Recently, parliamentary hearings “Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens: “The Immortal Regiment”” were held in the Duma. They were attended by deputies, senators, representatives of legislative and supreme executive bodies of state power of the subjects Russian Federation, the ministries of education and science, defense, foreign affairs, culture, members of public associations, organizations of foreign compatriots ... True, there were no those who came up with the action itself - journalists from Tomsk TV-2, no one even remembered them. And, in general, there was really no need to remember. "Immortal Regiment", which, by definition, did not provide for any staffing, no commanders and political officers, has already completely transformed into a sovereign "box" of parade crew, and its main task today is to learn to step in step and keep alignment in the ranks.

“What is a people, a nation? First of all, it is respect for victories,” Vyacheslav Nikonov, chairman of the parliamentary committee, admonished the participants when opening the hearings. — ​Today, when new war, which someone calls "hybrid", our Victory becomes one of the main targets for attacks on historical memory. There are waves of falsification of history that should make us believe that it was not us, but someone else who won, and also make us apologize ... ”For some reason, the Nikonovs are seriously sure that it was they, long before own birth, won Great Victory for which, moreover, someone is trying to make them apologize. But they weren't attacked! And the aching note of the nationwide misfortune that has not passed, the phantom pain for the third generation of the descendants of the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War is drowned out by a cheerful, thoughtless cry: “We can repeat it!”

Really, can we?

It was at these hearings that a terrible figure was named in between times, which for some reason was not noticed by anyone, which did not make us stop in horror on the run in order to understand WHAT we were told after all. Why this was done now, I do not know.

At the hearings, the co-chairman of the Immortal Regiment of Russia movement, State Duma deputy Nikolai Zemtsov, presented the report “Documentary basis of the People’s Project “Establishing the Fates of the Missing Defenders of the Fatherland”, within the framework of which studies of the population decline were carried out, which changed the idea of ​​the scale of the losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

“The total decline in the population of the USSR in 1941-1945 was more than 52 million 812 thousand people,” Zemtsov said, citing declassified data from the USSR State Planning Committee. - Of these, irretrievable losses as a result of the action of war factors - more than 19 million military personnel and about 23 million civilians. The total natural mortality of military personnel and the civilian population during this period could have amounted to more than 10 million 833 thousand people (including 5 million 760 thousand - ​deceased children under the age of four). The irretrievable losses of the population of the USSR as a result of the action of war factors amounted to almost 42 million people.

Can we… do it again?!

Back in the 60s of the last century, the then young poet Vadim Kovda wrote a short poem in four lines: “ If only in my front door / there are three elderly disabled people / then how many of them were injured? / And killed?

Now these elderly people with disabilities due to natural causes are less and less visible. But Kovda imagined the scale of losses quite correctly, it was enough just to multiply the number of front doors.

Stalin, proceeding from considerations inaccessible to a normal person, personally determined the losses of the USSR at 7 million people - a little less than the losses of Germany. Khrushchev - 20 million. Under Gorbachev, a book was published, prepared by the Ministry of Defense under the editorship of General Krivosheev, “Secrecy has been lifted”, in which the authors named and in every possible way justified this very figure - 27 million. Now it turns out that she was wrong.

“I forgive the Russians in advance for everything they do with Germany” (With)

This article discusses the losses suffered by the Red Army, the Wehrmacht and the troops of the satellite countries of the Third Reich, as well as the civilian population of the USSR and Germany, only in the period from 06/22/1941 until the end of hostilities in Europe

1. Losses of the USSR

According to the official data of the 1939 census, 170 million people lived in the USSR - significantly more than in any other single country in Europe. The entire population of Europe (excluding the USSR) was 400 million people. By the beginning of World War II, the population Soviet Union differed from the population of future enemies and allies by a high mortality rate and low life expectancy. Nevertheless, the high birth rate ensured a significant increase in the population (2% in 1938–39). Also, the difference from Europe was in the youth of the population of the USSR: the proportion of children under 15 years old was 35%. It was this feature that made it possible relatively quickly (within 10 years) to restore the pre-war population. The share of the urban population was only 32% (for comparison: in the UK - more than 80%, in France - 50%, in Germany - 70%, in the USA - 60%, and only in Japan did it have the same value as in USSR).

In 1939, the population of the USSR increased markedly after the entry into the country of new regions (Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states, Bukovina and Bessarabia), whose population ranged from 20 to 22.5 million people. The total population of the USSR, according to the certificate of the CSB on January 1, 1941, was determined at 198,588 thousand people (including the RSFSR - 111,745 thousand people). According to modern estimates, it was still less, and on June 1, 41 it was 196.7 million people.

Population of some countries for 1938–40

USSR - 170.6 (196.7) million people;
Germany - 77.4 million people;
France - 40.1 million people;
Great Britain - 51.1 million people;
Italy - 42.4 million people;
Finland - 3.8 million people;
USA - 132.1 million people;
Japan - 71.9 million people.

By 1940, the population of the Reich had increased to 90 million people, and taking into account satellites and conquered countries - 297 million people. By December 1941, the USSR had lost 7% of the country's territory, on which 74.5 million people lived before the start of the Second World War. This once again emphasizes that despite Hitler's assurances, the USSR had no advantages in human resources over the Third Reich.

During the entire period of the Great Patriotic War in our country, 34.5 million people put on military uniforms. This amounted to about 70% of the total number of men aged 15–49 in 1941. The number of women in the Red Army was approximately 500,000. The percentage of those called up was higher only in Germany, but as we said earlier, the Germans covered the labor shortage at the expense of European workers and prisoners of war. In the USSR, such a deficit was covered by the increased length of the working day and the widespread use of the labor of women, children and the elderly.

For a long time, the USSR did not talk about direct irretrievable losses of the Red Army. In a private conversation, Marshal Konev in 1962 called the figure 10 million people, the well-known defector - Colonel Kalinov, who fled to the West in 1949 - 13.6 million people. The figure of 10 million people was published in the French version of the book "Wars and Population" by B. Ts. Urlanis, a well-known Soviet demographer. In 1993 and 2001, the authors of the well-known monograph “Secrecy Removed” (edited by G. Krivosheev) published the figure of 8.7 million people; at the moment, it is indicated in most reference literature. But the authors themselves state that it does not include: 500,000 conscripts called up for mobilization and captured by the enemy, but not included in the lists of units and formations. The almost completely dead militiamen of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other large cities are also not taken into account. Currently the most complete lists irretrievable losses Soviet soldiers make up 13.7 million people, but approximately 12-15% of entries are repeated. According to the article " Dead Souls Great Patriotic War" ("NG", 06/22/99), the historical and archival search center "Fate" of the "War Memorials" association found that due to double and even triple counting, the number of dead soldiers of the 43rd and 2nd Shock armies in the studied the center of the battles was overestimated by 10-12%. Since these figures refer to the period when accounting for losses in the Red Army was not accurate enough, it can be assumed that in the whole war, due to double counting, the number of dead Red Army soldiers is overestimated by about 5–7%, i.e., by 0.2– 0.4 million people

On the issue of prisoners. The American researcher A. Dallin, according to archival German data, estimates their number at 5.7 million people. Of these, 3.8 million died in captivity, that is, 63%. Domestic historians estimate the number of captured Red Army soldiers at 4.6 million people, of which 2.9 million died. Unlike German sources, this does not include civilians (for example, railway workers), as well as seriously wounded who remained on the battlefield occupied by the enemy, and subsequently died from wounds or shot (about 470-500 thousand). The situation of prisoners of war was especially desperate in the first year of the war, when more than half of their total number (2.8 million people) was captured, and their labor had not yet been used in interests of the Reich. Open-air camps, hunger and cold, illness and lack of medicines, cruel treatment, mass executions of the sick and incapable of work, and simply of all those who are objectionable, primarily commissars and Jews. Unable to cope with the flow of prisoners and guided by political and propaganda motives, the occupiers in 1941 sent home over 300 thousand prisoners of war, mainly natives of western Ukraine and Belarus. Subsequently, this practice was discontinued.

Also, do not forget that approximately 1 million prisoners of war were transferred from captivity to the auxiliary units of the Wehrmacht. In many cases, this was the only chance for prisoners to survive. Yet again most of these people, according to German data, at the first opportunity tried to desert from units and formations of the Wehrmacht. In the local auxiliary forces of the German army stood out:

1) voluntary helpers (hiwi)
2) order service (one)
3) front-line auxiliary parts (noise)
4) police and defense teams (gema).

