The secrets of the GKChP over the years have acquired a large number of versions. Gkchp: deciphering the abbreviation, history

And up to now. On that summer day, August 19, all roads were blocked, depriving people of the opportunity to leave their dachas for the city. Armored personnel carriers are walking along the highways, and citizens are in confusion and bewilderment.

All central channels show "Swan Lake", then the news broadcast begins, announcing the introduction of a state of emergency.

Meeting of the State Committee for the State of Emergency before the August Putsch

The members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency took control of the state into their own hands, saying that the incumbent President M. Gorbachev was ill and, therefore, could not continue to perform his presidential functions. In fact, Gorbachev was in Foros, at the presidential dacha, which on the morning of August 19 was blocked by the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB troops of the USSR. Vice President Yanaev issues a decree on his appointment to the post of acting president.

A few days earlier, on August 17, future members of the GKChP meet at the ABC facility (a closed guest residence of the KGB). Here, the conspirators make a decision on the adoption of a state of emergency from August 19, the formation of the State Emergency Committee and the demand from Gorbachev that he sign the relevant decrees or resign, transferring powers to Yanaev. In addition, it was planned to detain Yeltsin at the Chkalovsky airfield after his arrival from Kazakhstan.

On August 18, a group of representatives of the committee flew to Foros to see Gorbachev in order to obtain his consent to the adoption of a state of emergency. The President did not give them his consent.

GKChP transcript: State Committee for state of emergency- the body that created the top leadership of the USSR.

Putsch organizers

If those who were opponents of the GKChP broke through to power during the collapse of the USSR and remained in their posts for quite a long time, then the career of the GKChPists was ended immediately after the putsch. The exceptions were army general Varennikov, who was not formally a member of the GKChP, but actively promoted it, and Starodubtsev, chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR, who was officially a member of this conspiratorial group. After the putsch failed, he was accused of treason, according to Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. However, in 1992, Starodubtsev was released from custody, where he was in Matrosskaya Tishina, for health reasons.

The rest of the key figures in the organizers of the coup had an unenviable further fate. The composition of the GKChP included:

• G. Yanaev. After his arrest, he stayed in a pre-trial detention center until 1994, when he was released from prison under an amnesty.
• O. Baklanov. He was arrested and released under an amnesty in 1994.
• B. Pugo. He shot himself on August 22, 1991.
• V. Kryuchkov. He was arrested, in 1992 he was released on bail. Released under amnesty.
• V. Pavlov. On August 19, Pavlov was hospitalized with alcohol poisoning at the Central Clinical Hospital, from where he was later taken into custody in a pre-trial detention center, where he remained until the 1994 amnesty.
• D. Yazov. After the end of the coup and imprisonment in a pre-trial detention center, he was released under an amnesty in 1994.
• A. Tizyakov. After the end of the coup and imprisonment in a pre-trial detention center, he was released under an amnesty in 1994.
• V. Starodubtsev.

The list shows how many people were members of the State Emergency Committee. However, besides them, several more people were accused of treason and arrested, who actively assisted the conspirators.

Those arrested were punished in Matrosskaya Tishina until 1992. Their cases were not brought to trial, and in 1994 an amnesty was declared for everyone.

Reasons for the creation of the State Emergency Committee

On August 19-21, 1991, members of the country's self-proclaimed government body tried to remove the incumbent president and seize power. The creation of the GKChP is a consequence of Gorbachev's unsuccessful attempts to reorganize a country that is in deep crisis.

After a period of stagnation, the country's economy found itself in a very distressed situation. Soviet President Gorbachev carried out versatile reforms, which became known as "Perestroika". However, they did not bring the desired economic effect. The intensification of the crisis, the collapse of the social sphere, the growth of drunkenness and unemployment gave rise to an acute crisis of confidence in Gorbachev. Both his opponents and former associates were dissatisfied with the results of the president's activities. The highest party apparatus began a struggle for power, and quite soon there were supporters of the overthrow of the president, who formed the composition of the State Emergency Committee.

