Aron's book "Peace and War between Nations" has played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school and, in particular, the sociology of international relations. Of course, the followers of his views (J.-P. Derrienick, R. Bosc, J. Unziger and others) take into account that many of the provisions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that he “did not half achieve his goal”, and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns precisely the sociological section and, in particular, the specific application of patterns and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see note 34, p. .457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and the main rationale for the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.

Explaining his position, J.-P. Derrienick 36 emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology: deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is quite arbitrary, because actionalism does not deny causality, and determinism is also "subjective", because it is the formulation of the researcher's intention. Its justification lies in the researcher's necessary distrust of the judgments of the people he studies. Specifically, this difference consists in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of causes of a special kind that must be taken into account. These are the reasons for the decision, that is, the choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is a sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with the criteria for evaluation). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problems of the sociology of international relations is the concept of "solution". At the same time, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue, according to the sociologist (that is, from interests).

As for the second trend in the French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid by G. Butul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as J.-L. Annequin, R. Carrer, J. Freund, L. Poirier and others. The polemology is based on a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of "collective aggressiveness" using the methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences. The basis of polemology, G. Butul writes, is dynamic sociology. The latter is "a part of that science which studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors which condition or correspond to them, and the modes of their reproduction" 37 . Based on the position of E. Durkheim about sociology as “history meaningful in a certain way,” polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave rise to history, since the latter began exclusively as the history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be a "history of wars." Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and borrowing of cultures, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, “violent imitation”: war does not allow states and peoples to become isolated in autarky, self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact between civilizations. But, in addition, it is also a “voluntary imitation” associated with the fact that peoples borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging wars, and so on. up to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technological progress: for example, the desire to destroy Carthage became an incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding. And in our days, all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most conspicuous of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.

Polemology must avoid a political and juridical approach, remembering that "politics is the enemy of sociology", which it constantly tries to subjugate, make its servant, just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology cannot actually study current conflicts, and, therefore, the historical approach is the main thing for it.

The main task of polemology is an objective scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that can be observed in the same way as any other social phenomenon and which at the same time is able to explain the causes of global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles related to the pseudo-obviousness of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should talk about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with legal illusory, explaining the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (likening wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of the sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the combination of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.

What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “new chapter in sociology”, as G. Butul calls the polemological trend in his book (see note 37, p. 8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has for its purposes a truly huge base of source studies, which is rarely available to other branches of sociological science. Therefore, the main question is in what directions to classify the countless facts of this huge array of documentation. Butul names eight such areas: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their diminishing objectivity; 2) a description of the types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of participants in wars about their goals; 3) the first stage of explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts; 4) the second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical views and doctrines; 5) selection and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the periodicity of wars; 8) social typology of wars, that is, the dependence of the main characteristics of war on the typical features of a particular society (see note | .37, pp. 18-25).

Based on this methodology, G. Butul puts forward and, resorting to the use of methods of mathematics, biology, psychology and other sciences (including ethnomology), seeks to substantiate his proposed classification of the causes of military conflicts. As such, in his opinion, the following factors act (according to the degree of decreasing generality): 1) violation of the mutual balance between social structures (for example, between the economy and demography); 2) the political conjunctures created as a result of such a violation (in full accordance with Durkheim's approach, they should be considered "as things"); 3) random causes and motives; 4) aggressiveness and militant impulses as a psychological projection of the psychosomatic states of social groups; 5) hostility and militant complexes ("Abraham Complex"; "Damocles Complex"; "Sensation Goat Complex").

In the studies of polemologists, one can feel the obvious influence of American modernism and, in particular, the factorial approach to the analysis of international relations. This means that these scientists also have many shortcomings of this method, the main of which is the absolutization of the role of "scientific methods" in the knowledge of such a complex social phenomenon as war is rightly considered. Such reductionism is inevitably associated with the fragmentation of the object under study, which conflicts with the declared adherence of polemology to the macrosociological paradigm. The rigid determinism underlying polemology, the desire to expel chance among the causes of armed conflicts (see, for example, note 37) entail devastating consequences in regard to the research goals and tasks it proclaims. First, it causes distrust in its ability to develop a long-term forecast regarding the possibility of outbreaks of wars and their nature. And, secondly, it leads to the actual opposition of war as a dynamic state of society to peace as a "state of order and peace" 38 . Accordingly, polemology is opposed to "irenology" (sociology of the world). However, in fact, the latter is generally deprived of its subject, since “one can study peace only by studying war” (see note 37, p. 535).

At the same time, one should not lose sight of the theoretical merits of polemology, its contribution to the development of the problems of armed conflicts, the study of their causes and nature. The main thing for us in this case is that the emergence of polemology played a significant role in the formation, legitimization and further development of the sociology of international relations, which found its direct or indirect reflection in the works of such authors as Zh.B. Durozel and R. Bosch, P. Assner and P.-M. Gallois, Ch. Zorgbib and F. Moreau-Defargue, J. Unzinger and M. Merle, A. Samuel, B. Bady and M.-K. Smoots and others, to whom we will refer in later chapters.

4. Domestic research on international relations

Until recently, these studies were painted in Western literature in one color. In fact, a substitution took place: if, for example, conclusions about the state of research on international relations in American or French science were made on the basis of an analysis of the dominant theoretical schools and the views of individual scientists, then the state of Soviet science was illuminated through a description of the official foreign policy doctrine of the USSR, interpretations of the corresponding Marxist attitudes that successively replaced each other by Soviet regimes (the regime of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, etc.) (see, for example: note 8, pp. 21-23; note 15, pp. 30-31). Of course, there were reasons for this: in the conditions of the total pressure of the official version of Marxism-Leninism and the subordination of social disciplines to the needs of the “theoretical justification of the party’s policy”, scientific and journalistic literature devoted to international relations could not but have a clearly expressed ideological orientation. Moreover, research in this area was in the zone of the closest attention of the all-powerful party authorities and state bodies. Therefore, for any research team that did not fall into the relevant nomenclature, and even more so for an individual, professional theoretical work in this area was associated with additional difficulties (due to the “closeness” of the necessary information) and risks (the price of a “mistake” could be too high). And the nomenclature science of international relations itself had, as it were, three main levels. One of them was intended to serve the needs of the foreign policy practice of the regime (analytical notes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee of the CPSU and other "leading authorities") and was trusted only by a limited circle of organizations and individuals. The other was addressed to the scientific community (albeit often under the heading "DSP"). And, finally, the third was called upon to solve the problem of propaganda among the broad masses of "the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the field of foreign policy."

And yet, as can be judged on the basis of theoretical literature, the picture was not so monotonous even then. Moreover, in the Soviet science of international relations there were both achievements and theoretical trends leading to polemics with each other. It will be exchanged primarily with the fact that the Soviet science of international relations could not develop in absolute isolation from world thought. Moreover, some of its trends received a powerful inoculation from Western schools, in particular, American modernism 39 . Others, proceeding from the paradigm of political realism, comprehend its conclusions taking into account domestic historical and political realities 40 . Thirdly, one can find an ideological affinity with transnationalism and attempts to use its methodology to enrich the traditional Marxist approach to the analysis of international relations 41 . As a result of experts' analysis of Western theories of international relations, a wider circle of readers got an idea of ​​them as well.

Nevertheless, the dominant approach remained, of course, orthodox Marxism-Leninism, so elements of any other (“bourgeois”) paradigm had to be either integrated into it, or when this could not be carefully “packaged” into Marxist terminology, or, finally, submitted in the form of "criticism of bourgeois ideology". This also applied to works specifically devoted to the sociology of international relations.

One of the first who drew attention to the need to develop this trend in the Soviet science of international relations were F.M. Burlatsky, A.A. Galkin and D.V. Ermolenko. Burlatsky and Galkin consider the sociology of international relations as constituent part political science. Noting that the traditional disciplines and methods of studying international relations have proved insufficient and that this sphere of public life, more than any other, needs an integrated approach, they believe that systems analysis is best suited to this task. It, in their opinion, is the main feature of the sociological approach, which makes it possible to consider international relations in a general theoretical plane 45 . The system of international relations is understood by them as a grouping of states based on the criteria of social class, socio-economic, military-political, socio-cultural and regional order. The main one is the social class criterion. Therefore, the main subsystems of the system of international relations are represented by capitalist, socialist and developing states. Of the other types of subsystems (for example, military-political or economic), there are both homogeneous (for example, the EEC or the Warsaw Pact) and heterogeneous (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement) subsystems (see note 45, pp. 265-273). The next level of the system is represented by its elements, which are foreign policy (or international) situations “the intersection of foreign policy interactions determined by temporal and content parameters” (see note 45, p. 273).

In addition to the above, the sociology of international relations, from the point of view of F.M. Burlatsky, is called upon to deal with such problems as: war and peace; international conflicts; optimization of international solutions; integration and internationalization processes; development of international communications; interrelation of domestic and foreign policy of the state; relations between socialist states 46 .