At the beginning of 1943, the Wehrmacht operated: up to 400 thousand Khivs, from 60 to 70 thousand Odies, and 80 thousand in the eastern battalions.

Some of the prisoners of war and the population of the occupied territories made a conscious choice in favor of cooperation with the Germans. So, in the SS division "Galicia" for 13,000 "places" there were 82,000 volunteers. More than 100 thousand Latvians, 36 thousand Lithuanians and 10 thousand Estonians served in the German army, mainly in the SS troops.

In addition, several million people from the occupied territories were deported to forced labor in the Reich. The ChGK (Extraordinary State Commission) immediately after the war estimated their number at 4.259 million people. More recent studies give a figure of 5.45 million people, of which 850-1000 thousand died.

Estimates of the direct physical extermination of the civilian population, according to the ChGK of 1946.

RSFSR - 706 thousand people.
Ukrainian SSR - 3256.2 thousand people.
BSSR - 1547 thousand people
Lit. SSR - 437.5 thousand people.
Lat. SSR - 313.8 thousand people.
Est. SSR - 61.3 thousand people.
Mold. SSR - 61 thousand people.
Karelo-Fin. SSR - 8 thousand people. (ten)

Another important question. How many former Soviet citizens chose not to return to the USSR after the end of the Great Patriotic War? According to Soviet archival data, the number of "second emigration" was 620 thousand people. 170,000 Germans, Bessarabians and Bukovinians, 150,000 Ukrainians, 109,000 Latvians, 230,000 Estonians and Lithuanians, and only 32,000 Russians. Today, this estimate seems to be clearly underestimated. According to modern data, emigration from the USSR amounted to 1.3 million people. Which gives us a difference of almost 700 thousand, previously attributed to irretrievable losses of the population.

For twenty years, the main estimate of the losses of the Red Army was the figure of 20 million people, “far-fetched” by N. Khrushchev. In 1990, as a result of the work of a special commission of the General Staff and the USSR State Statistics Committee, a more reasonable estimate of 26.6 million people appeared. At the moment it is official. Attention is drawn to the fact that back in 1948, the American sociologist Timashev gave an assessment of the losses of the USSR in the war, which practically coincided with the assessment of the General Staff Commission. Maksudov's assessment made in 1977 also coincides with the data of the Krivosheev Commission. According to the commission of G. F. Krivosheev.

So let's summarize:

Post-war estimate of the losses of the Red Army: 7 million people.
Timashev: Red Army - 12.2 million people, civilian population 14.2 million people, direct casualties 26.4 million people, total demographic 37.3 million.
Arntts and Khrushchev: direct human: 20 million people.
Biraben and Solzhenitsyn: Red Army 20 million people, civilian population 22.6 million people, direct human resources 42.6 million, total demographic 62.9 million people.
Maksudov: Red Army - 11.8 million people, civilian population 12.7 million people, direct casualties 24.5 million people. It is impossible not to make a reservation that S. Maksudov (A.P. Babenyshev, Harvard University, USA) determined the purely combat losses of the spacecraft at 8.8 million people
Rybakovsky: direct human 30 million people.
Andreev, Darsky, Kharkov (General Staff, Krivosheev Commission): direct combat losses of the Red Army 8.7 million (11,994 including prisoners of war) people. Civilian population (including prisoners of war) 17.9 million people. Direct human losses 26.6 million people.
B. Sokolov: the loss of the Red Army - 26 million people
M. Harrison: total losses of the USSR - 23.9 - 25.8 million people.

The estimate of the losses of the Red Army, given in 1947 (7 million) is not credible, because not all calculations, even with the imperfection of the Soviet system, were completed.

Khrushchev's assessment is also not confirmed. On the other hand, the “Solzhenitsyn” 20 million people lost only to the army or even 44 million are just as unfounded (without denying some talent of A. Solzhenitsyn as a writer, all the facts and figures in his writings are not confirmed by a single document and understand where he came from that took - impossible).

Boris Sokolov is trying to explain to us that the losses of the armed forces of the USSR alone amounted to 26 million people. He is guided by the indirect method of calculations. The losses of the officers of the Red Army are quite accurately known, according to Sokolov, this is 784 thousand people (1941–44). , displays the ratio of the losses of the officer corps to the rank and file of the Wehrmacht, as 1:25, that is, 4%. And, without hesitation, he extrapolates this technique to the Red Army, receiving his own 26 million irretrievable losses. However, this approach, on closer examination, turns out to be inherently false. Firstly, 4% of officer losses is not an upper limit, for example, in the Polish campaign, the Wehrmacht lost 12% of officers to the total losses of the Armed Forces. Secondly, it would be useful for Mr. Sokolov to know that with the regular strength of the German infantry regiment of 3049 officers, there were 75 people in it, that is, 2.5%. And in the Soviet infantry regiment, with a strength of 1582 people, there are 159 officers, i.e. 10%. Thirdly, appealing to the Wehrmacht, Sokolov forgets that the more combat experience in the troops, the lower the losses among officers. In the Polish campaign, the loss of German officers? 12%, in the French - 7%, and on the Eastern Front already 4%.

The same can be applied to the Red Army: if at the end of the war the loss of officers (not according to Sokolov, but according to statistics) was 8-9%, then at the beginning of the Second World War it could have been 24%. It turns out, like a schizophrenic, everything is logical and correct, only the initial premise is incorrect. Why did we dwell on Sokolov's theory in such detail? Yes, because Mr. Sokolov very often sets out his figures in the media.

In view of the foregoing, discarding the obviously underestimated and overestimated estimates of losses, we get: the Krivosheev Commission - 8.7 million people (with prisoners of war 11.994 million data for 2001), Maksudov - the losses are even slightly lower than the official ones - 11.8 million people. (1977? 93), Timashev - 12.2 million people. (1948). The opinion of M. Harrison can also be included here, with the level of total losses indicated by him, the losses of the army should fit into this interval. These data are received various methods calculations, because both Timashev and Maksudov, respectively, did not have access to the archives of the USSR and Russian Defense Ministry. It seems that the losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Second World War lie very close to such a "heap" group of results. Let's not forget that these figures include 2.6-3.2 million destroyed Soviet prisoners of war.

In conclusion, one should probably agree with Maksudov's opinion that the emigration outflow, which amounted to 1.3 million people, should be excluded from the number of losses, which was not taken into account in the study of the General Staff. By this value, the value of the losses of the USSR in the Second World War should be reduced. In percentage terms, the structure of losses of the USSR looks like this:

41% - aircraft losses (including prisoners of war)
35% - aircraft losses (without prisoners of war, i.e. direct combat)
39% - loss of the population of the occupied territories and the front line (45% with prisoners of war)
8% - home front population
6% - GULAG
6% - emigration outflow.

2. Losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops

To date, there are no sufficiently reliable figures for the losses of the German army, obtained by direct statistical calculation. This is explained by the absence of different reasons reliable source statistics on German losses.

According to Russian sources, 3,172,300 Wehrmacht soldiers were captured by Soviet troops, of which 2,388,443 were Germans in the NKVD camps. According to estimates by German historians, there were only about 3.1 million German servicemen in Soviet prisoner of war camps. The discrepancy, as you can see, is about 0.7 million people. This discrepancy is explained by differences in the estimate of the number of Germans who died in captivity: according to Russian archival documents, 356,700 Germans died in Soviet captivity, and according to German researchers, approximately 1.1 million people. It seems that the Russian figure of the Germans who died in captivity is more reliable, and the missing 0.7 million Germans who went missing and did not return from captivity actually died not in captivity, but on the battlefield.