The last straw was Gorbachev's decision to transform the USSR into the Union of Sovereign States, which angered some conservative politicians.

As a result, after Gorbachev left for Foros, the active work of the conspirators began to remove the president from power. What are the reasons for the creation of the GKChP? Among them are:

• Striving for power.
• Desire to preserve the integrity of the country.
• Dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's reforms.

Video about the activities of the State Emergency Committee

Goals of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

It should be noted that the activities of the GKChP were largely supported by the population. Some sources inform about 80% of the regions of the country that do not support the leadership of the USSR these days. In an appeal to the people, the following goals of the GKChP were named:

• Restoration of the positions of the USSR in the world.
• Changing the course of reform policy.
• Raising the standard of living of the people.
• Preservation of the composition of the USSR.

The modern Russian language identifies the word "putsch" with the concept of "a coup organized by a group of conspirators", and the term "coup d'état" with a radical change in the life of the state. Some politicians note that the actions of the State Emergency Committee cannot be called a putsch, or a coup, or a conspiracy. Since the members of the GKChP did not plan a radical change in the life of the state, but, on the contrary, an attempt was made to preserve the existing constitutional order, social and state system in the face of the danger of their “radical change”, which came from Gorbachev.

The consequences of the work of the State Emergency Committee

When the employees of the Alpha unit surrounded the country house of the President of the RSFSR Yeltsin, and he learned about the formation of the State Emergency Committee and the attempted coup, he decided to immediately go to the White House. The commander of Alpha received a command to let the president out of the dacha, however, such a decision had fatal consequences for the State Emergency Committee.

1. Arriving in Moscow, Yeltsin and other leaders of the RSFSR declared at a press conference about the illegality of the actions of the conspirators, calling what was happening a coup and calling on everyone to a general strike. A crowd of people is gathering outside the White House. The Ekho Moskvy radio station is broadcasting Yeltsin's speech.
2. The coup organizers sent a battalion of tanks to the White House, which, after negotiations, subjected to psychological pressure from the crowd, went over to the side of Yeltsin and the people.
3. The crowd is blocking the approaches of military equipment to the White House, erecting barricades of trolleybuses and other improvised means along Tverskaya Street not far from the National Hotel. People rally against the coup d'état. Alpha Special Forces are ordered to storm the White House, however, they refuse to do so.
4. On the night of August 21, the underpass at the intersection of the current Novy Arbat and Sadovoye Koltso was clogged with infantry fighting vehicles, as a result of which three people died as a result of maneuvering.
5. At this time, St. Isaac's Square in Leningrad was filled with protesters. Also, opponents of the State Emergency Committee are gathering in Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and some other cities.
6. A curfew is being introduced in Moscow, which is reported to people on the evening air of the Vremya program.
7. On the night of August 22, Gorbachev arrived in Moscow. The frames of his televised address to the people became historical event. After the press conference he held, the August putsch ends.

Video about the goals of the State Emergency Committee

The actions of the GKChP caused the launch of the mechanism for the collapse of the USSR, which is in a state of deep economic and political crisis. And, although the GKChPists sought to preserve the integrity of the country, they themselves, unwillingly, provoked the collapse Soviet Union. With the departure of Gorbachev, the existence of the ruling structure of the party ceased, the republics eventually began to acquire the status of independence and leave the once great power.

The Swan Lake, new colors on the state flag and broken, mutilated trolleybuses have become historical symbols of those events in modern Russia. The trolleybuses were later moved to the Museum of the Revolution, located on Tverskaya, and became its exposition.

How do you feel about the activities of the State Emergency Committee in 1991? Do you think their actions are correct? Share your opinion in

All members of the GKChP were arrested, with the exception of Boris Pugo, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, who committed suicide.