V.D. Ermolenko, in his understanding of the discipline under consideration, also proceeded from the macrosociological paradigm, which, however, he interpreted more broadly: “both as a set of generalizations and as a set of concepts and methods” 47 . In his opinion, the sociology of international relations is a sociological theory of the middle level, within which its own special conceptual apparatus is developed, as well as a number of private methods are created that allow conducting empirical and analytical research in the field of functioning, statics and dynamics of foreign policy situations, international events, factors, phenomena, etc. (See note 47, p. 10). Accordingly, the environment of the main problems that the sociology of international relations should deal with, he singled out the following:

a general analysis of the nature of international relations, their main patterns, main trends, the correlation and role of objective and subjective factors, economic, scientific, technical, political, cultural and ideological aspects in international relations, etc. special studies of the central categories of international relations (war and peace, non-political concept, foreign policy program, strategy and tactics, main directions and principles of foreign policy, foreign policy tasks, etc.);

a special study of categories that indicate the position of the state in the international arena, its class nature, state interests, strength, potential, moral and ideological state of the population, ties and degree of unity with other states, etc.

special studies of categories and problems related to the practical implementation of foreign policy actions: the foreign policy situation; foreign policy actions; foreign policy decisions and the mechanism for their preparation and adoption; foreign policy information and ways of its generalization, systematization and use; non-political contradictions and conflicts and ways to resolve them; international agreements and agreements, etc. study of trends in the development of international relations and domestic political events and the development of probabilistic pictures for the future (forecasting) (see note 47, pp11-12). The described approach laid the conceptual foundation for the study of specific problems of international relations with the help of specially developed analytical techniques that take into account the achievements of American modernism.

And yet, one cannot but admit that the development of the domestic science of international relations, squeezed into the narrow framework of the official ideology, experienced significant difficulties. A certain liberation from this framework was seen in the doctrine of "new political thinking" proclaimed in the mid-1980s by the creators of "perestroika". That is why, for some truth, for a very short time, tribute was paid to it even by those researchers who previously held views 49 that were very far from its content and who subsequently subjected it to sharp criticism 50 .

The starting point of the "new political thinking" was the awareness of a fundamentally new political situation in the history of mankind in the context of the global challenges that it faced by the end of the second millennium. "The basic, initial principle of the new political thinking is simple, wrote M. Gorbachev, a nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological, whatever goals" 51 . The danger of a nuclear war, other global problems that threaten the very existence of civilization, require a planetary, universal understanding. An important role in this is played by the understanding of the fact that the modern world is an indivisible integrity, although it contains diverse socio-political systems 52 .

The provision on the integrity and interdependence of the world led to the rejection of the assessment of the role of violence as the "midwife of history" and the conclusion that the desire to achieve one or another state of one's own security should mean security for all. A new understanding of the relationship between power and security has also emerged. Security began to be interpreted in such a way that it can no longer be ensured by military means, but must be achieved only through the political settlement of existing and emerging in the course of the development of interstate relations problems. Genuine security can be guaranteed more and more low level strategic balance, from which it is necessary to exclude nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. International security can only be universal, equal for all, the security of one of the parties increases or decreases to the same extent as the security of the other. Therefore, peace can be saved only by creating a system of joint security. This requires a new approach to relations between different types of socio-political systems and states, bringing to the fore not what separates them, but the common thing in which they are interested. Therefore, the balance of power must give way to a balance of interests. "Life itself, its dialectics, the global problems and dangers facing humanity require a transition from confrontation to cooperation of peoples and states, regardless of their social system" 53 .

The question of the relationship between class and universal interests and values ​​was raised in a new way: the priority of the latter over the former was declared and, accordingly, the need to de-ideologize international political and economic relations, cultural exchange, etc. Moreover, in the era of interdependence and universal values, it is not what separates them, but what unites them that comes to the fore in the interaction of states in the international arena, therefore the basis of international relations should be based on simple norms of morality and universal morality, and these relations have been rebuilt based on the principles of democratization, humanization, a new, more just world order leading to a safe, nuclear-free world (see note 51, p. 143).

Thus, the concept of “new political thinking was a significant step towards overcoming the confrontational view of the world based on the principles of opposition and struggle between two socio-political systems, the world-historical mission of socialism, etc. At the same time, this concept had a dual, contradictory character. On the one hand, it tried to bring together such incompatible things as an idealistic, normative approach to the analysis of international relations with the preservation of socialist, in the end, class ideals 54 .

On the other hand, the “new political thinking” opposes the “balance of power” and the “balance of interests” to each other. In fact, as the history of international relations and their current state shows, the realization of national interests is the goal that states are guided by in their interactions on the world stage, while force is one of the main means on the way to achieving this goal. Both the "European concert of nations" in the 19th century and the "Gulf War" at the end of the 20th century testify that the "balance of interests" largely depends on the "balance of power".

All these contradictions and compromises of the concept under consideration were revealed quite soon, and, accordingly, the short-term enthusiasm for it on the part of science also passed, which, however, in the new political conditions, ceased to be subjected to ideological pressure, and, accordingly, no longer needed official approval from the authorities. New opportunities also appeared for a developed sociology of international relations.

Notes

1. Hoffmann S. Theorie et relations intemationales. In: Revue francaise de science politique. 1961 Vol. XI.p.26-27.
2. Thucydides. History of the Penelopes War in eight books. Translated from Greek by F.G. Mishchenko with his preface, notes and index. T.I M., 1987, p.22.
3. Huntzinger J. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Paris, 1987, p.22.
4. Emer be Vattell. The law of nations, or the principles of natural law applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and sovereigns. M., 1960, p.451.
5. Philosophy of Kant and modernity. M., 1974, Ch. VII.
6. Marx K., Engels F. Manifesto of the Communist Party. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works. Ed. 2nd. T.4. M., 1955, p. 430.
7. Lenin V.I. Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Full coll. op. T.27.
8. Martin P.-M. Introduction aux relations intemationales. Toulouse. 1982.
9. Bosc R. Sociologie de la paix. Par "s. 1965.
10. BraillardG. Theories des relations internationales. Paris, 1977.
11. Bull H. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966 Vol. XVIII
12. Kuplan\1. A new Great Debate: Traditionalism versus Science in International Relations. In: World Politics. 1966 Vol. XVIII
13. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Critical analysis. M., 1976.
14. Korani B. et coll. Analyze des relations intemationales. Approches, concepts et donnees. Montreale, 1987.
15. Colard D. Les relations intemationales. Paris, New York, Barcelona, ​​Milan, Mexico, Sao Paulo. 1987.
16. Merle M. Sociologie des relations mternationales. Paris. 1974. 17 International relations as an object of study. M., 1993, ch.1.
17. Clare C. and Sohn L.B. World Pease trill World Law. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1960.
18. Gerard F. L. Unite federale du monde. Paris. 1971. Periller L. Demain, le gouvernement mondial? Paris, 1974; Le Mondialisme. Paris. 1977.
19. Morgenthau H.J. Politics among nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, 1955, p.4-12.
20. Wolfers A. Discord and Collaboration. Essays on international politics. Baltimore, 1962.
21. W ll H. The Case for a Classical Approach. In: World Politics. 1966 Vol. XVIII.
22. Rasenau J. Lincade Politics: Essay on the Convergence of National and International System. new york. 1969.
23. Nye J.S. (ml.). Interdependence and changing international politics// World economy and international relations. 1989. No. 12.
24. Laard E. International Society. London, 1990.
25. Amin S. Le Developpement inedal Paris. 1973. Emmanuel A. L "echange inegai Pans. 1975.
26. Amin S. L "accumulation a Iechelle mondiale. Paris. 1970, p.30.
27. O "Keohane R. Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and beyond In Political Science: The State of a Discipline. Washington. 1983.
28. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading. Addison Wesley. 1979.
29. Badie B., Smouts M.-C. Le retoumement du monde. Sociologie la scene Internationale. Paris. 1992, p. 146.
30. Merle M. Sur la "problematique" de I "etude des relations Internationales en France. In: RFSP. 1983. No. 3.
31. Tyulin I.G. Foreign policy thought of modern France. M., 1988, p.42.
32. Aron R Memoires. 50 ans de reflection politique. Paris, 1983, p.69.
33. Tsygankov P.A. Raymond Aron on political science and sociology of international relations // Power and Democracy. Foreign scientists about political science. Sat. M., 1992, pp. 154-155.
34. Aron R. Paix et Guerre entre les nations. Avec une presentation inedite de I'autenr. Paris, 1984.
35. Derriennic J.-P. Esquisse de problematiqie pour une sociology des relations intemationales. Grenoble, 1977, p. 11-16.
    The work of this Canadian scholar and follower of R. Aron (under whose guidance he wrote and defended his dissertation on the problems of the sociology of international relations) with good reason refers to the French school, although he is a professor at Lavaal University in Quebec.
36. Borthoul G. Paris. Traite de polemologie. Sociologie des querres. Paris.
37. BouthovI G., Carrere R., Annequen J.-L. Guerres et civilization. Paris, 1980
38. Analytical methods in the study of international relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Tyulina I.G., Kozhemyakova A.S. Khrustaleva M.A. M., 1982.
39. Lukin V.P. Centers of Power: Concepts and Reality. M., 1983.
40. Shakhnazarov G.Kh. Changing the balance of power between socialism and capitalism and the problem of peaceful coexistence // Great victory Soviet people. 1941- 1945. M., 1975.
41. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Ed. Gantmana V.I. M., 1976.
42. Kosolapoe R.I. Social nature of international relations // World economy and international relations. 1979 #7; Podolsky N.V. International relations and class struggle. M., 1982; Leninist foreign policy and the development of international relations. M., 1983.
43. Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations. Collection of scientific papers. Ed. Ashina G.K., Tyulina I.G. M., 1982.
44. Burlatsky F.M., Galkin A.A. Sociology. Policy. International relationships. M., 1974, pp. 235-236.
45. Vyatr E. Sociology of political relations. M., 1970, p.11.
46. Ermolenko D.V. Sociology and problems of international relations (some aspects and problems of sociological research of international relations). M., 1977, p.9.
47. Khrustalev M.A. Methodological problems of modeling international relations // Analytical methods and techniques in the study of international relations. M., 1982.
48. Pozdnyakov E.A., Shadrina I.N. On humanization and democratization of international relations // World economy and international relations. 1989. No. 4.
49. Pozdnyakov E.A. We ourselves ruined our house, we ourselves must raise it / / World economy and international relations. 1992. No. 3-4.
50. Gorbachev M.S. Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world. M., 1987, p.146.
51. Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. M., 1986, p.6.
52. Gorbachev M.S. Socialist idea and revolutionary perestroika. M., 1989, p.16.