The vast majority of publications devoted to the calculations of the combat demographic losses of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops are based on data from the central bureau (department) for accounting for the losses of personnel of the armed forces, which is part of the German General Staff of the Supreme High Command. Moreover, while denying the reliability of Soviet statistics, the German data are regarded as absolutely reliable. But upon closer examination, it turned out that the opinion about the high reliability of the information of this department was greatly exaggerated. Thus, the German historian R. Overmans in the article “The human casualties of the Second World War in Germany” came to the conclusion that “... the channels of information in the Wehrmacht do not reveal the degree of reliability that some authors attribute to them.” As an example, he reports that “... the official report of the loss department at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, relating to 1944, documented that the losses that were incurred during the Polish, French and Norwegian campaigns and the identification of which did not present any technical difficulties were almost twice as high as originally reported." According to Muller-Gillebrand, which many researchers believe, the demographic losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 3.2 million people. Another 0.8 million died in captivity. However, according to a certificate from the organizational department of the OKH dated May 1, 1945, only the ground forces, including the SS troops (without the Air Force and Navy), for the period from September 1, 1939 to May 1, 1945, lost 4 million 617.0 thousand people. people This is the most recent report on the losses of the German Armed Forces. In addition, from mid-April 1945, there was no centralized accounting of losses. And since the beginning of 1945, the data is incomplete. It remains a fact that in one of the last radio broadcasts with his participation, Hitler announced the figure of 12.5 million total losses of the German Armed Forces, of which 6.7 million are irretrievable, which exceeds the Müller-Hillebrand data by about two times. This was in March 1945. I do not think that in two months the soldiers of the Red Army did not kill a single German.

There is another statistics of losses - the statistics of burials of Wehrmacht soldiers. According to the appendix to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany "On the preservation of burial places", the total number of German soldiers who are in recorded burials in the territory of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is 3 million 226 thousand people. (on the territory of the USSR alone - 2,330,000 burials). This figure can be taken as the starting point for calculating the demographic losses of the Wehrmacht, but it also needs to be adjusted.

Firstly, this figure takes into account only the burial places of the Germans, and a large number of soldiers of other nationalities fought in the Wehrmacht: Austrians (of which 270 thousand people died), Sudeten Germans and Alsatians (230 thousand people died) and representatives of other nationalities and states ( 357 thousand people died). Of the total number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers of non-German nationality, the Soviet-German front accounts for 75-80%, i.e. 0.6-0.7 million people.

Secondly, this figure refers to the beginning of the 90s of the last century. Since then, the search for German graves in Russia, the CIS countries and Eastern Europe has continued. And the messages that appeared on this topic were not informative enough. Unfortunately, no generalized statistics of the newly discovered graves of Wehrmacht soldiers could be found. Tentatively, it can be assumed that the number of newly discovered graves of Wehrmacht soldiers over the past 10 years is in the range of 0.2–0.4 million people.

Thirdly, many burial places of the dead soldiers of the Wehrmacht on Soviet soil disappeared or were deliberately destroyed. Approximately 0.4–0.6 million Wehrmacht soldiers could be buried in such disappeared and nameless graves.

Fourth, these data do not include burials of German soldiers killed in battles with Soviet troops in Germany and Western European countries. According to R. Overmans, only in the last three spring months of the war, about 1 million people died. (minimum estimate 700 thousand) In general, on German soil and in Western European countries, approximately 1.2–1.5 million Wehrmacht soldiers died in battles with the Red Army.

Finally, fifth, among the buried were Wehrmacht soldiers who died of "natural" death (0.1-0.2 million people)

Major General V. Gurkin's articles are devoted to assessing the losses of the Wehrmacht using the balance of the German armed forces during the war years. Its calculated figures are given in the second column of Table. 4. Here, attention is drawn to two figures characterizing the number of Wehrmacht soldiers mobilized during the war, and the number of prisoners of war of Wehrmacht soldiers. The number of those mobilized during the war years (17.9 million people) is taken from the book by B. Müller-Hillebrand “The German Land Army 1933-1945”, vol.Z. At the same time, V.P. Bokhar believes that more were drafted into the Wehrmacht - 19 million people.

The number of prisoners of war of the Wehrmacht was determined by V. Gurkin by summing up the prisoners of war taken by the Red Army (3.178 million people) and the allied forces (4.209 million people) until May 9, 1945. In my opinion, this number is too high: it also included prisoners of war who were not soldiers of the Wehrmacht. The book by Paul Karel and Ponter Beddecker “German Prisoners of War of the Second World War” states: “... In June 1945, the Allied Command became aware that there were 7,614,794 prisoners of war and unarmed military personnel in the “camps, of which 4,209,000 by the time capitulations were already in captivity." Among these 4.2 million German prisoners of war, in addition to Wehrmacht soldiers, there were many other people. For example, in the French camp of Vitrilet-François, among the prisoners, "the youngest was 15 years old, the oldest was almost 70." The authors write about captive Volksturmites, about the organization by the Americans of special "children's" camps, where captured twelve-thirteen-year-old boys from the "Hitler Youth" and "Werewolf" were gathered. Mention is made of the placement in camps even of the handicapped.

In general, among the 4.2 million prisoners of war taken by the Allies before May 9, 1945, approximately 20–25% were not Wehrmacht soldiers. This means that the Allies had 3.1–3.3 million Wehrmacht soldiers in captivity.

The total number of Wehrmacht soldiers who were captured before the surrender was 6.3-6.5 million people.

In general, the demographic combat losses of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops on Soviet-German front amount to 5.2-6.3 million people, of which 0.36 million died in captivity, and irretrievable losses (including prisoners) 8.2-9.1 million people. It should also be noted that until recent years, Russian historiography did not mention some data on the number of Wehrmacht prisoners of war at the end of hostilities in Europe, apparently for ideological reasons, because it is much more pleasant to assume that Europe "fought" against fascism than to be aware that that some and a very large number of Europeans deliberately fought in the Wehrmacht. So, according to a note by General Antonov, on May 25, 1945. The Red Army captured 5 million 20 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers alone, of which 600 thousand people (Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Poles, etc.) were released before August after filtration measures, and these prisoners of war were sent to camps The NKVD did not send. Thus, the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in battles with the Red Army can be even higher (about 0.6 - 0.8 million people).

There is another way to "calculate" the losses of Germany and the Third Reich in the war against the USSR. Quite correct, by the way. Let's try to "substitute" the figures relating to Germany into the methodology for calculating the total demographic losses of the USSR. And we will use ONLY the official data of the German side. Thus, the population of Germany in 1939, according to Müller-Hillebrandt (p. 700 of his work, so beloved by supporters of the theory of "clouding with corpses"), was 80.6 million people. At the same time, you and I, the reader, must take into account that this includes 6.76 million Austrians, and the population of the Sudetenland - another 3.64 million people. That is, the population of Germany proper within the borders of 1933 in 1939 was (80.6 - 6.76 - 3.64) 70.2 million people. We figured out these simple mathematical operations. Further: natural mortality in the USSR was 1.5% per year, but in the countries of Western Europe the mortality rate was much lower and amounted to 0.6 - 0.8% per year, Germany was no exception. However, the birth rate in the USSR exceeded the European one in approximately the same proportion, due to which the USSR had a consistently high population growth throughout the pre-war years, starting from 1934.

We know about the results of the post-war population census in the USSR, but few people know that a similar population census was conducted by the Allied occupation authorities on October 29, 1946 in Germany. The census gave the following results:

Soviet zone of occupation (without East Berlin): men - 7.419 million, women - 9.914 million, total: 17.333 million people.
All western zones occupation, (excluding western Berlin): men - 20.614 million, women - 24.804 million, total: 45.418 million people.
Berlin (all sectors of occupation), men - 1.29 million, women - 1.89 million, total: 3.18 million people.
The total population of Germany is 65,931,000 people.

A purely arithmetic operation of 70.2 million - 66 million, it seems, gives a decrease of only 4.2 million. However, everything is not so simple.

At the time of the census in the USSR, the number of children born since the beginning of 1941 was about 11 million, the birth rate in the USSR during the war years fell sharply and amounted to only 1.37% per year of the pre-war population. The birth rate in Germany and in peacetime did not exceed 2% per year of the population. Suppose it fell only 2 times, and not 3, as in the USSR. That is, the natural increase in the population during the years of the war and the first post-war year was about 5% of the pre-war population, and in numbers amounted to 3.5-3.8 million children. This figure must be added to the final figure of the decline in the population of Germany. Now the arithmetic is different: the total population loss is 4.2 million + 3.5 million = 7.7 million people. But this is not the final figure either; for completeness of calculations, we need to subtract from the figure of population loss the figure of natural mortality for the years of the war and 1946, which is 2.8 million people (let's take the figure of 0.8% to be "higher"). Now the total decline in the population of Germany, caused by the war, is 4.9 million people. Which, in general, is very “similar” to the figure of the irretrievable losses of the Reich ground forces, given by Müller-Gillebrandt. So what did the USSR, which lost 26.6 million of its citizens in the war, really “fill up with corpses” of its enemy? Patience, dear reader, let's still bring our calculations to their logical conclusion.