From the point of view of the creators of the GKChP themselves, their actions were aimed at restoring the rule of law in the USSR and stopping the collapse of the state. Their actions did not receive a legal assessment, since all the arrested participants in the State Emergency Committee were amnestied even before the trial. Only V. I. Varennikov, who was not a member of the committee, voluntarily appeared before the court, and was acquitted.

Formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

Preparing to create a committee

From the "Conclusion on the materials of the investigation of the role and participation of officials of the KGB of the USSR in the events of August 19-21, 1991":

... in December 1990, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov instructed the former deputy head of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR Zhizhin V. I. and assistant former first Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Grushko V.F. Egorov A.G. to work out possible primary measures to stabilize the situation in the country in the event of a state of emergency. From the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, V. A. Kryuchkov, together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. Not having received the support of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from the beginning of August 1991 they began to implement specific measures to prepare for the imposition of a state of emergency illegally.

From August 7 to 15, Kryuchkov V.A. repeatedly held meetings with some members of the future GKChP at the secret facility of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR, codenamed UABCF. In the same period of time, Zhizhin V.I. and Egorov A.G., at the direction of Kryuchkov, corrected the December documents on the problems of introducing a state of emergency in the country. They, with the participation of the then commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General Grachev P. S., prepared for Kryuchkov V. A. data on the possible reaction of the country's population to the introduction of a state of emergency in the constitutional form. The content of these documents was then reflected in official decrees, appeals and orders of the State Emergency Committee. On August 17, Zhizhin V.I. participated in the preparation of the abstracts of V.A. Kryuchkov’s speech on television in the event of a state of emergency.

The participants in the conspiracy at various stages of its implementation assigned the KGB of the USSR a decisive role in:

• removal from power of the President of the USSR by isolating him;
• blocking possible attempts by the President of the RSFSR to resist the activities of the State Emergency Committee;
• establishing permanent control over the whereabouts of the heads of the authorities of the RSFSR, Moscow, known for their democratic views, people's deputies of the USSR, the RSFSR and the Moscow City Council, major public figures with a view to their subsequent detention;
• implementation together with parts Soviet army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the storming of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, followed by the internment of persons captured in it, including the leadership of Russia.

From August 17 to 19, some special forces of the KGB of the USSR and special forces of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR were put on high alert and redeployed to pre-allocated places to participate, together with units of the SA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in measures to ensure the state of emergency. On August 18, by the forces of specially created groups, President of the USSR Gorbachev was isolated in a resting place in Foros, and the President of the RSFSR Yeltsin and other opposition-minded persons were placed under surveillance.

Members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

1. Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (born 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
2. Kryuchkov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
3. Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR.
4. Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU.
5. Starodubtsev Vasily Alexandrovich (born 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
6. Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (born 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR.
7. Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (born 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
8. Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (born 1937) - Vice-President of the USSR, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Political positions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

In its first appeal, the GKChP assessed the general mood in the country as very skeptical about the new political course to dismantle the highly centralized federal structure of government, the one-party political system and state regulation of the economy, condemned the negative phenomena that the new course, according to the drafters, brought to life, such as speculation and the shadow economy, proclaimed that “the development of the country cannot be based on a drop in the living standards of the population” and promised a tough restoration of order in the country and the solution of economic problems, without mentioning, however, specific measures.

Events 19-21 August 1991

After the August events

1. The Russian leadership, which led the fight against the GKChP, ensured the political victory of the supreme bodies of Russia over the Union Center. Since the autumn of 1991, the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, as well as the President of the RSFSR, received complete supremacy over the laws of the USSR on the territory of Russia. With rare exceptions, the leaders of the regional authorities of the RSFSR, who supported the State Emergency Committee, were removed from their posts.
2. The republics of the USSR declared their independence (in chronological order):
3. The power structures of the USSR were paralyzed and disintegrated.
4. The process of concluding a new union treaty (the Union of Sovereign States) was disrupted.
5. The CPSU was banned and dissolved.
6. Soviet President Gorbachev returned to power, but actually lost his powers and was forced to resign at the end of 1991.