Sometimes this trend is classified as utopianism (see for example: Carr EH. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956).

In the majority of textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism is either not considered as an independent theoretical trend, or serves as nothing more than a "critical background" in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical trends.

“THORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS P.A. Tsygankov* MORTON KAPLAN AND A SYSTEMIC STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS The article is dedicated to the 55th anniversary of...»

Vestn. Moscow university Ser. 25. International relations and world politics. 2012. No. 1

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

P.A. Tsygankov*

MORTON KAPLAN AND SYSTEMS RESEARCH

INTERNATIONAL POLICY

The article is dedicated to the 55th anniversary of the publication of Morton's book

Kaplan "System and Process in International Politics"

significant influence on the development of international political theory.

An assessment is given of the typology of international systems proposed by M. Kaplan, based on two main criteria - the number of actors and the configuration of power, and forms of political behavior of states in the sphere of international relations. The scientific contribution of the work of M. Kaplan and the lessons that can be learned from the opposition of the "scientific" approach to the "traditional" one are comprehended.

Key words: Morton Kaplan, international relations theory, typology of international systems, system modeling, force configuration, behaviorism.

Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine an analysis of interstate relations, world processes, and even specific events in a particular region or country, not to mention research and attempts to predict global politics, without referring to the foundations of a systematic approach laid down in the work of Morton Kaplan "System and process in international politics”, which was published more than half a century ago.

*** Morton Kaplan is one of the representatives of the Chicago School of Political Science, known for its contribution to the development of empirical research and the formation of a behavioral direction. Lomonosov (e-mail: [email protected]).

leniya. The first generation of this school (1920-1930s), headed by C. Merriam and two of his colleagues, G. Gosnell and G. Lasswell, who became known as an ecological school, was strongly influenced by the sociological approach. Its representatives were skeptical about traditional historical and institutional directions, insisting on the need to introduce new research methods based on a more systematic and objective verification of political science judgments with empirical data.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the contradictions between the supporters of the historical-institutional-legal (L. White and G. Pritchett) and the behavioral or behaviorist (A. Zolberg, D. Greenstone and D. McRoy) approaches escalated again.

G. Almond argued: “It was a time when democracy was crushed on the European continent and when freedom of research and scientific research seemed to have little future in the light of developing events. And only after the Second World War, in the context of the great scientific revolution in nuclear physics and molecular biology, the impending rivalry with the USSR, which launched the satellite, did behaviorism reach national and global scales. … In the early post-war decades, there were many necessary and sufficient reasons for a behavioral revolution.”

Under these conditions, a group of so-called Young Turks, headed by D. Easton, M. Kaplan and L. Binder, advocated strengthening the empirical component in political science. The discussion that unfolded demanded clarification of the philosophical foundations and general theoretical premises of the adherents of both directions. This second wave of the behaviorist movement found its supporters on a national scale, which was facilitated by innovative works, in particular, by such authors as H. Ilow, O. Early, W. Millet and G. Almond (representative of the first wave).

G. Almond, G. Powell, S. Verba and G. Eckstein became pioneers of empirical comparative studies, and M. Kaplan and F. Schumann were among the first to apply this approach to the study of international relations [for more details, see: 29].

Behaviorists sought to discover uniformity and repetition in political behavior by systematically selecting and recording empirical data that could be quantified and accurately quantified. The results of such operations were to be used to test the validity of theoretical generalizations. At the same time, value judgments, questions of a philosophical nature, ethical assessments were to be considered analytically different from the process of empirical examination. The systems approach was entirely in keeping with this rationalist tradition. He answered both the methodological imperative of "modernism" - the use of quantitative research procedures and the formalization of scientific research, and the desire to create a general theory.

Already in the late 1950s, the costs of the positivist trend in political science seemed to have been successfully overcome. As S. Hoffman argued in 1959, “... all modern political science has a theoretical orientation, which is a reaction against the former “hyperfactualism”, as well as the influence of the physical sciences, sociology, communication sciences” .

However, in the science of international relations, the discussion continued, receiving after 1966 the name of the “second big dispute”, which affected precisely its theoretical orientation. Describing the views of the new generation of international affairs specialists, H.

Bull wrote:

“They strive for a theory of international relations, the provisions of which would be based on logical or mathematical proofs or on exact empirical verification procedures. Some of them think that classical theories international relations have no value, and imagine themselves to be the founders of a completely new science. Others believe that the results of the classical approach had some value, and perhaps even treat them with a certain sympathy, like the owner of the latest brand of car contemplating an old model. However, in both cases they hope and believe that their own type of theory will completely supplant the classical type.

Putting forward seven arguments in defense of the classical approach to the study of international relations, H. Bull paid special attention to criticism of M. Kaplan's theory of international systems, arguing that the models of international systems formulated by him and the basic rules characteristic of the behavior of each of them are, in fact, nothing more than than the "common place" gleaned from daily discussions about international relations and the general political structure that the world had or could have had.

Responding to criticism, M. Kaplan emphasized that the basic concept of the work "System and Process in International Politics"

simple enough. If the number, type, and behavior of states change over time, and if their military capabilities, economic resources, and information also vary, then it is likely that there is some relationship between these elements, due to which systems with different structures and behavior can be distinguished, characteristic of different periods of history. This concept, the author argues, may not be entirely correct, but it does not seem devoid of meaning for studying the issue of the influence of one or another type of international system on the foreign policy of states. Such a study requires systematic hypotheses about the nature of the relationships between variables, and only after these hypotheses have been developed can history be studied to confirm or refute them. Without this, the researcher has no criterion on the basis of which he can choose from the infinite set of facts at his disposal. These initial hypotheses point to areas of evidence that are most relevant to this type of study. There is reason to think that if the hypotheses are erroneous, then this will become quite obvious when trying to use them.

“The main idea of ​​this work,” writes M. Kaplan, “is that the development of knowledge about politics is possible only when considering data about it in terms of action systems. An action system is a set of variables that are different from the general parameters of the system and are interconnected in such a way that the described patterns of their behavior reflect the internal relationships of the quantities among themselves, as well as the relationship of a group of these quantities with a group of quantities that are outside the system under consideration.

This is a typology of international systems based on two main criteria: the number of actors and the power configuration. The results obtained by M. Kaplan allowed him to create such a typology and identify six types of international systems, or, more precisely, six states of equilibrium of one superstable international system, taking into account the specified criteria. At the same time, only two types correspond to the real history of international politics: the “balance of power system”, in which only the main actors, i.e. states (or rather, great powers) have significant military and economic potential; and a "soft (flexible) bipolar system" (loose bipolar system), which includes, in addition to national actors (states), international intergovernmental organizations, i.e. supranational actors in international politics. This type of international system consists of both global, universal actors and actors belonging to one of two blocs.

Four other types of international systems, which are described in the work of M. Kaplan, are, in fact, some kind of ideal models that never existed in reality. Thus, the “tight bipolar system” assumes that each actor that does not belong to either of the two blocks loses any noticeable influence or disappears. "Universal System"

(universal system), or “universal integrated system”, is characterized by the fact that in it important imperious political functions are transferred from states to a universal (global) organization that has the right to determine the status of certain countries, allocate resources to them and monitor compliance with agreed rules of international behavior. "Hierarchical system"

(hierarchical system) follows from the universal one, taking the form of a world state in which the role of specific countries is minimized. Finally, the “unit veto system” assumes that each actor (a state or a union of states) is able to effectively influence the overall international policy, since it has the ability (associated, for example, with the possession of nuclear weapons) to protect itself from any other states or coalitions of states.

This typology is not permanent. Subsequently, the author singled out such variants of the "flexible bipolar system" as "very flexible bipolar system", "discharge system" and "unstable block system". As a variant of the "single veto system"

he also considered the "partial proliferation system" model.