The fact is that the population of Germany proper in 1946 grew by at least another 6.5 million people, and presumably even by 8 million! By the time of the 1946 census (according to German, by the way, data published back in 1996 by the "Union of Exiles", and in total about 15 million Germans were "forcibly displaced") only from the Sudetenland, Poznan and Upper Silesia were evicted to Germany 6.5 million Germans. About 1 - 1.5 million Germans fled from Alsace and Lorraine (unfortunately, there are no more accurate data). That is, these 6.5 - 8 million must be added to the losses of Germany proper. And these are “slightly” different figures: 4.9 million + 7.25 million (arithmetic average of the number of Germans “expelled” to their homeland) = 12.15 million. Actually, this is 17.3% (!) of the German population in 1939. Well, that's not all!

I emphasize once again: the Third Reich is not even ONLY Germany at all! By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Third Reich “officially” included: Germany (70.2 million people), Austria (6.76 million people), Sudetenland (3.64 million people), captured from Poland "Baltic corridor", Poznan and Upper Silesia (9.36 million people), Luxembourg, Lorraine and Alsace (2.2 million people), and even Upper Corinthia cut off from Yugoslavia, a total of 92.16 million people.

The procedure for calculating the total human losses of Germany

The population in 1939 was 70.2 million people.
The population in 1946 was 65.93 million people.
Natural mortality 2.8 million people.
Natural increase (birth rate) 3.5 million people.
Emigration inflow of 7.25 million people.
Total losses ((70.2 - 65.93 - 2.8) + 3.5 + 7.25 = 12.22) 12.15 million people.

Every tenth German died! Every twelfth was captured!!!

Conclusion

The irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Second World War amount to 11.5 - 12.0 million people irrevocably, with actual combat demographic losses of 8.7-9.3 million people. The losses of the Wehrmacht and the SS troops on the Eastern Front amount to 8.0 - 8.9 million people irrevocably, of which 5.2-6.1 million are purely combat demographics (including those who died in captivity) people. In addition to the losses of the German Armed Forces themselves on the Eastern Front, it is necessary to add the losses of the satellite countries, and this is neither more nor less than 850 thousand (including those who died in captivity) people killed and more than 600 thousand prisoners. Total 12.0 (largest) million versus 9.05 (lowest) million.

A logical question: where is the “filling up with corpses”, about which Western, and now domestic “open” and “democratic” sources talk so much? The percentage of dead Soviet prisoners of war, even according to the most benign estimates, is at least 55%, and German, according to the largest, no more than 23%. Maybe the whole difference in losses is explained simply by the inhuman conditions of the prisoners?

The author is aware that these articles differ from the latest officially proclaimed version of the losses: the losses of the USSR Armed Forces - 6.8 million servicemen killed, and 4.4 million captured and missing, Germany's losses - 4.046 million servicemen dead, dead from wounds, missing (including 442.1 thousand dead in captivity), the loss of satellite countries 806 thousand killed and 662 thousand prisoners. Irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million and 8.6 million people. The total loss of Germany 11.2 million people. (for example on Wikipedia)

The issue with the civilian population is more terrible against 14.4 (the smallest number) million people of the victims of the Second World War in the USSR - 3.2 million people (the largest number) of victims from the German side. So who fought with whom? It is also necessary to mention that without denying the Holocaust of the Jews, the German society still does not perceive the "Slavic" Holocaust, if everything is known about the suffering of the Jewish people in the West (thousands of works), then they prefer to "modestly" keep quiet about the crimes against the Slavic peoples.

I would like to end the article with the phrase of an unknown British officer. When he saw a column of Soviet prisoners of war being driven past the "international" camp, he said:

“I forgive the Russians in advance for everything they do with Germany”

The application of the method of comparative analysis, the foundations of which were laid by Jomini, to the assessment of the ratio of losses requires statistical data on wars of different eras. Unfortunately, more or less complete statistics are available only for the wars of the last two centuries. Data on irretrievable combat losses in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, summarized based on the results of the work of domestic and foreign historians, are given in Table. The last three columns of the table demonstrate the obvious dependence of the outcome of the war on the magnitude of the relative losses (losses expressed as a percentage of the total number of the army) - the relative losses of the winner in the war are always less than that of the vanquished, and this dependence has a stable, recurring character (it is valid for all types of wars), that is, it has all the features of the law.

This law - let's call it the law of relative losses - can be formulated as follows: in any war, victory goes to the army that has the least relative losses.

Note that the absolute numbers of irretrievable losses for the victorious side can be either less (Patriotic War of 1812, Russian-Turkish, Franco-Prussian wars), or more than for the defeated side (Crimean, First World War, Soviet-Finnish), but the relative losses of the winner are always less than those of the loser.

The difference between the relative losses of the winner and the loser characterizes the degree of persuasiveness of the victory. Wars with close values ​​of the relative losses of the parties end peace treaties with the defeated side retaining the existing political system and army (for example, the Russo-Japanese War). In wars ending, like the Great Patriotic War, in the complete surrender of the enemy (the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871), the relative losses of the winner are significantly less than the relative losses of the vanquished (by at least 30%). In other words, the greater the loss, the greater must be the size of the army in order to win a convincing victory. If the losses of an army are 2 times greater than those of the enemy, then in order to win the war, its strength must be at least 2.6 times the strength of the opposing army.

And now let's return to the Great Patriotic War and see what human resources the USSR and Nazi Germany had during the war. Available data on the strength of the opposing sides on the Soviet-German front are given in Table. 6.

From Table. 6 it follows that the number of Soviet participants in the war was only 1.4-1.5 times the total number of opposing troops and 1.6-1.8 times the regular German army. In accordance with the law of relative losses, with such an excess in the number of participants in the war, the losses of the Red Army, which destroyed the fascist military machine, in principle could not exceed the losses of the armies of the fascist bloc by more than 10-15%, and the losses of regular German troops - by more than 25-30 %. This means that the upper limit of the ratio of irretrievable combat losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is the ratio of 1.3:1.

The figures for the ratio of irretrievable combat losses given in Table. 6 do not exceed the value of the upper limit of the loss ratio obtained above. However, this does not mean that they are final and not subject to change.

As new documents, statistical materials, research results appear, the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht (Tables 1-5) may be refined, changed in one direction or another, their ratio may also change, but it cannot be higher than 1.3: 1 .

Sources:

1. Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR "Number, composition and movement of the population of the USSR" M 1965
2. "The population of Russia in the 20th century" M. 2001
3. Arntts "Casual losses in the Second World War" M. 1957
4. Frumkin G. Population Changes in Europe since 1939 N.Y. 1951
5. Dallin A. German rule in Russia 1941–1945 N.Y.- London 1957
6. "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century" M.2001
7. Polyan P. Victims of two dictatorships M. 1996.
8. Thorwald J. The Illusion. Soviet soldiers in Hitler,s Army N. Y. 1975
9. Collection of messages of the Extraordinary State Commission M. 1946
10. Zemskov. Birth of the second emigration 1944–1952 SI 1991 No. 4
11. Timasheff N. S. The postwar population of the Soviet Union 1948
13 Timasheff N. S. The postwar population of the Soviet Union 1948
14. Arnts. Human losses in World War II M. 1957; "International Life" 1961 No. 12
15. Biraben J. N. Population 1976.
16. Maksudov S. Population losses in the USSR Benson (Vt) 1989.; "About the front-line losses of the SA during the Second World War" "Free Thought" 1993. No. 10
17. The population of the USSR for 70 years. Edited by Rybakovsky L. L. M 1988
18. Andreev, Darsky, Kharkov. "Population of the Soviet Union 1922–1991" M 1993
19. Sokolov B. "Novaya Gazeta" No. 22, 2005, "The Price of Victory -" M. 1991
20. Germany's War against the Soviet Union 1941-1945, edited by Reinhard Ruhrup 1991. Berlin
21. Müller-Gillebrand. "Land Army of Germany 1933-1945" M.1998
22. Germany's War against the Soviet Union 1941-1945, edited by Reinhard Ruhrup 1991. Berlin
23. Gurkin V. V. About human losses on the Soviet-German front in 1941–45. NiNI No. 3 1992
24. M. B. Denisenko. WWII in the demographic dimension "Eksmo" 2005
25. S. Maksudov. The loss of the population of the USSR during the Second World War. "Population and Society" 1995
26. Yu. Mukhin. If not for the generals. "Yauza" 2006
27. V. Kozhinov. Great War Russia. Series of lectures 1000th anniversary of Russian wars. "Yauza" 2005
28. Materials of the newspaper "Duel"
29. E. Beevor "The Fall of Berlin" M.2003