"Accomplices" and "sympathizers"

After the failure of the August coup, in addition to the members of the State Emergency Committee, some persons were brought to justice, according to the investigation, who actively contributed to the State Emergency Committee. All of them were released under an amnesty in 1994. Among the "accomplices" were:

• Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich (born 1930) - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; his appeal was broadcast on TV and radio along with the main documents of the State Emergency Committee.
• Shenin Oleg Semyonovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
• Prokofiev Yuri Anatolyevich (born 1939) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, 1st Secretary of the CPSU MGK.
• Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - army general.
• Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - Head of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
• Medvedev Vladimir Timofeevich (born 1937) - KGB general, head of Gorbachev's security.
• Ageev Geny Evgenievich (1929-1994) - Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR.
• Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (born 1946) - head of security at Gorbachev's residence in Foros

Trial of the GKChP

Formally, it turns out that each of these people, except for Varennikov, who accepted the amnesty, kind of agreed that he was guilty, and sort of agreed that he was guilty of what he was accused of, including under 64 th article. Formally so. But they all accepted the amnesty with the caveat: “I am innocent. And only because we are tired, we are tired, in the interests of society, in the interests of the state, responding to the decision of the State Duma on amnesty, only therefore we accept the amnesty.

Source - Wikipedia

The State Committee for the State of Emergency is a self-proclaimed authority in the USSR that existed from August 18 to August 21, 1991. It was formed from the first state and officials of the Soviet government, who opposed the reforms of Perestroika and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a new “Union of Sovereign States”, which was becoming a confederation consisting of part of already sovereign republics, carried out by the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev.
The forces under the leadership of the President of Russia (RSFSR) B. N. Yeltsin refused to obey the State Emergency Committee, calling their actions unconstitutional, there was an attempt to go on strike. The actions of the GKChP led to the events that became known as the "August Putsch".
From August 22 to 29, 1991, former members of the dissolved GKChP and those who actively assisted them were arrested, but from June 1992 to January 1993, they were all released on bail. In April 1993, the trial began. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the GKChP case were amnestied State Duma Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, despite Yeltsin's objection. One of the defendants, Valentin Varennikov, refused to accept the amnesty and his trial continued. On August 11, 1994, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russia acquitted Varennikov.

By the beginning of 1991, the situation in the USSR had become critical. The country has entered a period of disintegration. The leadership began to work on the issue of introducing a state of emergency.
From the "Conclusion on the materials of the investigation of the role and participation of officials of the KGB of the USSR in the events of August 19-21, 1991":

Marat Nikolaevich asked my advice on what type of helicopter to choose - Mi-8 or Mi-24. Naturally, I advised the Mi-24, since it was armored against 12.7 mm bullets, and all the tanks that were in the White House area had machine guns of this caliber. But in the event of failure of one of the engines, the Mi-24 helicopter could not continue flying. Mi-8 could fly on one engine. Tishchenko agreed with me. However, less than an hour later, he called back and happily announced that, according to the information he received from the same KGB department, all the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles brought into Moscow did not have ammunition, so he was preparing the Mi-8. And after some time, a message came that the commander of the Airborne Forces, General Grachev, stopped the division in Kubinka. By evening, it became clear that the GKChP had shamefully failed, and by noon on August 21, all the media loudly announced this. The bacchanalia of victory began.

Unfortunately, it was overshadowed by the death of three people under the wheels of an infantry fighting vehicle in the tunnel between Vosstaniya Square and Smolenskaya Square. It all seemed strange to me. Why bring troops and armored vehicles into Moscow without ammunition? Why is the Moscow department of the KGB trying to save Yeltsin, and why is the chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov a member of the GKChP? It all felt like some kind of farce. Subsequently, in 1993, Yeltsin really stormed the White House, and the tanks fired direct fire and by no means blank charges. And in August 1991, it all looked like a grandiose performance or monstrous stupidity on the part of the leadership of the State Emergency Committee. However, what happened happened. I'm only expressing my opinion. Further events developed at lightning speed: the return of Gorbachev from Foros, the ban and dissolution of the CPSU, the Belovezhskaya agreement on the liquidation of the USSR, the creation of the Union of Independent States on the basis of the former republics of the USSR.