The typology of international political systems developed by M. Kaplan became one of the foundations, on the basis of which he deduced various types of political behavior of states in the sphere of international relations.

Having singled out for this purpose five types (models) of such behavior (associated with the criteria for organizing the decision-making process, the distribution of benefits from interaction, preferences for creating coalitions, the content and direction of political activity, as well as the ability to adapt to the conditions in which decisions must be made), the author proceeded to a direct examination of each of them, trying to show how the behavior of this or that actor will change depending on its type and the type of international system.

Thus, unlike most researchers of his time, M. Kaplan is far from referring to history, considering historical data too poor for theoretical generalizations.

Based on general systems theory and systems analysis, he constructs abstract theoretical models designed to contribute to a better understanding of international reality.

Based on the conviction that the analysis of possible international systems involves the study of the circumstances and conditions in which each of them can exist or be transformed into a system of another type, he asks questions about why this or that system develops, how it functions, how reasons is in decline. In this regard, M. Kaplan names five variables inherent in each system: the basic rules of the system, the rules for transforming the system, the rules for classifying actors, their abilities and information. The main ones, according to the researcher, are the first three variables.

"Basic rules" define the relations between actors, whose behavior depends not so much on the individual will and special goals of each, but on the nature of the system of which they are components.

The "rules of transformation" express the laws of change in systems. Thus, it is known that in the general theory of systems, the emphasis is on their homeostatic character - the ability to adapt to changes in the environment, i.e. ability to self-preservation. Moreover, each model (or each type) of the system has its own rules of adaptation and transformation. Finally, the "rules for the classification of actors" include their structural characteristics, in particular the hierarchy that exists between them, which also affects their behavior.

According to M. Kaplan, the models constructed by him in his work “System and Process in International Politics” set the theoretical framework within which types of events that are apparently not related to each other can be brought into relationship with each other. From his point of view, any theory includes: a) a set of basic terms, definitions, axioms; b) formulation on their basis of provisions that will have an unambiguous empirical justification; c) the possibility of verifying or falsifying these provisions with the help of a controlled experiment or observation. At the same time, the researcher argued that for a preliminary, or initial, theory of international politics, the following are acceptable: first, certain mitigations of these requirements;

secondly, the removal of the condition for confirming the logical sequence; thirdly, the lack of a clear, unambiguous interpretation of the terms and methods of "laboratory" verification of provisions.

The question is whether M. Kaplan, even with these restrictions, managed to get closer to the realization of the modernist goal - the creation of a truly scientific theory of international relations, which will completely supplant classical traditionalism.

In broad terms, it is quite obvious that M. Kaplan, like most of his other colleagues - representatives of the so-called scientific (scientist) direction, rather shares the main provisions of classical political realism. Thus, he proceeds from the principle of anarchy in international relations: “Since there is no such judge who could keep disputes of this kind within any given boundaries, it cannot be said that this system has a full political status. In the modern international system, nation-states have political systems, but the international system itself has no such status. The international system can be characterized as a zero-status system.

The researcher's closeness to realistic positions was also manifested in his interpretation of the main actors of international relations - M. Kaplan considers states to be such, and first of all great powers. He is also convinced that the realist “doctrine based on the concept of “interest” is a fairly adequate description of the international system of the “balance of power”, despite the fact that from time to time within this system “sensations” (or “passion”) prevailed over "interest". Since the anarchic nature of international relations makes a clash of interests inevitable, they should be considered objective and considered primarily in terms of military security. From the point of view of M. Kaplan, “there is no direct inclination of national actors towards solidarity and cooperation, just as there is no transferable inclination that would force them to put the needs of other national actors above their own” .

Of course, one cannot fail to see that one of the main provisions on which the concept of M. Kaplan is based is the statement about the fundamental role of the structure of the international system in the behavior of states. In this issue, the researcher not only joins the canonical political realism, but also to a certain extent anticipates the theoretical constructions of neorealism. In addition, together with other modernists, he took another step forward compared to traditional realists, drawing attention to the relationship between foreign and domestic policies, which made it possible to enrich not only the factorial, but also the actor approach, including in the analysis, in addition to states, also substate and suprastate actors. . And yet, in general, the theoretical constructions of M. Kaplan do not go far beyond the realist tradition.

The theory of system modeling directly proposed by him also raises questions. M. Kaplan argues that there is no difference between the physical and human sciences when it comes to the need for empirical confirmation, and that, along with empirical research, the systems theory of international politics requires the use of models. So, for example, from his point of view, one can imagine a computer connected to the information bank system, which receives information from spies about the upcoming actions of the enemy, analyzes them taking into account the previous actions of this enemy and builds models of his future behavior, which makes it possible to make decisions. on measures to prevent them. However, in the words of H. Bull, it is the technique of building models that raises questions. Indeed, on the basis of what criteria did the author create such models, what is the measure of their rigor and logic, how do they correlate with the main types of behavior of international actors formulated earlier? M. Kaplan's theory does not provide answers to such questions.

In his desire to create a universal and indisputable knowledge of international relations, which would be similar to the natural sciences, M. Kaplan pays special attention to the comparison of theoretical models with historical international systems. At the same time, he is forced to admit the imperfection of this method of constructing a theory. “If the theoretical model is stable, but the historical system is unstable, then this means that some factor that has a certain effect has not been taken into account in the theory. If both systems are stable, then there is a possibility that the reasons for this are different from those contained in the hypotheses. Possible answers to this question can be obtained either through a deeper study of particular systems, or through additional comparative studies that will allow us to determine the differences in certain cases. The identification of forcing parameters would probably require an increase in the number of comparative studies. Obviously, however, such procedures do not give confidence in the final result, both because of the lack of clarity about their required number, and because of the unproven likelihood of repeating the types of international behavior of political actors.

One of the important criteria for the scientific character of knowledge, modernists consider its objectivity, which requires impartiality of assessments and freedom from ideological judgments from the scientist. Following this imperative, M. Kaplan even defines values ​​on the basis of needs and goals dictated by them, i.e. purely instrumental. However, this does not prevent him from expressing judgments of an exclusively ideological nature, not amenable to any of the scientific criteria. So, for example, he claims that the USSR "was forced to enter the war on the side of the West."

Despite the paucity of such provisions and the fact that they are by no means central in terms of the main issues of the book and its tasks, such statements cannot but undermine the credibility of the author’s theoretical constructions, who used the ideological clichés of the Western media, which impose on the mass consciousness anti-Soviet (and today - anti-Russian) myths. For science, such judgments are of no interest (logicians call them "useless"). Their purpose is different - the mobilization of public opinion, maintaining it in a state of constant readiness to approve some foreign policy guidelines and reject others. With their gross historical untruth, such statements once again confirm the illusory nature of the thesis about the possibility of an absolutely impartial, non-ideologized, free from any preferences, and therefore strict and purely scientific theory of international relations.

M. Kaplan proceeds from the prescriptive function of the theory, which is quite logical for a representative of the "scientific" direction, postulating the limitless possibilities of empirically verifiable knowledge. In this regard, an important place in his book is given to strategy, understood by the author as "the study of the restrictions that may be imposed on the rational choice of an opponent" or "the consideration of problems associated with predicting certain actions under given conditions" .

According to M. Kaplan, the main tool for solving strategic problems can be game theory, which allows analyzing various options for rational choice when making decisions in situations of certainty, uncertainty and risk. The researcher is convinced that this theory “is a fairly accurate tool, which is based on quite clearly expressed provisions. In the areas in which it finds application, one can be sure of the absence of errors (from the standpoint of common sense). In addition, knowledge of game theory is also important for studying those problem areas where it has not yet been used. In these areas, in the absence of better tools of analysis, game theory can be applied to clarify the provisions of common sense.

However, it was the rational choice theories that prevailed in the economics department of the University of Chicago in the 1970s and then invaded political science, as well as all social sciences, with the aim of making them truly scientific, that became a significant challenge to the conceptual views of M. Kaplan. According to K. Monroe, supporters of rational choice theories criticized behaviorism and the systemic theory of inputs and outputs, which, from their point of view, is not very suitable for understanding the psychological features of the decision-making process. The position of behaviorism, according to which external observers can only distinguish behavior, ceased to satisfy many, and cognitive scientists (led by G. Simon, a representative of another Chicago school) joined the economists in pushing rational choice methodology to the forefront of political research in the 1970s. Ultimately, the important philosophical difference between rational choice methodology and behaviorism was often virtually ignored. Behaviorists and rational choice theorists united in opposition to postmodernist attacks on "science", and the concepts of the second wave of the Chicago School turned out to be incorporated into ordinary common sense, in other words, they disappeared into rational choice theory.

Thus, the conceptual constructions of M. Kaplan did not stand the test in two respects: they did not become a replacement (or at least one of the replacement elements) for the "traditional" theory of international relations, and their "scientific" was not enough for the "rationality" of game theory supporters.

This does not mean, however, that the work of M. Kaplan left no traces, and his work was completely forgotten. The merit of the scientist is that he was one of the first to raise the question of the laws of functioning, change and comparative advantages of international systems of various configurations. The content of these laws is debatable, although the subject of such discussions, as a rule, is the same and concerns the comparative advantages of bipolar and multipolar systems.