Literature

Loss.ru

Chapter 11

................................................. ........... CONCLUSIONS From the above, it should be concluded that the fire superiority of the Red Army over the German army. Moreover, this fire superiority cannot be explained by quantitative superiority in gun barrels. Moreover, as a result of poor transport equipment, the Red Army made little use of its mortar weapons at the battalion and regimental level. After all, an 82 mm mine weighs 3 kg, and 30 pieces are fired per minute. For 10 minutes of shooting, you need 900 kg of ammunition for a mortar. Of course, the transport was provided primarily by artillery, not mortars. It turned out that a maneuverable, light artillery weapon was tied to ammunition points, and could not work in the interests of the battalions. The problem was solved by mixing mortars into mortar regiments, where they could be supplied with ammunition centrally. But as a result, the battalion, regimental and even divisional level turned out to be weaker than the German one, because mortars made up half of the trunks in the division in the pre-war states. The anti-tank artillery of the Soviet rifle divisions was weaker than the German one. As a result, three-inch light artillery regiments rolled out for direct fire. There were not enough air defense systems. We had to divert heavy machine guns and anti-tank rifles from the first line for these purposes. Due to what was fire superiority achieved from the first days of the war? Fire superiority by the Red Army was achieved through skill and courage. This is confirmed not only by the calculations of personnel losses, but also by the losses of military equipment, property, and transport.

Here is Halder's entry dated 11/18/41 says that out of 0.5 million vehicles that were in the German army on 06/22/41, 150 thousand were irretrievably lost and 275 thousand needed repair, and 300 thousand were needed for this repair. tons of spare parts. That is, about 1.1 tons of spare parts are needed to repair one car. What condition are these cars in? From them, only the frames remained! If we add to them those cars from which there are not even frames left, it turns out that all cars produced by German car factories in a year burn out in Russia in less than six months. So Hitler was worried about this circumstance, so Halder was forced to discuss these issues with General Bule.

But cars are not fighting in the first line of troops. What happened in the first line? Hell is hell! Now we need to compare all this with the losses of auto-tractor equipment in the Red Army. With the outbreak of war, the production of cars and tractors was sharply reduced in favor of tanks, and the production of artillery tractors ceased altogether. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 1942, the Soviet Union had lost only half of the pre-war fleet of artillery tractors, mainly in encirclement, and then, until the very victory, used the remaining half, with practically no losses in them. If the Germans in the first six months of the war lost almost all the vehicles that they had in the army at the beginning of the war, then the Soviet army lost 33% of the available and received vehicles over the same period. And for the whole of 1942, 14%. And by the end of the war, car losses were reduced to 3-5%.

But these losses repeat, according to the form of the loss graph, the irretrievable losses of the personnel of the Red Army, with the only difference being that the average monthly loss of vehicles is 10-15 times less. But after all, the number of cars at the front was just as many times less. It can be assumed that the loss of vehicles from enemy fire in 1941 in the Red Army was no more than 5-10%, and 23-28% of losses were due to maneuvering actions of German troops, encirclement. That is, the loss of vehicles can also serve to characterize the loss of personnel. Because they also reflect the fire capabilities of the parties. That is, if the fascist troops lose 90% of vehicles in 1941, then almost all of these losses are losses from the fire of the Soviet troops, and this is 15% of losses per month. It can be seen that the Soviet army is at least 1.5-3 times more effective than the German army.

In an entry dated December 9, 1941, Halder writes about the irretrievable average daily loss of 1,100 horses. Considering that horses were not put in the battle line and that horses at the front are 10 times less than people, the figure of 9465 people of average daily irretrievable losses for December 1941 from table 6 receives additional confirmation.

German losses in tanks can be estimated based on their availability at the beginning and end of the period of interest. As of June 1941, the Germans had about 5,000 of their own and Czechoslovak vehicles. In addition, in Halder's entry of December 23, 1940, the figure is 4930 captured vehicles, mostly French. There are about 10,000 cars in total. At the end of 1941, the German tank troops were equipped with tanks by 20-30%, that is, about 3000 vehicles remained in stock, of which about 500-600 captured French, which were then transferred from the front to protect the rear areas. Halder also writes about this. Even without taking into account the tanks produced by the German industry in six months, without taking into account Soviet captured tanks used by the Germans, Soviet troops irretrievably destroyed about 7,000 German vehicles, not counting armored cars and armored personnel carriers, in the first 6 months of the war. In four years, this will amount to 56,000 vehicles destroyed by the Red Army. If we add here 3,800 tanks produced by the German industry in 1941 and 1,300 captured Soviet tanks captured by the Germans at storage bases, we get more than 12,000 destroyed German vehicles in the first six months of the war. During the war years, Germany produced about 50,000 vehicles, and the Germans had 10,000 vehicles before the war, as we calculated. The allies of the USSR could destroy 4-5 thousand tanks or so. Soviet troops lost about 100,000 tanks and self-propelled guns during the war, but it must be understood that the operational life of Soviet tanks was significantly less. Here there is a different approach to life, to technology, to war. Different ways to use tanks. Different tank ideology. The Soviet principles of tank building are well described in the trilogy by Mikhail Svirin under the general title "The History of the Soviet Tank 1919-1955", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", ("The armor is strong, 1919-1937", "Stalin's armor shield, 1937-1943 "," Stalin's Steel Fist, 1943-1955"). Soviet wartime tanks were calculated for one operation, had a resource of 100-200 km at the beginning of the war, up to 500 km by the end of the war, which reflected views on the operational use of tanks and the military economy. After the war, the resource of tanks had to be increased by a number of measures to 10-15 years of service, based on the needs of the peacetime economy and the new concept of the accumulation of weapons. Thus, tanks were initially conceived not to be spared. This is a weapon, why spare it, they need to fight. That is, the losses in the tanks of the USSR are 1.5-2 times higher, and the losses of people are 1.5-2 times lower.

In this case, it should be borne in mind that the Germans could restore up to 70% of the wrecked tanks within a week, according to Guderian. This means that if out of a hundred German tanks that entered the battle at the beginning of the month, 20 vehicles remained by the end of the month, then with irretrievable losses of 80 vehicles, the number of hits may exceed 250. And such a figure will appear in the reports of the Soviet troops. However, the Soviet General Staff, more or less accurately, corrected the reports of the troops, taking into account this circumstance. Therefore, in the operational report for December 16, 1941, announced by the Soviet Information Bureau, it is said that the Germans lost 15,000 tanks, 19,000 guns, about 13,000 aircraft and 6,000,000 people killed, wounded and captured in the first five months of the war. These figures are quite consistent with my calculations and quite accurately reflect the real losses of the German troops. If they are overpriced, then not very much, given the then situation. In any case, the Soviet General Staff assessed the situation much more realistically than the German General Staff even in 1941. In the future, the estimates became even more accurate.

The losses of aircraft by the German side are considered in the book by Kornyukhin G.V. "Air War over the USSR. 1941", LLC "Publishing House "Veche", 2008. There is a table of calculations of the losses of German aviation without taking into account training machines.

Table 18:

* The number of aircraft surrendered after the surrender
** According to the reference book "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Figures"
*** An attempt to calculate the "squeeze" from the documents of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe, carried out by R. Larintsev and A. Zabolotsky.
**** For 1945, the Quartermaster General's papers could not be found, apparently he was tired of preparing propaganda opuses. It is unlikely that the Quartermaster General quit his job and went on vacation, rather, he quit the secondary work that the Ministry of Propaganda entrusted to him.

Table 18 shows that modern ideas about German losses in aviation are completely untrue. It can also be seen that the Soviet data differ significantly from the theoretically calculated values ​​only in 1945 and 1941. In 1945, the discrepancies are due to the fact that half of the German aviation refused to fly, and was abandoned by the Germans at the airfields. In 1941, the discrepancy was formed from the poorly organized by the Soviet side accounting for downed German aircraft in the first two or three months of the war. And in the post-war history, the estimated figures from the time of the war, voiced by the Soviet Information Bureau, were ashamed to enter. Thus, 62936 German aircraft destroyed by the Soviet side are clearly visible. The combat losses of the Soviet Air Force amounted to 43,100 combat vehicles during the war. However non-combat losses combat vehicles of the Soviet Air Force are almost the same as combat vehicles. Here again the difference in the quality of technology and the attitude towards it is visible. This difference was fully recognized by the Soviet leadership; the USSR could compete with united Europe in the volume of military production only if it had a completely different view of the quality, nature and use of these products. Soviet vehicles, especially fighters, wore out very quickly in wartime conditions. Nevertheless, plywood-linen aircraft with engine life for several flights successfully resisted all-duralumin aviation with German-quality engines.