The most absurd, of course, seemed the collapse of a single Slavic core: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It seemed that some kind of insanity had occurred among the leaders of these republics, who demonstrated complete ignorance of the history of the creation of Russian statehood. But the most striking thing was that all this was supported by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which hastened to dissolve itself, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the Belovezhskaya conspiracy.

I remembered the words of Denikin and Wrangel, who, after the defeat of the white movement in civil war 1918, referring to their descendants in their memoirs, they noted the historical merit of the Bolsheviks in that they basically preserved Great Russia. Modern Bolsheviks, dressed in national clothes, completely destroyed the great power, completely disregarding the opinion of its peoples.

Some time later, it became clear that all these processes were headed by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev, and with the very dubious and incomprehensible role of Gorbachev. Most of the rulers in the new states belonged to a cohort of workers in the CPSU party apparatus, and most of the oligarchs and "new" Russians in the past belonged to the party or Komsomol elite. Before the eyes of the whole people, active supporters of the policy of the CPSU turned into its fierce enemies. Calls for a "witch hunt" began, however, they were soon suspended, since this clearly could affect them themselves.

The people were deceived.

Links:
1. Ogarkov and operation "Herat"
2. Akhromeev Sergey Fedorovich
3. Gorbacheva Raisa Maksimovna (ur. Titarenko)
17.

The first and last president of the USSR began to carry out actions leading to the destruction of his country. In order to stop this madness, a few brave people decided to remove Gorbachev, and staged a coup, while forming a structure called the State Emergency Committee. Deciphering the State Emergency Committee uncomplicated and simple, this abbreviation means State Committee for the State of Emergency. Before continuing, I want to recommend you some popular publications, for example, how to understand the word Label, what does Light mean, what is Casual? In the history of the Soviet Union, it was the most short-lived politic system. Yeltsin, supported by Western intelligence agencies, arranged " orange revolution". At that time it was surprising and incomprehensible, now these technologies are an "open book".

In general, people, obeying the actions of the puppeteer, completely forget that not one coup, not a single revolution brought prosperity, on the contrary, the standard of living of the population was rapidly declining. We will not cite Ukraine as an example, everything here is so banal and clear that it even takes surprise that there are people who believe in this nonsense.

GKChP- The State Committee for the State of Emergency, this is a self-proclaimed authority in the USSR, which lasted only a few days from August 18 to 21, 1991, and peacefully rested in a bose

Against the backdrop of unfolding burning events, Pavlov carried out his monetary reform by issuing coins of the 1991 sample, which participated in circulation until 09/26/93. Then another reform was carried out, after which all banknotes release from 1961 to 1992 year ordered to live long.

Interestingly, it is the coins of 1991 with the Spasskaya Tower of the Kremlin on the obverse and the building of the Supreme Council on the reverse that are now called the coins of the State Emergency Committee. Although, in fact, nothing GKChP they do not, because Pavlov conceived his reform much earlier, and their release began a few months before this shameful event. However, to make it easier to distinguish between coins with the same denomination and issued in the same country, they came up with this name, which gave them a certain amount of mystery.

Coins of the State Committee for the State of Emergency- this is money that came into being thanks to the Pavlovian reform, and coincided in time with a series of extremely unpleasant events for the USSR

The events of the August coup, the creation and inglorious decline of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991, have acquired a huge number of versions of "what it was" and "why it happened." Can the actions of the GKChP be called a coup d'état, and what did the putschists actually achieve?