So, R. Aron believed that the bipolar system contains a tendency to instability, since it is based on mutual fear and encourages both opposing sides to be rigid in relation to each other because of the opposition of their interests.

M. Kaplan also expresses a similar opinion, arguing that the bipolar system is more dangerous, as it is characterized by the desire of counterparties for global expansion, implies a constant struggle between them either to maintain their positions or to redistribute the world. Of course, the multipolar system of the balance of power contains certain risks (for example, the risk of nuclear proliferation, conflict between small actors, or the unpredictability of the consequences that changes in blocs between great powers can lead to), but they do not compare with the dangers of a bipolar system.

Without limiting himself to such remarks, M.

Kaplan considers the "rules" of stability for bipolar and multipolar systems and identifies six rules that each of the poles of a multipolar system must adhere to to keep it stable:

1) expand their capabilities, but better through negotiations than through war;

2) it is better to fight than not to be able to expand their capabilities;

3) it is better to stop the war than to destroy a great power, because there are optimal sizes of the interstate community (it is no coincidence that European dynastic regimes believed that their opposition to each other had natural limits);

4) resist any coalition or individual nation trying to dominate the system;

5) to resist any attempts of this or that national state to “join the supranational international organizational principles”, i.e. to the dissemination of the idea of ​​the need for the subordination of states to any higher authority;

6) treat all great powers as acceptable partners; allow a defeated country to enter the system as an acceptable partner, or replace it by strengthening another, previously weak state.

One gets the impression that these rules are derived inductively from the foreign policy of the great powers (primarily the United States) and then (already in a deductive way) are presented as the general principles of their behavior in a multipolar system.

At the same time, it is obvious that the non-observance by the "winners" in the "cold war" of rule 3 and especially rule 6 (with the objective impossibility of fulfilling its third part) with subsequent stubborn attempts to contain post-Soviet Russia on the path to great power contributed to the chaos of the international system and the decrease in its security.

M. Kaplan also raised the issue of the optimal number of poles in a multipolar power balance system. Many believe that five great powers are necessary for the greatest stability of such a system. According to M. Kaplan, this is the minimum limit, and the level of safety increases when the number of poles exceeds a certain upper limit, which has not yet been identified. Of course, this question has not found its theoretical solution (as, indeed, the problem of the relative degree of safety of bi- and multipolar systems) and is unlikely to be found on the path of system modeling. However, its very formulation and discussion, initiated by the work of M. Kaplan, contribute to the development of the theory of international relations, since, on the one hand, they reveal many other theoretical problems, and on the other hand, they warn against one-sided conclusions and decisions based on them.

Among the merits of M. Kaplan is the appeal to the sociological approach in the study of international relations.

Analysis in terms of interest groups, role functions, cultural factors gave him the opportunity to go beyond the unilateral state approach: he not only distinguished several types of national, supranational and subnational actors, but also identified signs of social intrusion, albeit within the framework of a hypothetical model of a hierarchical international system :

"... the rules of the hierarchical system are transferred mainly to functional actors such as trade unions, industrial organizations, police organizations and organizations within the health care" . Turning to the sociological approach allowed the scientist, albeit contrary to the general logic of rational choice, to notice that “national actors can behave just as irrationally and inconsistently as people”

However, the main merit of M. Kaplan is that thanks to his work "System and Process in International Politics"

he was one of the first scientists to draw attention to the importance, fruitfulness and need for a systematic approach in this area of ​​research.

Indeed, despite the fact that the understanding of the importance of this approach in the social sciences dates back to Antiquity, it has only recently become widespread in them, and in the theory of international relations it has become relevant due to an attempt to make it the basis for studying and predicting the political interactions of states, which was first tested by M. Kaplan. He made a significant contribution to the consideration of international reality as a certain integrity, functioning according to its own, albeit not always clear and unchanged, laws, and not just as a set of interacting elements that can be studied in isolation. At the same time, one of the main ideas of the concept of M. Kaplan is to postulate the fundamental role that its structure plays in the knowledge of the laws and determinants of the international system. This idea is shared by the vast majority of researchers: J. Modelski and O. Young, M. Haas and S. Hoffmann, K. Waltz and R. Aron built their theories on its basis ...; the founders of the English school [see: 11], constructivism and neo-Marxism in the theory of international relations relied on it. In domestic science, the use of a systematic approach in this area of ​​research has yielded fruitful results in the works of A.D. Bogaturova, N.A. Kosolapova, M.A. Khrustalev and many others.

The indicated advantages of M. Kaplan's work are not canceled by the subsequently identified limits and risks associated with the use of system analysis [see, for example: 8; 27]. The risks are due to the fact that, firstly, no system that has reached a certain level of complexity can be fully known: as soon as the researcher goes beyond relatively simple systems, the grounds for considering his conclusions correct are significantly reduced. Secondly, not every reality can be "squeezed" into the conceptual boundaries of the systems approach without the threat of distorting its inherent characteristics. Third, there may be a temptation to replace research analytics with simplistic holism. Fourth, system analysis can obscure alternative approaches, because often a superficial comparison of different objects creates the impression that their common features make them similar, while researchers forget that the objects under study also have differences that may turn out to be much more significant. Fifth, the systems approach is quite conservative, which is associated with a superficial analogy between mechanical and organic systems, on the one hand, and social systems, on the other. Thus, the issues of balance, stability and survival of the system are the fruits of the transfer of models from one sphere to another on the basis of superficial analogies, without the necessary consideration of the characteristics of social (in this case, international) systems. Finally, sixthly, questions of a philosophical, even ethical nature arise, connected with the influence of system analysis on political behavior. The risk is that the systems theory, revealing the mechanisms of functioning, factors of balance, harmony and disharmony of social systems, can lead to political action, the norms of which are determined by a certain model. It is a question of reducing the study of international relations to "sociotechnical" procedures. However, the political practice of international relations cannot be reduced to a simple application of scientific data. The technical and organizational rationality of system models, as Yu. Habermas noted, does not exhaust the rationality of political action [see. about it: 27]. And this despite the fact that political action, like human behavior in general, is by no means always distinguished by rationality.

It is worth noting that M. Kaplan himself saw the limits and pitfalls of a systematic approach. So, he emphasized that, firstly, “... methods of mathematical study of the complex problem of interactions in the system have not yet been developed. For example, a physicist can make accurate predictions about a system with two participants, rough predictions about a system with three participants, and only partial predictions about a system with a large number of participants. A scientist cannot predict the path of one gas molecule in a whole tank full of gas.

Second, the predictions that a physicist makes are only applicable to an isolated system. The scientist does not make a prediction about the amount of gas in the tank, about the invariance of the temperature in the tank, or that it will always be at the place of the experiment. It predicts what will be the characteristic behavior of most of the gas molecules under constant conditions of temperature, pressure, etc.” . In this regard, M. Kaplan believed that those who develop models do not consider them applicable at all. They are applicable only within a certain social context, which must be specified in advance. In doing so, it is extremely important to determine whether this context actually exists.

M. Kaplan also warned: “Game theory has not solved the most important problems of strategy, especially those that arise in the field of international politics. … Game theory analysis is not an accurate tool for addressing these issues. This kind of analysis cannot also serve as a substitute for other political and sociological theories. “However, if game theory is not currently a sufficient tool of analysis, then it at least narrows the scope in which rational decision-making can take place, and also shows the factors that influence strategic games” . Ultimately, M. Kaplan wrote: “The degree of confidence that we attach to our research will never come close to that which a physicist has in relation to the study of mechanics. ... At the same time, without theoretical models, we are unable to operate even with the differences that are available to us, and study these issues with the same degree of depth.

It is no coincidence that even such an opponent of the “scientific” approach as H. Bull, not only did not deny, but actively used the concept of “international system” in his research, believing that its main attributes are, “firstly, the existence of many sovereign states; secondly, the level of interaction between them in the sense in which they form a system;

thirdly, the degree of acceptance general rules and institutions in the sense in which they shape society. It is no coincidence that the three most common approaches to the study of international relations today - from the standpoint of the international system, international society and world society - do not exclude, but mutually presuppose each other. As K. Boulding emphasized, the study of international systems undertaken by M. Kaplan is extremely important, and not so much from the point of view of the results he achieved, but from the standpoint of the methodological path that it opens up in the analysis of international relations.

This is primarily due to the heuristic potential that a systematic approach has, facilitating the task of finding conditions for balance and stability, mechanisms for regulating and transforming international systems. In this regard, the work of Morton Kaplan can still serve as a significant help in the analysis of international politics today.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. Essays on the theory and political analysis of international relations. M.: Scientific and educational forum on international relations, 2002.

2. Wallerstein I. Analysis of world systems and the situation in modern world. St. Petersburg: University book, 2001.

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No. 1. P. 91-93.

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6. Berton P. International Subsystems - A Submacro Approach to International Studies // International Studies Quarterly. 1969 Vol. 13. No. 4. Special Issue on International Subsystems. P. 329-334.