Hitler not for nothing believed that the Soviet industry would not be able to make up for the loss of weapons, and could not, if it had strived for a symmetrical response to the German challenge. Having 3-4 times fewer workers, the Soviet Union could produce 3-4 times less labor costs.

At the same time, one should not draw a conclusion about the mass death Soviet pilots or tankers from the imperfection of technology. Such a conclusion will not find confirmation either in memoirs, or in reports, or in statistical studies. Because he is unfaithful. It's just that in the USSR there was a technical culture different from European, a different technogenic civilization. The book cites the losses of Soviet military equipment, including decommissioned equipment that has used up its resource, which is irreparable due to a lack of spare parts and a weak repair base. It should be remembered that in terms of the development of production, the USSR had a base of only two, albeit heroic, five-year plans. Therefore, the response to European technical equipment was not symmetrical. Soviet technology was designed for a shorter, but more intensive period of operation. Rather, it was not even calculated, but it turned out like this by itself. Lendliz cars did not last long in Soviet conditions either. To produce repair forces means to tear people away from production, from war, and to produce spare parts means to occupy those capacities that can produce finished machines. Of course, all this is necessary, the question is the balance of opportunities and needs. Considering the fact that in battle all this work can burn out in a minute, and all produced spare parts and repair shops will remain out of work. Therefore, when, for example, Shirokorad in the book "Three Wars of Great Finland" complains about the unsuitability of Budenovka or about the differences in the quality of the uniforms of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, the question arises, did he think well? In order to pursue European quality, one must have a European industry, such was Germany, and not the USSR. Budyonovka or bogatyrka is a mobilization version of a headdress, they were invented at the end of the First World War, just because production was weak. As soon as the opportunity arose, they were replaced with normal hats. Who is to blame that such an opportunity appeared only in 1940? Honorary saint and honorary pope of our kingdom, Tsar Nicholas the bloody and his satraps. Democrats from the Kerensky gang. As well as the now sung white bandits. At the same time, the Germans wore winter caps. When Shirokorad in the book "The March on Vienna" complains that the gun turrets on armored boats were installed from tanks, and were not specially designed, he does not take into account that tank turrets were mass-produced at tank factories, and specially designed turrets should have been produced in a medium series at factories shipbuilding. Does a specialist in the history of technology not see the difference? Rather, he is looking for cheap sensations where there are none. And so it is with everything. Aircraft were produced at furniture factories, and cartridges at tobacco factories. Armored cars were produced at the crushing equipment plant in Vyksa, and PPS wherever there was a cold stamping press. famous in Soviet time an anecdote about a combine with a vertical take-off is more likely to come to Stalin's time than to later times.

Labor heroism played a decisive role Soviet people, but we must not forget about the merits of the Soviet government, personally Stalin, who correctly set priorities in the scientific, technical, industrial and military spheres. Now it is fashionable to complain that there were few walkie-talkies and a lot of tanks, but would it be better if there were fewer tanks and more walkie-talkies? The radios don't fire. Although they are needed, but where to get the funds for everything? Where necessary, there were walkie-talkies.

In this regard, I want to focus on a key moment in the history of the war, on the preparation of pre-war industry for mobilization in wartime. Special samples and modifications of all weapons were developed for release in wartime. Special technologies were developed for implementation in non-core industries, specialists were trained to implement these technologies. Since 1937, the army began to receive modern, domestic weapons, to replace the alterations and modifications of pre-revolutionary and licensed samples. Artillery and automatic rifles were the first to be introduced. Then priority was given to tanks and combat aircraft. Their production began to unfold only in 1940. New machine guns and automatic cannons were introduced during the course of the war. It was not possible to develop the automotive and radio industries to the required extent before the war. But they set up a lot of steam locomotives and wagons, and this is much more important. The capacity of specialized factories was sorely lacking, and the mobilization of non-core enterprises, prepared even before the war, gives the right to assert that Stalin deserved the title of generalissimo even before the war, even if he had done nothing more to win. And he did a lot more!

On the anniversary of the start of the war, the Soviet Information Bureau published operational reports summarizing the results of hostilities since the start of the war on an accrual basis. It is interesting to summarize these data in a table that will give an idea of ​​the views of the Soviet command, of course, adjusted for some, forced, propaganda element in relation to their own casualties. But the nature of Soviet propaganda of that period is interesting in itself, because now it can be compared with the published data of the work.

Table 19:

Table 19 shows that the Soviet government concealed from the Soviet people only one figure - the loss of the missing in the encirclement. During the entire war, the losses of the USSR as missing and captured amounted to about 4 million people, of which less than 2 million people returned from captivity after the war. These figures were hidden in order to reduce the fears of the unstable part of the population before the German advance, to reduce the fear of encirclement among the unstable part of the military. And after the war, the Soviet government considered itself guilty before the people, for being unable to foresee and avoid such a development of events. Therefore, after the war, these figures were not advertised, although they were no longer hidden. After all, Konev quite openly declared after the war about more than 10,000,000 irretrievable losses of Soviet troops. He said it once, and there was nothing more to repeat, to reopen wounds.

The rest of the numbers are generally correct. During the entire war, the USSR lost 61,500 field artillery barrels, 96,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, but no more than 65,000 of them for combat reasons, 88,300 combat aircraft, but only 43,100 of them for combat reasons. About 6.7 million Soviet soldiers died in battle (including non-combat losses, but excluding those who died in captivity) during the entire war.

The losses of the enemy are also indicated correctly. Enemy personnel losses have been greatly underestimated since 1942, and in 1941 they are correctly indicated at 6,000,000 total losses. Only the losses of German tanks are perhaps slightly overestimated, by about 1.5 times. This is naturally related to the difficulty of accounting for the number of repaired and reused machines. In addition, in the reports of the troops, along with damaged tanks and self-propelled guns, other armored vehicles could also be indicated. The Germans had a lot of different combat vehicles on both half-track and wheeled chassis, which can be called self-propelled guns. Then the losses of the Germans in armored vehicles are also indicated correctly. A slight overestimation of the number of downed German aircraft is not significant. The loss of guns and mortars of all calibers and purposes for the Red Army amounted to 317,500 pieces during the war, and for Germany and its allies, the loss of 289,200 pieces is indicated in the work. But in the 12th volume of the "History of the Second World War", in table 11, it is said that Germany alone produced and lost 319900 pieces of guns, and the same Germany produced mortars and lost 78800 pieces. In total, the loss of guns and mortars in Germany alone will amount to 398,700 barrels, and it is not known whether rocket systems are included here, most likely they are not. In addition, this figure definitely does not include guns and mortars produced before 1939.

Since the summer of 1942, there has been a tendency in the Soviet General Staff to underestimate the number of Germans killed. Soviet military leaders began to assess the situation more carefully, fearing to underestimate the enemy at the final stage of the war. In any case, one can speak about special, propaganda loss figures published by the Sovinformburo only in relation to the number of captured and missing Soviet servicemen. Otherwise, the same figures were published that the Soviet General Staff used in their calculations.

The course and outcome of the war cannot be understood if we exclude from consideration the European fascist atrocities in relation to the peaceful Soviet population and prisoners of war. These atrocities constituted the purpose and meaning of the war for the German side and all of Germany's allies. The fighting was only a tool to ensure the unhindered implementation of these atrocities. The only goal of Europe united by the fascists in World War II was to conquer the entire European part of the USSR, and to destroy most of the population in the most brutal way, in order to intimidate and enslave the rest. These crimes are described in Alexander Dyukov's book "For what the Soviet people fought", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2007. 12-15 million Soviet civilians, including prisoners of war, became victims of these atrocities throughout the war, but we must remember that only during the first war winter, the Nazis planned to kill more than 30 million peaceful Soviet citizens in the occupied territories of the USSR. Thus, we can talk about the salvation by the Soviet army and partisans, the Soviet government and Stalin of more than 15 million lives of Soviet people planned for destruction in the first year of the occupation, and about 20 million planned for destruction in the future, not counting those saved from fascist slavery, which often was worse than death. Despite numerous sources, this point is extremely poorly covered by historical science. Historians simply avoid this topic, limiting themselves to rare and common phrases, and yet these crimes exceed in the number of victims all other crimes in history combined.