Secrets of the referendum 03/17/1991 on "life and death of the USSR"

Despite the ensuing years of litigation, numerous public performance participants in the coup and its opponents, the final clarity is still missing. And probably never will.

In fact, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR was active from 10 to 21 August 1991. The main declared goal at first was to prevent the collapse of the USSR: the exit to the members of the GKChP was seen in the new Union Treaty, which Gorbachev planned to sign. The treaty provided for the transformation of the Union into a confederation, and not from 15, but from nine republics. Not without reason, the putschists saw this as the beginning of the end of the Soviet state.

And this is where the differences begin. It would seem that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was the main supporter of the Union Treaty. The main opponents are members and supporters of the State Emergency Committee. But later, at the trial and beyond, one of the leaders of the putsch, Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev, argued that "the documents of the GKChP were developed on behalf of Gorbachev," and other participants in that process generally noted that the prototype of the GKChP was created on March 28, 1991 on meeting with Gorbachev and with his "blessing".

The next moment is the behavior of the putschists already in the course of the events themselves in relation to the then head of the USSR. It is worth recalling that in those days he went on vacation to the Foros dacha in the Crimea. Knowing at the same time that everything is completely restless in the country, that the people and a huge part of the party and state nomenklatura are dissatisfied with "Perestroika", and, moreover, knowing the attitude towards the reformatting of the USSR, in which the citizens of the Union saw simply the dismantling of the country. The referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held on March 17, 1991, and most of citizens spoke out for the territorial integrity of the state.

By the way, this is exactly why the terms "putsch", "revolution" and "coup" in the strict sense are in no way suitable for defining the activities of the State Committee. The participants of the GKChP just advocated the preservation of the country, its integrity, sovereignty and the preservation of the staus quo, with the curtailment of the most odious perestroika initiatives.

Moreover, when it finally became clear that the GKChP case was lost, the putschists first of all sent a delegation back to Gorbachev at Foros, and some of them were arrested at the moment when they got off the plane in Moscow, which flew with Gorbachev.

The events of the three days of August themselves also represent something devoid of logic at first glance. On the one hand, members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency declare that Mikhail Gorbachev is unable to govern the country for health reasons, and so on. about. Yanaev becomes the President of the USSR, but at Gorbachev's dacha they turn off the telephone connection only in his office. Communication worked perfectly not only in the guard house, but also in the cars of the presidential motorcade. And, moreover, it later turns out that at the dacha "Mikhail Sergeevich has been actively working all these days and signing decrees."

Another goal was the removal from power of Boris Yeltsin, the then president of the RSFSR and, it seems, already at that time a political opponent of Gorbachev. But this elimination did not happen either by detention or by ambush in the forest along the route of the presidential cortege from the dacha to Moscow.

It did not happen in Moscow either, although there were all the possibilities. Troops had already been brought into the capital, and the people had not yet begun to gather around the White House, where Yeltsin had arrived. Moreover, according to some versions, Yeltsin's guards, consisting of KGB officers, were ready to "localize the object", but did not receive the corresponding order, although one of the putschists was the head of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov.

In general, the very composition of the participants in this State Committee leads to complete bewilderment as to why they did not succeed in what they had planned. Among the "putschists" were the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the minister of defense, and, as mentioned above, the head of the KGB, and the prime minister with the vice president. But the coup failed and they all ended up in the dock.

There are, of course, a number of conspiracy theories. One of them was once voiced by Mikhail Poltoranin, the press minister and Yeltsin's supporter during the coup. It boils down to the fact that the putsch was Gorbachev's greatest provocation.

According to this Soviet and Russian official, "Gorbachev used them (GKChP. - Ed.) in the dark. In his characteristic manner, he said or hinted: men, we are losing power, the country. I myself cannot return the USSR to the desired mode of functioning, I have the image of a democrat in the world. I'm going on vacation, you tighten the screws here, close the newspapers. I'll be back, I'll unscrew some nuts, the world will calm down. The people who got into the GKChP sincerely wanted to save the country. When everything started spinning, they rushed to him: come back, Mikhail Sergeyevich. And he washed his hands: I don't know anything. The Moors have done their job."