7. Boulding K. Theoretical Systems and Political Reality: A Review of Morton A. Kaplan System and Process in International Politics // Journal of Conflicts Resolution. 1958 Vol. 2. P. 329-334.

8 Braillard Ph. Thorie des systmes et relations internationales. Bruxelles:

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Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. P. 20-38.

11. Buzan B. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School // International Organization. 1993 Vol. 47. No. 3. P. 327-352.

12. Deutsch K., Singer D. Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability // World Politics. 1964 Vol. 16. No. 3. R. 390-406.

13. Finnemore M. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

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15. Haas M. National Subsystems: Stability and Polarity // The American Political Science Review. 1970 Vol. 64. No. 1. P. 98-123.

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Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

21. Kaplan M.A. Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems // The American Political Science Review. 1957 Vol. 51. No. 3.

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by J. Rosenau. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1969. P. 291-303.

25. Kaplan M.A., Burns A.L., Quandt R.E. Theoretical Analysis of the Balance of Power // Behavioral Science. 1960 Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 240-252.

26. Kaplan M.A., Katzenbach N. De B. The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law // The American Political Science Review. 1959 Vol.

53. No. 3. P. 693-712.

27. Meszaros T. Quelques reflexions sur l'ide du systme en sciences politiques // Encyclopdie de L'Agora. URL: http://agora.

qc.ca/cosmopolis.nsf/Articles/no2007_2_Quelques_reflexions_sur_lidee_de_systeme_en_scien?OpenDocument (visit: 2/15/2012).

28. Modelski G. Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics // International Studies Quarterly. 1996 Vol. 40. No. 3. P. 321-342.

29. Monroe K.R. The Chicago School: Forgotten but Not Gone // Perspectives Forum on the Chicago School of Political Science. March 2004 Vol. 2.

No. 1. P. 95-98.

30. Nettl P. The Concept of System in Political Science // Political Studies.

1966 Vol. 14. No. 3. P. 305-338.

31. Onuf N. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

32. Rosecrance R. Action and Reaction in World Politics. Boston: Little Brown, 1963.

33. Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub, 1979.

34. Wendt A. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

35. Young O. Systems of Political Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
"NAUKA" MOSCOW -1968 CONTENTS B. A. Uspensky (Moscow). Relationships of subsystems in language and are connected...» VARIANTS OF DISORDERS OF MENTAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF ST. According to the modern anthropological ... "energetics them. L.A. Melentiev, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Irkutsk, Russia [email protected], [email protected] Annotation In s...»

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The theory of international relations in the XXI century. Moscow: International relations, 2015.

Work in the field of international relations theory (ITR) in Russia does not always meet with understanding and encounters difficulties of an objective nature. There are many who view it as something secondary to applied and regional studies. Some are fascinated by non-empirically verifiable conspiracy theories and, when discussing the springs of world politics, tend to express themselves in semi-allusions. The weakness of the material and educational base of the still young discipline, the lack of specialists and the relatively low involvement of the Russian academic community in global research projects also belong to the difficulties in the development of TME.

All this hardly contributes to Russia's solution of large-scale foreign policy tasks. The processes of regionalization and cultural and civilizational identification are gaining momentum in the world. Russia is increasingly positioned by politicians as a "state-civilization", which must defend its positions in the face of growing competition between great powers for their interests and values. In the global community of international affairs, there is a growing need for the formation of national and regional schools of international relations. The polemic between the supporters of universal and cultural-regional specific knowledge is put forward in the position of a new important dispute. Even in the United States, which more than others lay claim to the formation of universal knowledge, it was not the first time that international congresses were held under the motto of discussing the cultural specifics of theoretical research.

The book by Timofey Bordachev and his co-authors Elena Zinovieva and Anastasia Likhacheva is an important contribution to the development of TMT in Russia. Its publication testifies to the emergence among Russian international affairs specialists of more clear and previously present in latent forms of differences in theoretical positions. As a textbook for bachelors, the book nevertheless clearly indicates an orientation towards the classical realism of Edward Carr, Raymond Aron and Henry Kissiger and the increment of knowledge in the tradition of positivism. The authors fit realism into a broad historical and theoretical context, analyzing a number of classic works from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War to Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics. A clear designation of positions is intended to contribute to a more active discussion of the chosen approach by international experts, thereby pushing the development of the TMT.

The orientation of the authors towards classical realism does not mean that they ignore other approaches. In particular, the textbook pays tribute to the liberal, Marxist and constructivist paradigms. There are chapters on both the great ideological debates in the IMT and the structural and critical areas related to the formation of a systems approach, integration theories, varieties of world-system analysis, and understanding the significance of socio-cultural norms in international relations. Positioning the book as sustained in the traditions of classical realism does not mean ignoring other directions within the framework of the realist paradigm. In addition to the classical direction, the strengths and weaknesses of the structural directions of realism (neorealism and neoclassical realism) and geopolitics are analyzed.

The undoubted advantages of the book by Bordachev and his co-authors include the clarity of presentation and the explanation in an accessible language of the advantages of classical realism. These advantages are associated with the analysis of the most dangerous political processes (conflicts and wars), understanding the existing balance of power in world politics and giving priority to states, especially great powers, which remain the most important participants in international relations. Whatever one writes today about the growing role of global institutions or non-governmental organizations, the crisis of economic globalization and the political order in the world has revealed the importance of the interaction of states - the United States, Germany, Russia, China and others - in preventing further destabilization of the world order. Whatever one may say about the decentralization and “hybridization” of violence in the Middle East and Eurasia, it is obvious that it is a consequence of the contradictions of states, and its level cannot be reduced without reducing friction and conflicts between states.

Compared with structural trends, classical realism is also distinguished by a non-reductionist approach to the increment of theoretical knowledge. Along with the use of strictly scientific methods and models borrowed from mathematics, the authors of the book, following Nicollo Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, Hedley Bull and others, do not abandon the qualitative understanding of the realities of world politics, pay tribute to logic and intuition, understand that theory, being a system of comprehension connections and patterns, is "both the result of analysis and a tool for promoting one's ideas." The undoubted successes of the book include the wealth of empirical material, including the chronology of the most important events, intellectual portraits of leading international experts, as well as the presence of "cases" (from the English case-studies) that serve as an illustration and context of the theoretical provisions under consideration. Thanks to this, TMO comes to life, clearly demonstrating its necessity and viability.

However, one should also mention the characteristic weaknesses of the approach used in the book. They are largely inherent in realism itself and can only partly be addressed to the authors of the textbook. I will point out two of them in particular.

The first is related to the fact that realists, as the most conservative trend in academic TMT, do not adapt quickly enough to the changes taking place in the world, including those that should be within their direct competence. For example, the information revolution that has been going on for several decades has not yet produced deep developments by representatives of realist theory. They prefer to analyze wars, including those with the use of new systems of violence and weapons, but have not yet made information wars the subject of their attention. Information wars and the issue of "soft power" are actively discussed by experts, books and articles are published on these topics, including in Russia. As for the leading Western journals of academic realism, which seek to set the tone in matters of theory, such as International Security And Security Studies, then this issue is almost not presented there. Meanwhile, informatization and globalization pose in a new way, but by no means cancel the need for a realistic understanding of the dilemmas of security, as old as the world, and the problems of national sovereignty, imperialism and others.

By the way, in the study of the media space, the meanings that are being formed in it, and the challenges and opportunities that arise for the state in academic science, much more has been done by those whom realists rarely honor with attention - constructivists, post-structuralists and representatives of critical theory and critical geopolitics. The authors of the book devote a separate chapter to constructivism, but barely mention post-structuralism and critical geopolitics, although it was the latter that intellectually prepared a relatively new and now relatively independent direction - constructivism.

The second weakness of realism in general - although classical to a lesser extent than structural - is connected with its inclination towards a static-conservative understanding not only of the world system, but also of the processes of formation of social knowledge. The authors of the book pay considerable attention to the methods of studying international relations, but it seems that Russian realists and international specialists in general need a full discussion of a wide range of issues related to the methodology, epistemology and ontology of knowledge. What is the discursive nature and conceptual structure of the national interest? What values ​​underlie it? Should values ​​be considered separately or in conjunction with interests? It is difficult to answer these questions without understanding how theory is included in the context of social and cultural realities and how it transforms in response to this context. If this context is important, is it permissible to insist on the universal nature of our knowledge of international relations, as realists do?

In fairness, I note that classical realism is known for its skepticism not only towards the universalist ambitions of transforming the world, but also towards attempts to form a universally applicable system of knowledge about international relations. British researcher Edward Carr wrote, for example, that the Western science of international relations should be understood as "the best way to rule the world from a position of strength", without doubting that "the study of international relations in the universities of Africa and Asia, if carried out from the point of view of the exploitation of the weak by the strong. However, the skepticism inherent in classical realism is hardly a sufficient foundation for the increment of theoretical knowledge. For such an increment, it is necessary to comprehend the foundations of this skepticism, related to the study of the peculiarities of national perception, the multidirectional trajectories of national historical development, the originality of the geographical location and cultural context. In connection with the comprehension of these realities, the importance of developing a national TMO is obvious, which can support the promotion of the country's image, interests and values ​​in the world. Here one cannot do without integrating the best achievements of Russian political thought, which for centuries has been analyzing the cultural and civilizational features of Russia and their influence on the country's relations with the external environment. Unfortunately, structuralist realists were unable to appreciate the richness of historical and cultural conditions and national values ​​and their influence on the formation of TMT in various countries and regions. The authors of the book are aware of the importance of the problem, completing their work with a chapter on national schools of international relations.