In a note dated November 24, 1941, Halder writes about the report of Colonel-General Fromm. The general military-economic situation is represented as a falling curve. Fromm believes that a truce is necessary. My conclusions confirm Fromm's conclusions.

It also indicates that the loss of personnel at the front is 180,000 people. If this is a loss of combat strength, then it is easily covered by recalling vacationers from vacation. Not to mention the conscription of the contingent born in 1922. Where is the falling curve here? Why, then, in the entry dated November 30, it says that 50-60 people remained in the companies? To make ends meet, Halder claims that 340,000 men make up half of the combat strength of the infantry. But this is ridiculous, the combat strength of the infantry is less than a tenth of the army. In fact, it should be read that the loss of troops at the front is 1.8 million people on 11/24/41 in combat strength and 3.4 million in the total number of troops of the "Eastern Front" on 11/30/41, and the regular number of troops " Eastern Front "6.8 million people. This is probably the right thing to do.

Perhaps someone will not believe my calculations about German losses, especially in 1941, when, according to modern ideas, the Red Army was completely defeated and supposedly the German army did not suffer losses in some cunning way. That's bullshit. You can't forge victory out of defeats and losses. From the very beginning, the German army suffered defeat, but the Reich leadership hoped that the USSR was having an even worse situation. Hitler spoke directly about this in the same diary of Halder.

The situation of the border battle was best conveyed by Dmitry Egorov in the book "June 41st. Defeat of the Western Front.", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2008.

Of course, the summer of 1941 was terribly difficult for the Soviet troops. Endless battles with no visible positive results. Endless environments where the choice was often between death and captivity. And many chose captivity. Maybe even the majority. But it must be borne in mind that mass surrenders began after one or two weeks of intense struggle in the environment, when the fighters ran out of ammunition even for small arms. The commanders, desperate to win, gave up command of the troops, sometimes even on a front-line scale, fled from their fighters and in small groups either tried to surrender or go to their east. The fighters fled from their units, dressed in civilian clothes or, left without leadership, huddled in crowds of thousands, hoping to surrender to the German detachments clearing the area. And yet the Germans were beaten. There were people who chose a more reliable position for themselves, stocked up on weapons and accepted their last battle, knowing in advance how it would end. Or they organized disorderly crowds of encircled people into combat detachments, attacked German cordons and broke through to their own. Sometimes it worked. There were commanders who kept control of their troops in the most difficult situations. There were divisions, corps and entire armies that attacked the enemy, inflicted defeats on the enemy, staunchly defended themselves, evaded German attacks and beat themselves. Yes, they beat me so much that it was 1.5-2 times more painful. Each blow was answered with a double blow.

This was the reason for the defeat of the fascist hordes. The irretrievable demographic losses of the German army amounted to about 15 million people. The irretrievable demographic losses of other Axis armies amounted to 4 million people. And in total, up to 19 million enemies of different nationalities and states had to be killed to win.

Our planet has known many bloody battles and battles. Our whole history consisted of various internecine conflicts. But only the human and material losses in World War II made mankind think about the importance of everyone's life. Only after it did people begin to understand how easy it is to unleash a massacre and how difficult it is to stop it. This war showed all the peoples of the Earth how important peace is for everyone.

The Importance of Studying the History of the 20th Century

The younger generation sometimes does not understand how the history differs over the years that have passed since their end, it has been rewritten many times, so the youth is no longer so interested in those distant events. Often these people do not even really know who took part in those events and what losses humanity suffered in the Second World War. But the history of your country should not be forgotten. If you watch American films about World War II today, you might think that it was only thanks to the US Army that victory over Nazi Germany became possible. That is why it is so necessary to convey to our younger generation the role of the Soviet Union in these sad events. In fact, it was the people of the USSR who suffered the greatest losses in World War II.

Background of the bloodiest war

This armed conflict between the two world military-political coalitions, which became the biggest massacre in the history of mankind, began on September 1, 1939 (in contrast to the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from June 22, 1941 to May 8, 1945 G.). It ended only on September 2, 1945. Thus, this war lasted 6 long years. There are several reasons for this conflict. These include: a deep global crisis in the economy, the aggressive policy of some states, Negative consequences the then Versailles-Washington system.

Participants in the international conflict

62 countries were involved in this conflict to one degree or another. And this despite the fact that at that time there were only 73 sovereign states on Earth. Fierce battles took place on three continents. Naval battles were fought in four oceans (Atlantic, Indian, Pacific and Arctic). The number of opposing countries changed several times throughout the war. Some states participated in active hostilities, while others simply helped their coalition allies by any means (equipment, equipment, food).

Anti-Hitler coalition

Initially, there were 3 states in this coalition: Poland, France, Great Britain. This is due to the fact that it was after the attack on these countries that Germany began to conduct active hostilities on the territory of these countries. In 1941, such countries as the USSR, the USA, and China were drawn into the war. Further, Australia, Norway, Canada, Nepal, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Belgium joined the coalition, New Zealand, Denmark, Luxembourg, Albania, Union of South Africa, San Marino, Turkey. To varying degrees, countries such as Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Panama, Mexico, Argentina, Honduras, Chile, Paraguay, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Nicaragua have become allies in the coalition. , Haiti, El Salvador, Bolivia. They joined and Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Liberia, Mongolia. During the war years, even those states that had ceased to be allies of Germany joined the anti-Hitler coalition. These are Iran (since 1941), Iraq and Italy (since 1943), Bulgaria and Romania (since 1944), Finland and Hungary (since 1945).

On the side of the Nazi bloc were such states as Germany, Japan, Slovakia, Croatia, Iraq and Iran (until 1941), Finland, Bulgaria, Romania (until 1944), Italy (until 1943), Hungary (until 1945), Thailand (Siam), Manchukuo. In some occupied territories, this coalition created puppet states that had virtually no influence on the world battlefield. These include: Italian Social Republic, Vichy France, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. On the side of the Nazi bloc, various collaborationist troops, created from among the inhabitants of the opposing countries, often fought. The largest of them were RONA, ROA, SS divisions created from foreigners (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian, Estonian, Norwegian-Danish, 2 Belgian, Dutch, Latvian, Bosnian, Albanian and French each). Volunteer armies of such neutral countries as Spain, Portugal and Sweden fought on the side of this bloc.

Consequences of the war

Despite the fact that during the long years of the Second World War the alignment on the world stage changed several times, the result of it was the complete victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. This was followed by the creation of the largest international United Nations Organization (abbreviated - UN). The result of victory in this war was the condemnation of fascist ideology and the prohibition of Nazism during the Nuremberg trials. After the end of this world conflict, the role of France and Great Britain in world politics significantly decreased, and the USA and the USSR became real superpowers, dividing new spheres of influence among themselves. Two camps of countries with diametrically opposed socio-political systems (capitalist and socialist) were created. After the Second World War, a period of decolonization of empires began throughout the planet.

theater of war

Germany, for which the Second World War was an attempt to become the only superpower, fought in five directions at once:

• Western European: Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France.
• Mediterranean: Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Libya, Egypt, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq.
• East European: USSR, Poland, Norway, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Yugoslavia, Barents, Baltic and Black Seas.
• African: Ethiopia, Somalia, Madagascar, Kenya, Sudan, Equatorial Africa.
• Pacific (in commonwealth with Japan): China, Korea, South Sakhalin, Far East, Mongolia, Kuril Islands, Aleutian Islands, Hong Kong, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Sarawak, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Brunei, New Guinea, Sabah, Papua, Guam, Solomon Islands, Hawaii, Philippines, Midway, Marianas and numerous other pacific islands.

Beginning and end of the war

They began to be calculated from the moment the German troops invaded Poland. Hitler had been preparing the ground for an attack on this state for a long time. On August 31, 1939, the German press reported on the capture of the radio station in Gleiwitz by the Polish military (although this was a provocation by saboteurs), and already at 4 am on September 1, 1939, the Schleswig-Holstein warship began shelling the fortifications in Westerplatte (Poland). Together with the troops of Slovakia, Germany began to occupy foreign territories. France and Great Britain demanded that Hitler withdraw troops from Poland, but he refused. Already on September 3, 1939, France, Australia, England, New Zealand declared war on Germany. Then they were joined by Canada, Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa, Nepal. So the bloody World War II began to quickly gain momentum. The USSR, although it urgently introduced universal conscription, did not declare war on Germany until June 22, 1941.