This version finds indirect confirmation in Gorbachev's policy towards the CPSU. The fact is that Mikhail Sergeevich tried with all his might to reduce the influence of the party both on himself and on the state as a whole. And as a result of the suppression of the GKChP, the activities of the CPSU were suspended, and then, literally a few months later, the party was completely dissolved. But the problem is that the presence of the Communist Party did not suit not only Gorbachev, but also Yeltsin, who, apart from the party, was not satisfied with Gorbachev himself.

And on this occasion, there is another version in which it was Yeltsin who became the main beneficiary of the putsch and it was he who, at least, knew about the upcoming events, as he knew that nothing bad would happen to him. Mikhail Vasilyev writes about this in his investigative material.

According to him, “Gorbachev in 1991 as a leader suited only an insignificant group of bureaucrats. Patriots who could not forgive him for scandalous concessions to the West, and democrats who dreamed of overthrowing the central government, and the rapidly impoverished people dreamed of his departure. one powerful force without a clear leader, but with great potential.

Part of the party elite and special services took a clear course towards the capitalization of the USSR in order to privatize its immense resources. And they didn't need the talker Gorby. But who will replace him? Where can one find such a leader of "one blood" who would speak the same language with them, but be popular among the people? After all, otherwise the change of the social order would be impossible.

The answer lies on the surface - it's Boris Yeltsin.

Further, the author leads to the fact that the head of the KGB and one of the putschists, Kryuchkov, was in collusion with Yeltsin and understood how everything would end in the end. However, this version has one very significant inconsistency, namely, Yeltsin's hot, to the point of exceeding his own authority, desire to condemn and imprison the putschists.

In general, it’s worth starting with the fact that no one was eager to plant putschists. And at the first opportunity, the prisoners were released on bail. As a result, of course, they spent from a year to a year and a half in Matrosskaya Tishina, but upon leaving, they were able not only to participate in rallies and demonstrations, but also to run and be elected to the Russian parliament. And then to fall under the amnesty, with which everything was also more than interesting. First and foremost, the amnesty was announced even before the completion of the trial, which violated procedural rules, and formal logic. How can amnesty be given to people for whom a court verdict has not yet been announced? As a result, an additional meeting had to be held in order to settle all legal norms.

Secondly, according to the memoirs of the then Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Kazannik, he called and warned Yeltsin that the State Duma would include putschists in the lists of amnestied putschists. To which, according to Kazannik, Yeltsin sharply replied: "They won't dare!" Nevertheless, they dared, and Yeltsin imposed his own resolution on this decision, which read "Kazannik, Golushko, Yerin. Do not release anyone from those arrested, but investigate the criminal case in the same order." But Kazannik refused to follow the resolution, despite telephone conversations in which Yeltsin again declared: "You wouldn't dare to do that." By the way, under that amnesty, the defenders of the White House in 1993 were also released.

Well, and most importantly, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee, Valentin Varennikov, refused the amnesty and eventually won the case in 1994. However, the rest of the putschists, even agreeing to an amnesty, in the end did not plead guilty to "high treason", and on the whole it is clear why.

As for Yeltsin's desire for a final investigation and, apparently, a guilty verdict for the members of the GKChP, there was a certain political symbolism in this. It was necessary to show that the return to the USSR is so marginal that it is simply criminal, that reverse simply no. Well, the demonstration that now he is the sovereign master in the country was also useful. However, it didn't work out. And it did not turn out so well that many high-ranking government officials, even of that time, called this court a "farce."

By the way, later the fate of most of the putschists was favorable. For the most part, they occupied high positions in state, public and commercial structures. In general, they quickly turned from the Soviet into the new Russian elite. Some of them, even despite their more than respectable age, continue to work actively until now.