Summing up, I want to support the efforts of Bordachev and his co-authors to develop an academic trend in Russia related to classical realism. Sensitivity to alternative approaches at home and abroad, coupled with a focus on fact-checked knowledge, will help Russian scholars get involved in global studies of international relations and gradually form their own theoretical directions. Like any TMT, realism is strong in its openness to other directions and approaches and willingness to learn from them, while remaining realism. Fruitful, in particular, is the interaction of realism and constructivism with its attention to the systems of meanings, values ​​and identities that are emerging in world politics. Without the theoretical integration of the latter, it is difficult to imagine the full promotion of the national interests and cultural and civilizational values ​​of Russia in the world. The above critical considerations do not negate the need to develop the classical realist trend. On the contrary, active efforts to develop this and other areas will contribute to the pluralization of knowledge, without which the full growth of TMT is impossible.

The most well-established provisions and conclusions of the world international political science are generalized and systematized; its basic concepts and the most famous theoretical directions are given; gives an idea of ​​the current state of this discipline in our country and abroad. Particular attention is paid to the globalization of world development, changes in the nature of threats to international security, and the features of a new generation of conflicts. For students of higher educational institutions studying in the areas and specialties of "International Relations", "Regional Affairs", "Public Relations", "Sociology", "Political Science", as well as undergraduates, graduate students and university professors.

Preface Chapter 1. Object and subject of international political science Chapter 2. The problem of method in the theory of international relations Chapter 3. The problem of patterns of international relations Chapter 4. Traditions, paradigms and disputes in TIR Chapter 5. Modern schools and trends in the theory of international relations Chapter 6 International system Chapter 7. Environment of the system of international relations Chapter 8. Participants of international relations Chapter 9. Goals, means and strategies of participants in international relations Chapter 10. National interests: concept, structure, methodological and political role Chapter 11. International security Chapter 12. Problem legal regulation of international relations Chapter 13. Ethical dimension of international relations Chapter 14. Conflicts in international relations Chapter 15. International cooperation Chapter 16. Social foundations of the international order Instead of a conclusion Appendix 1. Some international principles, doctrines, theories. International organizations, treaties and agreements Appendix 2. Resources on the Internet dedicated to research in the field of international relations (A.B. Zruzhitt)

The above diversity has greatly complicated the problem of classifying modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria that can be used by certain authors.

Thus, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, highlighting the Anglo-Saxon concepts, the Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the "third world" (8)

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and the philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (towards the behaviorist school) (9) Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author Philip Briar refers to the general theories of political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations. As for private theories, among them are: the theory of international actors (Bagat Korani); the theory of interactions within international systems (George Modelski, Samir Amin; Karl Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace studies (Lucien Poirier, David Singer, Johan Galtwig); integration theory (Amitai Etzioni; Carl Deutsch); theory of international organization (Inis Claude; Jean Siotis; Ernst Haas) (10)

Still others believe that the main dividing line will be the method used by certain researchers, and, from a ϶ᴛᴏth point of view, they focus on the controversy between representatives of traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations (11,12)

The fourth are based on highlighting the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, highlighting the main and turning points in the development of science (13)

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist Bagat Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations on the basis of the methods they use ("classical" and "modernist") and the conceptual vision of the world ("liberal-pluralistic" and "materialist").

Examples of various classifications of modern theories of international relations could be continued. It should not be forgotten that it is important, however, to note at least three significant circumstances. First of all, any of these classifications is conditional and cannot exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations1. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome ϲʙᴏe "blood relationship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, contrary to the opposite opinion still encountered today, there is every reason to talk about the emerging synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual "compromise" between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we confine ourselves to a brief consideration of such trends (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-Marxism.

"However, they do not set themselves such a goal. Their goal is different - to comprehend the state and theoretical level achieved by the science of international relations by summarizing the available conceptual approaches and comparing them with what was done earlier.

The legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Do not forget that Watgel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vitoria, Greece, Kant, on the other, found direct reflection in that major scientific discussion that arose in the United States between the two - Lrvymi wars, discussions between realists and idealists. |Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical sources, such as utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the belief in the need and possibility to end world wars and conflicts between states through the legal regulation and democratization of international relations, the spread of morality and justice to them.According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of resolving conflicts that arise between its members peacefully, using legal methods. regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange.It is important to note that one of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism found its ϲʙᴏe embodiment in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Woodrow Wilson (17), in the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), which provides for the rejection of the use of force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stymson Doctrine (1932), according to which the United States refuses diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State John F. Dulles and Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of this country), President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) and President George W. Bush (1988-1992) In the scientific literature, it was represented, in particular, by the book of such American authors as R. Clark and L.B. Dream "Achieving peace through world law." The book proposes a step-by-step project

"Sometimes the ϶ᴛᴏ direction qualifies as utopianism (see, for example: Carr. N. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956.

th disarmament and creation of a system of collective security for the whole world for the period 1960-1980.
It is worth noting that the main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between nations should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution (18) Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors (19) The idea of ​​a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII - "Pacem in terns" or 04/16/63, Paul VI - "Populorum progressio" dated 03/26/67, and John Paul II - dated 12/2/80, who even today advocates the creation of "political power endowed with universal competence.

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds of our day. Moreover, it can be said that in recent years its influence on certain aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

With all this, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day1) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, hopelessly lagged behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it turned out to be deeply undermined due to the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was a revival on American soil of the European classical tradition, with its inherent promotion of such concepts as "power" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict" in the analysis of international relations.

It is worth saying that political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing out, in particular, to the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time

In the majority of textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism is either not considered as an independent theoretical trend, or serves as nothing more than a "critical background" in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical trends.

They contributed to the unleashing of the Second World War to a large extent, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives - Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Walfers and others - determined the path of the science of international relations for a long time. The undisputed leaders of the ϶ᴛᴏth direction were Hans Morgenthau and Reymond Aron.

1 The work of G. Morgenthau "It is worth saying - the political relations between the Nazis] Mi. Struggle for power", the first edition of which was published in | 48, became its kind of "bible" for many generations (D || political scientists both in the United States itself and in other countries "" JSffaaa. From the position of G. Morgenthau, international relations / pbl are an arena of acute confrontation between states. In ostyuve of all international activities of the latter lies their desire to increase their power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. With ϶ᴛᴏm, the term "power" is understood in the broadest sense: as the military and economic power of the state, the guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, the possibility of spreading its ideological attitudes and spiritual values. the state provides itself with power, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy - military strategy and diplomacy.The first of these is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is a peaceful struggle for power. We note the fact that in the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest". The result of the desire of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests will be the establishment of a certain balance (balance) of power (strength) on the world stage, which will be the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of the world - ϶ᴛᴏ is the state of balance of power between states.

According to Morgenthau, there are two factors that are able to keep the aspirations of states to power within some limits - ϶ᴛᴏ international law and morality. At the same time, relying too much on them in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealist school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being solved by means of collective security mechanisms or

means of the UN. Projects of harmonization of national interests through the creation of a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hope to avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from six principles of political realism, which he substantiates at the very beginning of his book (20) In brief, they look as follows.

1. It is worth saying that politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, there is the possibility of creating a rational theory, which is able to reflect these laws - although only relatively and partially. It is this theory that makes it possible to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It is worth noting that it provides a link between the mind, seeking to understand international politics, and the facts to be known. It is worth noting that it allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not related to the data, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Note that this concept thus avoids two errors. First of all, judgments about the interest of a politician on the basis of motives, and not on the basis of his behavior. And, secondly, deducing the interest of a politician from his ideological or moral preferences, and not from his "official duties".

It is worth saying that political realism includes not only a theoretical, but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. A rational policy is a correct policy, as it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept "interest expressed in terms of power" will not be unchanged. It is important to understand that it depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the international policy of the state takes place. This also applies to the concepts of "power" (power) and "political balance", as well as to such an initial concept, denoting the main character of international politics, as the "nation-state".

It is worth saying that political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change

modern world. He is convinced that such a change can only be brought about by the skillful use of objective laws that have worked in the past and will work in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. It is worth saying - political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time, he is also aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. It is worth noting that they must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!". It is worth noting that it cannot afford suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. It is worth saying that political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral norms. It is important to note that it is one thing to know that nations are subject to the moral law in their politics, and quite another to claim to know what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. Note that the theory of political realism proceeds from a pluralistic conception of human nature. A real person is ϶ᴛᴏ and "economic man", and "moral man", and "religious man", etc. Only "political man" is like an animal, since he has no "moral brakes". Only a "moral person" is a fool, because he lacks caution. Only

*PeJEDi^^fe^yLhuman"> can be exceptionally holy, because he has ^y^Ynv^^desires.

^Three times, political realism upholds the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from others and takes place in its own terms.