In the spring of 1940, Hitler's troops began the occupation of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Then she went to France. In June 1940, Italy began to fight on Hitler's side. In the spring of 1941, she quickly captured Greece and Yugoslavia. On June 22, 1941, she attacked the USSR. On the side of Germany in these hostilities were Romania, Finland, Hungary, Italy. Up to 70% of all active Nazi divisions fought on all Soviet-German fronts. The defeat of the enemy in the battle for Moscow thwarted Hitler's notorious plan - "Blitzkrieg" (lightning war). Thanks to this, already in 1941, the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition began. On December 7, 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States also entered this war. The army of this country for a long time fought with its enemies only in the Pacific Ocean. Great Britain and the United States promised to open the so-called second front in the summer of 1942. But, despite the fiercest battles on the territory of the Soviet Union, the partners in the anti-Hitler coalition were in no hurry to engage in hostilities in Western Europe. This is due to the fact that the United States and Britain were waiting for the complete weakening of the USSR. Only when it became obvious that it was rapidly beginning to liberate not only its own territory, but also the countries of Eastern Europe, the Allies hurried to open a Second Front. This happened on June 6, 1944 (2 years after the promised date). From that moment on, the Anglo-American coalition sought to be the first to liberate Europe from German troops. Despite all the efforts of the allies, Soviet army the first to occupy the Reichstag, on which she hoisted her own. But even the unconditional surrender of Germany did not stop the Second World War. For some time there were hostilities in Czechoslovakia. Also in the Pacific, hostilities almost did not stop. Only after the atomic bombing of the cities of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945), carried out by the Americans, did the Japanese emperor understand the futility of further resistance. As a result of this attack, about 300 thousand civilians died. This bloody international conflict ended only on September 2, 1945. It was on this day that Japan signed the act of surrender.

Victims of the global conflict

The first large-scale losses in World War II were suffered by the Polish people. The army of this country could not resist a stronger enemy in the face of the German troops. This war had an unprecedented impact on all of humanity. About 80% of all people living on Earth at that time (more than 1.7 billion people) were drawn into the war. Military operations took place on the territory of more than 40 states. For 6 years of this world conflict, about 110 million people were mobilized into the armed forces of all armies. According to the latest data, human losses are about 50 million people. At the same time, only 27 million people were killed on the fronts. The rest of the victims were civilians. Most of the human lives lost were such countries as the USSR (27 million), Germany (13 million), Poland (6 million), Japan (2.5 million), China (5 million). The casualties of other warring countries were: Yugoslavia (1.7 million), Italy (0.5 million), Romania (0.5 million), Great Britain (0.4 million), Greece (0.4 million). ), Hungary (0.43 million), France (0.6 million), USA (0.3 million), New Zealand, Australia (40 thousand), Belgium (88 thousand), Africa (10 thousand .), Canada (40 thousand). More than 11 million people were killed in fascist concentration camps.

Losses from international conflict

It is simply amazing what losses the Second World War brought to mankind. History testifies to 4 trillion dollars that went to military spending. In the warring states, material costs amounted to about 70% of the national income. For several years, the industry of many countries was completely reoriented to the production of military equipment. Thus, the USA, USSR, Great Britain and Germany during the war years produced more than 600 thousand combat and transport aircraft. The weapons of World War II have become even more effective and deadly in 6 years. The most ingenious minds of the warring countries were busy only with its improvement. Many new weapons were forced to come up with the Second World War. The tanks of Germany and the Soviet Union were constantly modernized throughout the war. At the same time, more and more advanced machines were created to destroy the enemy. Their number numbered in the thousands. So, only armored vehicles, tanks, self-propelled guns were produced more than 280 thousand. More than 1 million various artillery pieces left the conveyors of military factories; about 5 million machine guns; 53 million submachine guns, carbines and rifles. The Second World War brought with it the colossal destruction and destruction of several thousand cities and other settlements. The history of mankind without it could go according to a completely different scenario. Because of it, all countries were thrown back in their development many years ago. Colossal funds and forces of millions of people were spent on eliminating the consequences of this international military conflict.

USSR losses

A very high price had to be paid for the fact that the Second World War ended faster. The losses of the USSR amounted to about 27 million people. (according to the last count of 1990). Unfortunately, it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to obtain accurate data, but this figure is most consistent with the truth. There are several different estimates of the losses of the USSR. So, according to the latest method, about 6.3 million are considered killed or died from their wounds; 0.5 million who died from diseases, were sentenced to death, died in accidents; 4.5 million missing and captured. The total demographic losses of the Soviet Union amount to more than 26.6 million people. In addition to the huge number of deaths in this conflict, the USSR suffered huge material losses. According to estimates, they amounted to more than 2600 billion rubles. During World War II, hundreds of cities were partially or completely destroyed. More than 70 thousand villages were wiped off the face of the earth. 32 thousand large industrial enterprises were completely destroyed. The agriculture of the European part of the USSR was almost completely destroyed. It took several years of incredible efforts and huge expenses to restore the country to the pre-war level.

(in brackets - including officers)

* There are summation errors in the table. - Ed.

Germany was forced to surrender its losses in manpower. In principle, she had enough weapons and equipment, even the newest and most advanced models, such as, say, ballistic missiles, jet planes, powerful tanks, etc.

A coalition of allies fought against fascist Germany with its satellites: the USSR, England and the USA. And from the point of view of inflicting decisive losses on Germany, looking at the tables, one can determine which of the allies played the main role in that war.

The losses of the German Navy are undoubtedly determined by the combat operations of the fleets and aviation of England and the USA. And although by December 1944 the Baltic Fleet had not yet said its final word and Captain Marinescu had not yet drowned the entire school of the German submarine fleet and did not become the Fuhrer's personal enemy, but let's give the Allies their due - probably in the end they determined the losses of the Germans at sea by almost 95%. But the human losses of the Germans at sea by the beginning of 1945 amount to just over 2% of their total recorded losses.

In the air, by the middle of the war, England and the United States crushed the Germans with their numerical superiority, it is natural that the main forces of the Luftwaffe were always on the defense of the territory of Germany itself and here they suffered serious losses. Nevertheless, if we sum up the losses of the Luftwaffe only from combat operations (the first four sums of the final column), we get combat losses - 549393, of which 218960 are losses on the Eastern Front, or 39.8% of all combat losses of the German Air Force.

If we accept that the losses of the Luftwaffe airmen on all fronts were proportional, then on the Eastern Front, the Germans would have to lose 39.8% of all their pilots. The number of those killed among the missing is not known, let's assume that half of the flight personnel listed as missing were captured, and half died. Then the estimated amount of the dead flight personnel on 01/31/1945 will be (43517 + 27240/2) = 57137 people, and 39.8% of this number will be 22740 people.

The Soviet Air Force lost 27,600 pilots throughout the war. Considering what kind of aircraft they had to fly in the initial period of the war (in the first 6 months we lost more than 20 thousand aircraft, and the Germans about 4 thousand), then the constantly exaggerated tales of some kind of super superiority of German pilots over Soviet ones do not look convincing . Indeed, to these figures of German losses, one must add the losses after 01/31/45, and the losses of the Finns, Hungarians, Italians and Romanians.

And finally loss ground forces fascist Germany on all fronts (the top six numbers of the final column of the corresponding part of the table) as of January 31, 1945 amounted to 7,065,239 people, of which the Germans lost 5,622,411 people on the Soviet-German front. This accounts for 80% of all their combat losses.

Since the Germans were reluctant to surrender to the troops of the Red Army, it is possible to calculate the proportion of German soldiers killed on the Eastern Front, of all those killed on 01/31/1945. This proportion is more than 85%. This is for the period from September 1, 1939.

On 01/31/1945, the Germans on all fronts in the air and on the seas lost in battle at least (according to the Navy, let me remind you, the losses are given on 12/31/1944) - 7789051 people. Of these, in battles with the Red Army, the Soviet Air Force and fleets - 5851804 people, or 75% of all German losses. One ally out of three pulled out 3/4 of the entire war. Yes, there were people!