As we will see from the further presentation, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents - and, even more so, opponents - of this direction. With all this, its conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, the desire for an impartial and rigorous analysis

The lysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and the fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them, all contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment and in the circles of statesmen in various countries.

At the same time, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. From the very beginning, its serious shortcomings prevented its transformation into a central link, cementing the beginning of a certain unified theory.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a "natural state" of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism, in essence, feeds these relations to interstate ones, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state in the interpretation of political realists look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves look like some kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical reaction to external influences. The only difference is that some states will be strong, while others will be weak. No wonder one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table (21). reality, etc., - significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations, reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true because the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as "power" and "national interest" remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its desire to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has, in fact, become a hostage of its own approach. He did not take into account very important trends and changes that have already taken place, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. It is important to note that at the same time one more circumstance was overlooked: the fact that these changes require the use, along with traditional ones, of new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All ϶ᴛᴏ caused criticism in hell-

than political realism on the part of adherents of other sub-hov, and, above all, on the part of representatives of the so-called modernist trend and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to a growing awareness of the need to supplement the political analysis of international realities with sociological ones.

Representatives of ^modernism*, or the "scientific" direction in the analysis of international relations, most often without affecting the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. It is worth saying that the controversy between "modernists" and "traditionalists" reaches a special intensity, starting from the 60s, having received the name "new big dispute" in the scientific literature (see, for example: 12 and 22). the desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (Quincy Wright, Morton Caplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Kalevi Holsti, Ernst Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the researcher’s intuition, judgments by analogy, etc. . This approach, which arose in the United States, touched upon studies not only of international relations, but also of other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil as early as the 19th century.

Indeed, Sei-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods that have already been tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, a ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙa technical base that gives researchers new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by a rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of inter-

international relations, rejecting both any "metaphysical prejudices" and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. At the same time, as M. Merl emphasizes (see: 16, pp. 91-92), this approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposite models, between which specialists in the field of social sciences also hesitate.
From one point of view, ϶ᴛᴏ is the teaching of Charles Darwin about the ruthless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation. On the other hand, the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the USA took the second path - the path of likening society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From a ϶ᴛᴏ point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, with a transition then to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to his surroundings. In the heritage of organicism, according to M. Merl, two trends can be distinguished. It is important to note that one of them focuses on the study of the behavior of actors, the other - the articulation of various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second - to functionalism and a systematic approach in the science of international relations (see: ibid., p. 93)

Being a reaction to the shortcomings of the traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become in any way a homogeneous trend - either in theoretical or methodological terms. What he will have in common will be mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, to increase the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which leads to the actual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivism. It should be noted that, nevertheless, many studies of adherents of the modernist trend turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also with very significant

my conclusions drawn from them. It should not be forgotten that it is also important to note the fact that they opened the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then representatives of transnationalism (Robert O. Koohane, Joseph Nye), integration theories (David Mitrani) and interdependence (Ernst Haas, David Mo-urs) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. At the center of the new "great dispute" that flared up in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and strength for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward a general idea, according to which political realism and the etatist paradigm that is characteristic of it do not fit the character and main trends of international relations and therefore should be from abandoned. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state, as an international actor, loses its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The diversity of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and "channels" (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them, oust the state from the center of international communication , contribute to the transformation of such communication from "international" (i.e., interstate, if we recall the data-logical meaning of the ϶ᴛᴏth term) into "transnational * (i.e., carried out in addition to and without the participation of states)" Rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond interstate interactions has led us to think in terms of transnational relations," American scientists J. Nye and R. Kooheyi write in the preface to her book "Transnational Relations and World Politics".

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, the transformation of the situation in world markets, the growth in the number

and the importance of transnational corporations stimulated the emergence of new trends on the world stage. The prevailing among them are: the outstripping growth of world trade compared to world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes will be an increase in the interdependence of the world and a relative decrease in the role of force in international relations (23) Proponents of transnationalism1 often tend to consider the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, to the analysis of which the same methods are applicable, which allow understanding and explaining the processes occurring in any social organism. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that, in essence, we are talking about a macro-sociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, which is why many of the provisions of the ϶ᴛᴏ movement continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (24) At the same time, his undoubted ideological affinity with classical idealism, with its inherent inclinations to overestimate the real significance of observed trends in changing the nature of international relations, left its mark on him. A certain similarity of the provisions put forward by transnationalism with a number of provisions that defend the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations will also be noticeable.

Representatives of neo-Marxism (It is worth saying - Paul Baran, It is worth saying - Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Arjiri Immanuel, Immanuel Do not forget that Wallerstein and others) - a trend as heterogeneous as transnationalism, is also united by the idea of ​​the integrity of the world community and a certain utopia in assessing its future. At the same time, the starting point and the basis of their conceptual constructions is the idea of ​​the asymmetry of the interdependence of modern

"Among them, one can name not only many scientists from the USA, Europe, and other regions of the world, but also well-known political figures - for example, such as former French President V. Giscard d" Estaing, influential non-governmental political organizations and research centers - for example. Palme Commission, Brandt Commission, Club of Rome, etc.

moreover, about the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, about the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the former colonial countries gained their political independence. This will be in the inequality of economic exchanges and uneven development (25)

For example, the "center", within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends in its development on the raw materials and resources of the "periphery". At the same time, the countries of the periphery will be consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. It should be noted that in this way they fall into the dependence of the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the end, "economic growth based on integration into the world market is underdeveloped development (tm)" (26)

In the 1970s, such an approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the Third World countries of the idea of ​​the need to establish a new world economic order. Under the pressure of these countries, which make up the majority of the member countries of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year, a Charter on economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has ϲʙᴏ and strengths and ϲʙᴏ and shortcomings, each demonstrates certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. It is worth saying that the controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, to the enrichment of the science of international relations as a whole. With all this, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

The ϶ᴛᴏt term itself demonstrates the desire of a number of American scientists (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Greiko, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time

namely, to enrich it, taking into account the new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical trends. It is significant that one of the most long-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohane, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism "power", "national interest", rational behavior, etc. - remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations (27) On the other hand, K. Waltz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach due to the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of the conclusions, the need for which is traditionally rejected by the supporters of the traditional view.

The emergence of the school of neorealism in international relations is associated with the publication of the book by K. Waltz "Let us note that the theory of international politics", the first edition of which was published in 1979 (28) Defending the main provisions of political realism ("natural state" of international relations, rationality in the actions of the main actors, national interest as their main motive, striving for the possession of power), its author at the same time criticizes their predecessors for the failure of attempts to create a theory of international politics as an autonomous discipline. He criticizes Hans Morgenthau for identifying foreign policy with international politics, and Raymond Aron for his skepticism about the possibility of creating International Relations as an independent theory.

Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, taking as its starting point the existence of a global system, and not states that will be its elements, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.

With ϶ᴛᴏm, the systemic nature of international relations is conditioned, according to K. Walz, by actors not interacting here, not by their main features (associated with geographical location, demographic potential, socio-cultural specifics, etc.), but by the features of the structure of the international system . (For this reason, neorealism is often classified as structural realism or simply structuralism.) Being a consequence of the interactions of international actors, the structure of the international system at the same time does not tend to a simple sum of such interactions, but represents

is an independent phenomenon capable of imposing certain restrictions on states, or, on the contrary, offering them favorable opportunities on the world stage.

It should be emphasized that, according to neorealism, the structural features of the international system are actually independent of any efforts of small and medium-sized states, being the result of interactions between great powers. This means that it is precisely to them that the "natural state" of international relations is truly characteristic. As for the interactions between the great powers and other states, they can no longer be characterized as anarchic, as they take on other forms, which most often depend on the will of the great powers.

It is important to note that one of the followers of structuralism, Barry Bazan, developed its main provisions in relation to regional systems, which he considers as intermediate between the global international and state systems (29) The most important feature of regional systems, from his point of view, will be the complex security. The point is that neighboring states turn out to be so closely connected with each other in matters of security that the national security of one of them cannot be separated from the national security of others.
It should be noted that the structure of any regional subsystem is based on two factors, which are considered in detail by the author:

the distribution of opportunities among the existing actors and the relations of friendliness or hostility between them. With ϶ᴛᴏm, both, B. Bazan shows, are subject to manipulation by the great powers.

Using the methodology proposed in this way, the Danish researcher M. Mozaffari made it the basis for the analysis of structural changes that occurred in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq by allied (and in essence - American) troops (30) As a result, he came to the conclusion about the operational nature of structuralism, about its advantages in comparison with other theoretical directions. With all this, Mozaffari also shows the weaknesses inherent in neorealism, among which he names the provisions about the eternity and immutability of such characteristics of the international system as its "natural state", the balance of forces, as a way of stabilizing, its inherent static (see: ibid., p. .81)

due to its own advantages than to the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to maintain maximum continuity with the classical school means that most of its inherent shortcomings remain the lot of neorealism (see: 14, p. 300, 302). An even more severe sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smooey and B. Badi, according to their theories of international relations, remaining in captivity of the Western-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as "predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War , nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to sinful social reality "(31)

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main motives for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline - the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scientists.